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Abstract
This thesis seeks to engage, both critically and creatively, with the place of
history, experience and memory in what Marija Cetinic calls a ‘catastrophic era’,
where the violent stimuli of the modern techno-aesthetic results in a poverty of
experience. It asks the question—increasingly fraught, increasingly urgent: How
do we experience, witness and remember within the sensory deluge, shock and
surfeit of modernity?
The critical component of this thesis extends the work of Walter Benjamin (with a
particular focus on The Arcades Project and Baudelaire, which have been
positioned as Benjamin’s ‘prehistory of modernity’) and Susan Buck-Morss’
interdisciplinary writing on aesthetics, anaesthetics and narcotic modernity,
updating both scholars’ approaches for the new modernity, in which a ‘virulence
of memory’ shocks the collective consciousness into historical and contemporary
amnesia. Against the current ‘memory crisis’ of modernity, I argue that
experience, memory and empathy—a cultural ‘awakening’—are possible, and
look to literature, specifically allegory, as an alternative means of witnessing
contemporary and historical trauma, both punctual and structural. In doing so, I
introduce two original concepts. First, the thesis argues that allegory offers
simultaneous (somatic) connection to and (territorial and temporal) distance from
the sites of trauma, allowing a reader to engage—as ‘intimate-distant witness’—
without activating the protective shock reflexes that inhibit experience and
memory. Secondly, I argue that the intimate-distant landscape of allegory
encourages ‘empathic synaesthesia’, wherein the pain of others’ trauma can be
felt, indirectly but somatically, as referred pain or referred sensation.
My theoretical framework is then used to analyse two contemporary allegorical
novels: Téa Obreht’s The Tiger’s Wife, which represents the punctual trauma of
the Balkan war(s), and Charlotte Wood’s The Natural Way of Things, which
speaks to the structural trauma of gender and the punctual trauma of the Hay Girls
Institute. The thesis also includes a textual analysis of my novel, The Memory
Addicts, which forms the second (creative) component of this thesis, and shares
the same central concerns as the critical exploration. The novel, set in a world
overrun and overwhelmed by memory, asks impossible questions about how we
i

bear witness and how we live with the past without betraying the present. Within
its allegorical thread (the Island of Lorne), the text also represents the trauma of
transinstitutionalisation within boarding houses, wondering what it means to have
too much and what it costs to have too little, to lie awake worrying that even
that—even you—can be taken away.

ii
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Introduction
A crisis of memory
The mass perception of loss has elicited a memory crisis in contemporary
culture.
—Charity Scribner1
…historically traumatic events simultaneously summon forgetting and
remembrance. In their shockingness and extremity of horror, such events
impel a forgetfulness or displacement at the same time that they
repeatedly return, on emotional and ethical terms, for private and public
consideration.
—Roger Simon and Claudia Eppert (1997, p. 123)
It is not an accident that there has been a proliferation of research into various
facets of memory in recent years; the modern techno-aesthetic is an assault—of
information, narrative, entertainment, attention, emotion and, of course, memory,
both the personal and the collective. We are drowning in memory. Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the 24-hour news cycle: a deluge of content that bleeds
into our personal news streams, creating a hamster wheel of social media updates,
news bulletins, news alerts and push notifications, all demanding witness.
Memory is an onslaught, and its presence is relentless.
The study of memory has been equally persistent. What Charity Scribner (in her
critical theory and cultural studies work) calls a ‘memory crisis’ is framed
variously as threat, opportunity and curiosity in the various interdisciplinary fields
concerned with memory. From medical research into improving or restoring the
brain’s capacity for memory, through to the tech industry’s exponential expansion
of our digital storage capacity, memory is an increasingly important research
domain. Culturally, questions of memory seem both fraught and imperative
against the backdrop of mobile use and social media, where memories are
1

Scribner 2003, p. 300
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documented more regularly—and shared more widely—than ever before. This
deluge is not without cost: users are confronted by a barrage of information,
memory, news and trauma, from a range of close and distance sources, and the
effect of this oversupply is increasingly pathologised in terms like addiction and
can, I will argue, lead to an amnesia of overwhelm.
Historical memory, too, has been the subject of increased emphasis in the Western
political sphere. In the introduction to her book Committing the Future to
Memory: History, Experience, Trauma (2013, p. 3), philosopher Sarah Clift cites
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Rwanda as examples of sites of recent historical trauma
whose names are invoked in political discourse as part of a wider pledge to
committing events to public memory and consciousness.2 In adopting the ethos of
‘Never Forget’ as a traumatic reminder or warning, Clift argues, politicians have
extended the role of memory well beyond recollections of the past for the sake of
prosperity, national consolation or memorial celebration: “The injunction of
‘Never Forget’ has become virtually indiscernible from the future-orientated
promise of ‘Never Again.’ Memory has thus been given the task of creating a
better future by virtue of past events that must remain passed—that is, safely
located in the past.” This traumatic reminder—Never Forget—applies equally to
the national, the local and the hyperlocal; it is echoed in the discourse around gun
violence, gendered violence and death or injury in combat or emergency services.
And yet, however strong and urgent the imperative to remember, within the
information deluge of modernity, events are collectively forgotten—or, indeed,
never deeply experienced at all.
While digital memory may be almost limitless, human memory is not. The sheer
volume of digital information exposure—and the rate at which this increases—
makes it difficult to accurately assess the quantity of information processed or the
impact it may have on a person’s cognitive processes, memory and narrative
coherence, except insofar as knowing the scale is vast and the effects are likely to

2

To this, I could add Syria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Nauru, Afghanistan, Somalia, West Papua …
a harrowing and incomplete list of large-scale historical catastrophes, which have unfolded or
progressed in the course of writing this thesis and which have—sometimes even before they have
finished unfolding—been submerged by the flow of the relentless, fast-moving news cycle.
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be substantial. One of the few studies that quantifies, on a meaningful scale, the
quantity of information modern life exposes us to is The University of
California’s Global Information Industry Centre’s 2009 How Much Information?
Report (Bohn & Short, 2009; even this is already woefully out-dated in the fastchanging field in which it is situated), which found that in 2008 the average
American encountered 100,500 words, 11.8 hours of data or 34 gigabytes per day
from sources ranging from newspapers and books to games, radio, television and
online. While the report is careful to differentiate between storage and
consumption of information, it is clear that the volume of information modern,
Western citizens are exposed to is enormous. How then do we situate discussion
of memory, history and trauma within a modern experience of a “virulence of
memory” (Assmann 1992, in Clift 2013)—a “world saturated with memory”
(Clift 2013, p. 1)? As Clift asserts:
[T]he political, ethical, and epistemological questions regarding how we
remember have become some of the most important, and some of the most
disquieted, questions of our time. The demonstrable rise of secular practices
of historical memory attests to this disquiet, as do the proliferation of
theoretical attempts to understand the significance of this problem.
It is not just against this climate of disquiet about memory that I have conducted
this research, it is because of it, and this is not just a political crisis but also a
personal one. As a former journalist, I have felt the harrowing speed of the 24hour news cycle and the need to move from one narrative onto the next, even as
the events of the first continue to unfold. I know the frustration of seeing
important stories lost in the constant turnover. As a news and media consumer, I
routinely feel overwhelmed by the unending stream of news and information—
increasingly needing to (again, in pathological terms) detox from the technoaesthetic while simultaneously carrying the guilt of turning away from stories that
I have the responsibility to see, feel outraged about, perhaps even try to prevent.
My phone has 63 apps, four feeds, a rolling barrage of notifications and alerts—
on my computer, I am drowning in dozens of open browser tabs. As my devices
constantly alert me to the fact that they are running out of storage, my mind feels
similarly fragmented and depleted. I am running out of ways to store, comprehend
and filter it all. And yet, I continue to believe that it is crucial that we witness
history—and indeed the present—both because of history’s role as reflection of
3

the past, but more importantly as engagement with the future.
In this new ‘crisis of memory’—fuelled by a 24-hour news format that cycles
through images of traumas on an ongoing basis—it is not only the past that is
forgotten, but also the present. Events and traumas are lost from public
consciousness, discourse and memory, even as they are taking place. It is this
disjuncture—the gulf between the imperative to witness and the fatigue and
impossibility of it—that drove this research, prompting the following questions:
•

How do we experience, witness and remember within the sensory deluge,
shock and surfeit of modernity?

•

Are there alternative ways to narrate and witness traumatic histories? If so,
do alternative modes of remembering offer alternative opportunities for
empathic engagement with trauma?

•

Does fiction, specifically allegory, offer enough distance from real events to
allow an overloaded audience to connect more deeply with others’ trauma
and to commit events to experience and memory? Can the simultaneous
distance and closeness of allegory offer pathways to empathic engagement
with history and trauma?

As both creative and critical engagement, this thesis will interrogate these
questions.
Trauma, testimony and witness
There is, of course, a robust body of literature that examines the role of testimony
and witness in moving, not past, but ‘through’ the unrepresentable nature of
trauma. Trauma theory3 has been the focus of increased interest since the 1990s,
and while it is not the intention of this thesis to draw on its scholars as a central
methodological framework, it is necessary to foreground my argument within the
locus of trauma theory for two reasons. Firstly, because this thesis accepts trauma
theory’s assumption that the act of traumatic recovery takes place in relation to a
witness. Secondly, because this thesis examines one of the underexplored barriers
3

The term ‘trauma theory’ first appears in Cathy Caruth’s monograph Unclaimed Experience:
Trauma, Narrative and History (1996), but its seminal works—Caruth’s edited collection Trauma:
Explorations in Memory (1995) and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s Testimony: Crisis of
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (1992)—preceded this term.
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to witness: that is, I will suggest the act of witnessing is under threat because the
conditions of modernity compromise the nature of experience, as a precursor to
collective memory. It is, therefore, necessary to outline the central arguments of
trauma theory before introducing my methodological framework.
Trauma theory applies the theoretical frameworks of psychology4 to the study of
postcolonialism as a means of seeking to understand the traumatic legacies of
history (from the colonial traumas of slavery, indenture, forced migration and
colonisation) to sites of more recent punctual trauma (such as genocide, war,
disaster and displacement). According to Felman and Laub (1992), trauma leaves
a landscape of ‘traceless traces’ and while the experience of trauma is, in itself,
unrepresentable, unacknowledgable and often unnameable, a deferred
acknowledgement of it—the buried, the forgotten, the unspeakable—is possible
through the act of testimony, which demands a witness. It is important to note that
trauma theory’s seminal scholars (Felman and Laub, Caruth and LaCapra) all
foreground the act of testimony within the context of witnessing, insisting that it
is only within this relation that testimony can be made to trauma’s ‘traceless
traces’. Unheard testimony inhibits healing because it traps the survivor in an
experience without end:
Trauma survivors live not with memories of the past, but with an event that
could and did not proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attained
no closure, and therefore, as far as its survivors are concerned, continues
into the present and is current in every respect (Felman & Laub, p. 69).
Trauma theorists acknowledge the privileged position of literature in giving voice
to events that defy understanding and representation. Postcolonial creative acts, it
is argued, can move ‘through’ the many crises of traumatic testimony—its
belatedness, its indigestibility, its traumatic disruption—by offering narrative
structures that are, in themselves, disrupted/disrupting and
destabilised/destabilising. In discussing Shoah as representative of the potential of
literature more broadly, Felman and Laub (p. 206, original emphasis) cite:
…the capacity of art not simply to witness but to take the witness stand: the
film takes responsibility for its times by enacting the significance of our era
as an age of testimony… Shoah gives us to witness a historical crisis of
4

Notably, the work of Dominick LaCapra and Marianne Hirsh, which both build on Freud’s
frameworks as their foundation.
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witnessing, and shows us how, out of this crisis, witnessing becomes, in all
senses of the word, a critical activity.
However, while the trauma literature presents a compelling case for engaging
with and carrying forward the past, the task it advocates is difficult and potentially
problematic for both the survivors of trauma and its witnesses. Homi K. Bhabha
(1994, p. 63) challenges the notion of remembering as a “quiet act of
retrospection”, suggesting that testimony “is a painful re-membering, a putting
together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present”. The
cost of this re-membering (even when framed as the empathetic recovery of the
voices of traumatised testifiers) and the potential for exploitation, eroticisation or
aestheticisation of such stories must necessarily be considered. Radstone (2007),
Ward (2013), Craps and Buelens (2008), Herrero and Baelo-Allué (2011) and
Centinic (2010) are among the scholars who have challenged trauma theorists to
adopt a more self-reflexive and critical approach to the discipline, in part to
ensure that such acts of testimony are not “at the expense of those for whom
trauma criticism claims to speak” (Radstone, p. 23), and in part to broaden the
spectrum of texts considered under trauma theory. That is, to include more nonWestern texts (and indeed, more diverse modes of storytelling) and to expand
beyond the tendency to focus on ‘punctual’ (singular, traumatic, usually Western
historical events) to include the structural trauma of race, gender, sexual identity,
class and other inequalities. While the discipline has yet to resolve these issues,
this critical acknowledgement is movement in the right direction.
However, while the focus on survivor and testimony is vital, the existing body of
trauma literature fails to adequately address the limitations and threats imposed on
the act of witnessing trauma. Within this gap in scholarship, my thesis will thus
address a specific threat to the role of witness in the case of contemporary and
historical trauma: it will argue that in the context of modernity, the task of witness
(and by extension, the capacity for personal and collective memory) is threatened
by the violent and frequent shocks of the techno-aesthetic, the proliferation of
information and the resulting deficit of experience.5

5
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This concept will be defined shortly, as the focus of the first chapter.

Methodology
The critical component of this two-part thesis will use the work of Walter
Benjamin and Susan Buck-Morss as a theoretical framework to argue that the
shocks of modernity threaten the very nature of experience, separating present
experience from historical memory and ‘numbing’ the public to events’ impact. I
will also draw on and refer to the work of a range of other scholars, including
Benjamin scholars (particularly Richard Wolin, Uwe Steiner and David Frisby),
trauma scholars (including Cathy Caruth, Dominick LaCapra, David Eng and
David Kazanjian), allegory theorists (Kate Jenckes, Marcus Fabius Quintilian and
Maureen Quilligan) and a range of interdisciplinary memory and modernity
scholars (particularly John Scanlan, Sarah Clift and Rosalind Morris) to develop
and foreground my arguments.
Under what Buck-Morss (in the 1990s) calls the modern anaesthetic, amnesia of
the event is possible, even as it is unfolding, and sites of contemporary trauma are
forgotten before they have even dropped off the news agenda and been relegated
to the domain of the past. As an original contribution to the field, I update these
frameworks in the context of the 21st century techno-aesthetic and further develop
Buck-Morss’ conception of a somatic consciousness to propose that allegory, as
embodiment of history and memory and act of testimony and witness, has the
potential to generate what I call ‘empathic synaesthesia’—referred pain, or
referred sensation. I will argue that through allegory, the ‘intimate-distant
witness’ can experience empathic and critical engagement with past and present
trauma without activating the shock reflexes that diminish experience. Allegory
circumvents shock and allows for experience and empathic engagement in the
following ways:
1. Allegory creates a subjective space for simultaneous connection to and
remoteness from the sites of trauma—an ‘intimate distance’ from punctual
and structural trauma.
2. While the techno-aesthetic threatens temporality and space, allegory offers
frameworks to transport traumas from their temporal and territorial settings
as events that are both urgent and timeless, close and distant.
7

3. As embodiment of trauma, allegory situates the traumatic narrative in the
body but not the self, which heightens opportunities for critical cognition.
My concept of empathic synaesthesia offers fresh opportunities for critical
engagement with literary texts as well as ways for writers to frame their creative
processes within the broader debate on the ethics of historical memory. Within
this first, critical, component of the thesis, I demonstrate the utility of my
concepts of intimate-distant witness and empathic synaesthesia through my
analysis of two allegorical texts: Téa Obreht’s The Tiger’s Wife (which speaks to
a punctual trauma) and Charlotte Wood’s The Natural Way of Things (which is
concerned with structural trauma). I note that these novels are part of a long and
wide literary tradition of allegorical or semi-allegorical texts that apply the
structures and conventions of the genre to traumatic history, including the works
of Toni Morrison, Paulo Coelho, George Orwell, Mikhail Bulgakov, Franz Kafka,
Isabel Allende and many others. There are a great many texts I could have chosen
for analysis, some of which engage more directly with issues of memory and
forgetting. For example, Yōko Ogawa’s The Memory Police (in which a village
practices the quiet rituals of enforced disappearance), Kazuo Ishiguro’s The
Buried Giant (which can be read as an allegory of historical amnesia) and Janet
Frames’ The Carpathians (in which a memory flower holds both past and future
memories), all have creative and critical resonances with my work. Trauma
theorists Roger Luckhurst (2008), Anne Whitehead (2004) and Matthew Mead
(2014) all acknowledge a specific body of literature that inspired early scholarly
work within the discipline, including Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987), Margaret
Atwood’s Cat’s Eye (1988), Anne Michael’s Fugitive Pieces (1996) and J.M.
Coetzee’s work, particularly The Master of Petersburg (1994). These texts,
however, are preceded by body of Spanish-language works arising from the Civil
War and Franco dictatorship, including the work of Arturo Barea, Ana María
Matute, Ignacio Aldecoa and María Zambrano. In their introduction to Memory
and Trauma in the Postwar Spanish Novel: Revisiting the Past, Sarah Leggott and
Ross Woods (2013, p. 7) examine the recent critical interest in these, and pre-war,
Spanish texts; what they conceptualise as “an obsession with the past” (in the
context of literary texts and the “growth of so-called memory studies in literary
8

scholarship”) may well align with an interdisciplinary international interest in
memory, the past and modernity, which will be outlined in Chapter One of this
thesis. Efforts to decolonialise the discipline of trauma studies have also focused
on a wide range of non-Western texts, including, for example, Ayi Kwei Armah’s
Fragments (1970), Lisa Fugard’s Skinner’s Drift (2006), Achmat Dangor’s
Kafka’s Curse (1997), Chris Abani’s Song for night (2007), K. Sello Suiker’s The
Quiet Violence of Dreams (2001), Haruki Murakami’s work, particularly After the
Quake (2002) and Melissa Lucashenko’s Hard Yards (1999). This is by no means
an exhaustive list. While the frameworks developed within this thesis could
certainly be applied to other texts, The Tiger’s Wife and The Natural Way of
Things have been selected primarily because they share a somatic approach to
allegory (as embodied memory), the allegorical components of both novels are
substantial and structural elements, and because they represent deep, embodied
engagement with a punctual and structural trauma, respectively.
To contain the scope of this thesis, textual analysis will be limited to:
•

Narrative context.

•

The ‘intimate-distance’ offered by the allegorical space within the text,
and the mode’s ability to generate both (temporal and territorial) distance
from and (somatic) connection to trauma. This, I will argue, situates the
reader as intimate-distant witness.

•

The way the allegorical components of the novels situate punctual and
structural trauma within the body, giving form to the ‘traceless traces’ of
trauma and offering opportunities for empathic synaesthesia.

The second part of this thesis is a creative work, which (as practice-led research)
interrogates the contemporary crises of experience and memory and also applies
the frameworks of intimate-distant witness and empathic synaesthesia through
allegory. The relationship between critical research and creative work is
symbiotic; my novel, The Memory Addicts, is both explicitly and implicitly
concerned with the same research questions as the thesis. Specifically, not only is
it thematically concerned with the surfeit of modernity (Finn, the protagonist, is
the allegorical embodiment of the contemporary crisis of experience), but also the
9

novel, as an allegorical artefact, addresses the punctual trauma of boarding houses
during deinstitutionalisation of mental health facilities in industrialised countries
(including Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) in
the 1970s and 1980s and the structural trauma of gender and mental illness. This
application of my critical interrogation of memory, experience and empathy will
be explored within an exegetical chapter within this thesis.
While the exegetical chapter of this thesis is confined to development of my
central theoretical arguments, I would also like to acknowledge that a number of
allegorical novels inspired or underpinned aspects of both the creative and critical
components of this thesis, in direct and indirect ways. In particular, Borges’
Funes the Memorius, in which the protagonist is cursed with perfect memory (in
Funes’ case, a fictional condition that has some overlap with my novel protagonist
Finn’s non-fictional hyperthymesia) was instrumental in imagining and
articulating the burdens of infinite memory and their impacts on thought,
processing and empathy. Within the short story, the narrator’s final reflections on
Funes’ condition are stripped of the wonder with which it is initially introduced:
“I suspect, however, that he was not very capable of thought. To think is to forget
differences, generalize, make abstractions. In the teaming world of Funes, there
were only details, almost immediate in their presence” (p. 154). These lines may
reflect Benjamin and Buck-Morrs’ concerns about the pervasive weight of
information and stimulation-overwhelm, which are detailed in Chapter 1 of this
thesis. Moreover, in my creative work, both Funes and the narrator’s mournful
response to his affliction6 influenced development of my novel’s protagonist and
secondary characters. Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Unconsoled (1995) also made me
think deeply about trauma, temporal disruption and the ways individual characters
might inhabit conflicting timescapes. Ishiguro’s novel focuses on an amnesiac
pianist, Ryder, who is dislocated from the present; Ishiguro’s structural and
rhetorical techniques helped inform the ways characters in my novel experience
and engage with time differently and deepened my understanding of trauma
theory’s analysis of the unending nature of trauma. Matthew Mead’s (2014) astute
6

The narrator concludes: “I thought that each of my words (that each of my movements) would
persist in his implacable memory; I was benumbed by the fear of multiplying useless gestures” p.
154.
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analysis of the grammar of Ryder’s dislodgement from time within The
Unconsoled, particularly the use of past-tense phrases like “I remembered” and “I
recalled” (pp. 505-509), was also helpful. Finally, Yann Martel’s The Life of Pi
(2001) inspired the ways in which the novel engages with the unreliability of
memory, and Martel’s conception of writing and reading the other as an act of
“empathic imagination” (in Sielke 2003, p. 25) allowed me to engage with the
idea of inherited memory as a border-crossing into others’ insights and suffering.
Outline of Chapters
In order to address the topics outlined thus far, the thesis will be structured as
follows: Chapter One will establish how modernity and the techno-aesthetic
threaten personal and collective memory, drawing on the work of both Benjamin
and Buck-Morss, whose work is premised on a Freudian understanding of shock.
I will situate these scholars’ ideas within our own, contemporary, crisis of
memory: the modern anaesthetic. In Chapter Two, I will expand on Buck-Morss’
work on somatic consciousness as a means of circumventing the shock reflex,
drawing on the discourse around allegory, which I suggest is a mode of
storytelling that provides both distance from and connection to historical and
contemporary, structural and punctual trauma. In this chapter, I will introduce and
define my concept of the intimate-distant witness and explore the possibilities
allegory offers for empathic synaesthesia. In doing so, I will establish the scope,
limitations and methodology for the textual analysis. In Chapter Three, I will
apply these concepts to Téa Obreht’s novel, The Tiger’s Wife. Set in an unnamed
(fictionalised) Balkan country, this text serves to illustrate both the barriers to
witness (its protagonist Natalia can neither articulate nor fully experience the
trauma of war) and the capacity for allegory, as embodiment of trauma and
memory, to offer alternative pathways to witness. I will first discuss the
geographic and temporal distance offered by the allegory and then examine the
somatic connection the narrative offers and the potential for empathic
synaesthesia. While the novel contains two allegorical threads, discussion will
centre on the tiger narratives, in particular, as representative of punctual trauma.
In Chapter Four, I will examine Charlotte Wood’s The Natural Way of Things,
employing the same methodological process as Chapter 3. This allegorical text
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has been chosen as an example of a structural trauma (with roots also in a
punctual one); my analysis will focus on the way the text represents internalised
shame and the female body, the trauma of assault and the threat of assault and the
corporeal legacy of trauma. Chapter Five applies these frameworks to my own
novel, The Memory Addicts (which, as a separate artefact, constitutes Part 2 of
this thesis), focusing on inherited trauma and the structural trauma of gender and
mental illness. Finally, the conclusion will revisit the potential for empathic
synaesthesia to facilitate a quiet ‘awakening’ from the narcotic surfeit of
modernity.
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Chapter 1
A moment of danger: the atrophy of modern experience
Lost in the mean world, jostled by the crowd, I am like a weary man
whose eye, looking backwards, into the depth of the years, sees nothing
but disillusion and bitterness, and before him nothing but a tempest.
— Baudelaire7
We use the word ‘connection’ to describe our relationship with technology and,
within the phantasmagoria of modern life, it is possible to be ‘connected’ for
almost every waking moment. We might listen to podcasts while walking the dog,
play music on waterproof speakers in the shower, update social media feeds on
the train, check the news in the coffee line, drown in emails and then come home,
exhausted from the onslaught, to stream television late into the night. To call this
kind of engagement ‘connection’ is a dangerous irony; the more connected we
become to the techno-aesthetic, the greater the distance from our immediate
surroundings, emotions and indeed experience itself. This chapter examines the
various ‘atrophies of experience’ facilitated by modernity and the technoaesthetic, drawing primarily on Walter Benjamin and Susan Buck-Morss.
Through the lens of their work, I will look in two places for an understanding of
and awakening from this atrophy of experience: the past, and the body.
Walter Benjamin’s prehistory of modernity
Benjamin’s notions of historical materialism, aesthetics, modernity and
experience, written during the ‘moment of danger’ of 1930s fascism, hold
valuable parallels for the current time, and recent interest in his work8 reflects
this. An interdisciplinary body of research on the perils of modernity, particularly
as applied to history and memory, draws heavily on the works of Arendt, Brecht,
7

Walter Benjamin, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ in Illuminations, Hannah Arendt (ed.) and
Harry Zohn (trans.) 1968, p. 193.
8
Between 2005-2010, more than 300 books and articles on Walter Benjamin were published, in
the English language alone (Kaufmann 2010). In part, reinvigorated interest in his work can be
attributed to Harvard editions of Selected Writings (1996-2003) and the Arcades Project (1999)
making the texts widely available to an English-speaking audience (Duttlinger 2007)—resulting
in, for example, Uwe Steiner’s Walter Benjamin (2004) and David Ferris’ The Cambridge
Companion to Walter Benjamin (2004).
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Locke, Hegel, Blanchot, Simmel, Nietzsche and Baudelaire, but Benjamin is by
far the most cited thinker in this expanding field. Benjamin’s work in The Arcades
Project, Baudelaire and, to a lesser extent, The Storyteller, has been described as
a “pre-history of modernity”, exploring the “increasing atrophy of experience”
(Frisby 2013, p. 260) in ways that remain both challenging and relevant. For
example, in Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the Work of
Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin, David Frisby identifies Benjamin as the scholar
most directly linked to recent discussion of modernity: “In particular… Benjamin
sought to investigate an important dimension in the experience of modernity: the
radical discontinuity of experience that is implicit in the fleeting, transitory and
the fortuitous and is manifested as the shock or the sensation of the ever-new” (p.
260).9
In using Benjamin as a theoretical framework, it is important to acknowledge
some of the associated challenges. Although frequently read as a body of work,
Benjamin’s texts (written between 1913 and 1940) are thematically diverse and
contain traces of his own life during periods of great upheaval. At times the texts
oscillate between dichotomies with “maddening” inconsistency (Steinberg 1996,
p. 152). For this reason, attempts to find coherence within his oeuvre and classify
his theories are problematic. Benjamin has been labelled as literary, theological,
Marxist, materialist, Manichean and deconstructivist—as David Kaufmann (2010,
n.p.) suggests: “Benjamin had no trouble trying on others’ thoughts to see if they
fit”. Richard Wolin, whose biography Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of
Redemption (1994) is credited with being one of the clearest and most insightful
introductions to the scholar available, also acknowledges the inherent challenges
in classifying Benjamin’s work: “… it takes on the form of a series of
contradictions, a network of discontinuous extremes—in no uncertain terms, it
assumes the form of a ruin.” (p. 251)
This chapter does not seek to add to the body of literature attempting to classify

9

Similarly, Benjamin’s writings are a focal point for Christine Buci-Glucksmann in Baroque
Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity (1994), Malcolm Waters (ed) in Modernity: After Modernity
(1999), and Andrew Benjamin and Charles Rice (eds) in Walter Benjamin and the Architecture of
Modernity (2009), to name but a few.
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Benjamin’s work. The breadth of his writing—and its diverse themes—puts
discussion of the entire body of work well outside the scope of this project, and
necessitates some reliance on Benjamin scholars as well as the primary texts. It
also requires clear scope. Thus, this chapter will investigate Benjamin’s analysis
of the impact of the shock of modernity (particularly as it relates to narrative,
news, memory, history and trauma) on the structures of memory and the nature of
experience, focusing on three specific aspects:
1. Firstly, Benjamin’s work on historical materialism will be used to establish
a case for consistent and critical engagement with the past. Historical
materialism provides both an argument and model for engagement with
historical trauma.
2. Throughout The Arcades Project and Baudelaire, Benjamin explores the
impact of the shock of modernity on the nature of experience itself. He
argues that the city (and modernity) is a landscape of shock and spectacle,
and that exposure to it calls into question the possibility of experience itself.
This will be explored in order to examine contemporary barriers to witness,
and indeed the very ability to experience and witness historical and more
proximate traumas within the context of modernity. While this thesis will
also, where possible, draw on Benjamin’s theories of art and aesthetics as
context for its arguments, it will nevertheless privilege Benjamin’s later
work in instances where there are contradictions between or within texts,
particularly in relation to use of the term ‘shock’.
3. Finally, I will situate Benjamin’s work within the landscape of the 21st
century. To do so, I will focus on a specific scholarly reading of Benjamin’s
work. Susan Buck-Morss has conceptualised disengagement with the
present as a theory of modern anaesthetics and called for a return to a
critical somatic consciousness. This chapter will thus examine the
implications of Benjamin’s work: firstly through Buck-Morss’ scholarship
in the 1990s, and then in the current techno-political environment.
In the final part of this chapter, I will further interrogate Buck-Morss’
interpretations of Benjamin’s work, as well as her distinct contributions to the
fields of memory, history and the nature (and aestheticisation) of experience
(which she calls ‘modern anaesthetics’). Buck-Morss’ suggests a reappropriation
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of the aesthetic into a ‘discourse of the body’, which I will further develop into
my concepts of empathic synaesthesia and the intimate-distant witness in the
following chapter.
Historical materialism as engagement with historical trauma
Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940), as a “treatise on
political and ethical stakes of mourning remains” (Eng and Kazanjian 2003, p. 1),
underpins much of the discussion of the treatment of history in postcolonial
literature. Benjamin, in the context of rising Nazism, identifies historical
discourse as the prevailing method of transmitting the past and submits it to
critique, holding its structures to account for the disjuncture between the past and
the needs of the present. His task is to dismantle the very concept of history. He
characterises the notion of history as a means of fixing or solidifying events as
true, firm and unchanging as “the strongest narcotic of the century” (Frisby 2013,
p. 218) and claims that “historical knowledge of the truth is only possible as the
transcendence of illusion” (Frisby, p. 211). For him, the greatest danger of the
‘illusion’ of history is that its structure, framing and retelling provoke empathy
only with the victor.
In rejecting historicism as a paradigm that, in grasping for or gripping onto the
past, cements the victor’s version of events as fact, Benjamin (1940) provides a
framework in which histories can be confronted, challenged and rewritten. As a
creative process, then, Benjamin offers historical materialism as a more hopeful
means of engaging the past:
[Historical materialism] animat[es] history for future significations as well as
alternative empathies. For the historical materialist, to relive an era is not to
‘blot out everything’ one knows about ‘the later course of history’—simply to
bring memory to the past. On the contrary, reliving an era is to bring the past
to memory. It is to induce an active tension between the past and present,
between the dead and the living. In this manner, Benjamin’s historical
materialist establishes a continuing dialogue with loss and its remains. (Eng
& Kazanjian 2003, p. 1)
Instead of history’s “eternal image of the past”, Benjamin advocates engagement
with history that is original to every new present, “an after-life of that which is
understood, whose pulse can still be felt in the present” (Frisby, p. 218). In
provoking an active tension between the past and the present, Benjamin suggests
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lost histories (and, indeed, histories of loss) can be mourned, allowing for a more
open and active relationship with history—an “awakening” into history. Through
(re)animating history, we can clear a space for alternative versions of events and
engage alternative empathies, beyond identification with the victor. As Eng and
Kazanjian (p. 6) frame his work, Benjamin asks us: “to seize hold of elusive
histories that have been obscured by the historicist’s genuine image, not in order
to fix those histories and establish new genuine images or new eternal truths, but
to allow lost pasts to step into the light of a present moment of danger”.
Benjamin on the poverty of experience
While there is much discussion of Benjamin’s historical materialism as
subversion of the totalising narratives of history10, a growing body of modernity
scholars suggest that whilst history and historicism are key concepts in Theses on
the Philosophy of History, much of the text is concerned with the illusion of
progress—characteristic of the period of enormous change in which they were
written. Benjamin even frames his critique of history (“a tangle of purely factual
details”) in terms that connect it to experience: “[history is] nothing but the
residue of memorable things and events that never broke the surface of human
consciousness because they were never truly, that is politically, experienced” (p.
477).
The dangers of historicism are, for Benjamin, most clearly illustrated in the
unobtainable nature of the ideal of progress, in which the goal continuously shifts
out of reach. Benjamin transforms this ideal into “a nightmare of destruction and
indecipherability” (Clift 2013, p. 11). In Zentralpark, Benjamin says: “the concept
10

There is strong precedent for the application of Benjamin’s historical materialism to the
discussion of literary genres of the fantastic, from readings of magical realism as “liberating
engagement with the codes of imperial history” (Zamora & Faris 1995, p. 422) through to analysis
of the fantastic as a means of reanimating the past in the present (see, for example, Huggan 2007)
and even discussion of historical novels as “the site of a revisionist attitude towards the past”
(Ungari 2012, n.p.). Benjamin’s work also emerges as a unifying thread in much of the literature
on trauma fiction—from Stef Craps and Gert Buelens’ rejection of historicist and culturalist
paradigms in Postcolonial Trauma Novels (2008) to Anne Whitehead’s discussion of trauma and
landscape in Trauma Fiction (2004). Similarly, outside the context of literature, Benjamin’s
theories have been used extensively to discuss alternative discourses with historical trauma, from
representations of the holocaust (LaCapra 1996), race in post-apartheid Africa (Coombes 2003),
modern China’s struggles with globalisation (Wang 2004) and the “memory crisis” of modern
Germany’s nostalgia for a state socialism that “probably never existed” (Scribner 2002).
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of progress is to be grounded in the idea of catastrophe. The fact that it goes ‘on
and on’ is the catastrophe” (in Buck-Morss 1989, pp. 228-229).
In attempting to catalogue Benjamin’s texts for Walter Benjamin: An Introduction
to his Work and Thought (2010) Uwe Steiner suggests that it is not the notion of
history that preoccupies Benjamin, but that of progress and its impact on
experience: “[t]he real issue for him is the experience of time itself and, therefore,
the philosophical question: what are the conditions that make experience possible
in an era in which experience has become problematic?” (p. 6). Steiner traces
Benjamin’s fascination with experience, evident from his earliest school essay,
which protested the way ‘experience’ is used to undermine ‘inexperienced’ youth,
through to his unfinished magnum opus The Arcades Project (Passagen-Werk).
Experience and Poverty (1933), which argues that technological developments
have wrought a “completely new kind of wretchedness… on mankind”, is further
evidence of Benjamin’s sustained concern experience and, eventually, with
modernity’s impacts on experience. Steiner (p. 2) suggests:
What unifies these studies thematically—studies ranging from ‘The Work of
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility’ through to the ‘expose’
of ‘The Arcades Project’ to the essays on Baudelaire—is Benjamin’s attempt,
grounded in a philosophy of history, to render the nineteenth century as the a
priori for all critical insights into the present era, and this to make this era
intellectually perceptible as the prehistory of its own time.
Similarly, Frisby (2013) repeatedly describes Benjamin’s work as a “prehistory of
modernity”, and while this focus is apparent throughout the Baudelaire studies,
early writing, The Storyteller and Theses on the Philosophy of History, nowhere is
this more clearly articulated than in The Arcades Project. It is this work, primarily
written in the ’20s and ’30s, that has become ingrained in cultural theory as the
cornerstone perspective on modernity and the metropolis.
Unearthing modernity from the phantasmagoria of the Arcades
The Arcades Project is a strange and complex object, caught between genres and
incomplete (and mostly unpublished) at Benjamin’s death in 1940. It began as a
brief article on the arcades but extended to include his work on modernity,
Baudelaire, shock and the city. The unorthodox historical project, which he called
his “dialectical fairy tale” (quoted in Scanlan 2013, p. 54), is an attempt to
18

“retrieve the past from the forgotten topographies of the Parisian Arcades”
(Hanssen 2006, p. 2) and awaken readers from the myth of progress. In short,
Benjamin hoped to develop “a materialist history that disenchants the industrial
dreamworld of commodities and yet rescues the utopian desire that it engendered
for the purpose of social transformation” (Buck-Morss 1995, p. 7).
Benjamin’s arcades are “dream-houses of the collective” (Benjamin in BuckMorss 1995, p. 5), remnants of the past caught in time and half-forgotten but
firmly established phantasmagorias on the threshold to a world of fantasy and
illusion. Rather than celebrating modernity, he undermines it through rendering
the dream-images of capitalism transparent. He describes the iconography of the
arcades as “the original temples of commodity capitalism” (in Buck-Morss 1995,
p. 5), constructed in the shape of a cross and with commodities displayed as idols
in their gas-lit windows: “The arcades initiated a cult of commodities that gave
material expression to the promise of happiness for the urban masses, a social
utopia to be delivered by means of the new industrial power.” As the industrial
metropolis grew into a dazzling, large-scale techno-aesthetic of department stores
and entertainment complexes, the original arcades became ruins, shadows of
another era. Within the new phantasmagoria of the department store, shoppers
could, for the first time, see the entire array of exoticised and eroticised products
at once: a landscape in which commodities masked the conditions of their
production, distance and deception were built into the nature of the shopping
experience, and shoppers willingly bought into the mass distractions of
commodification, fashion, marketing, branding and entertainment. Similarly,
Benjamin also tries to expose the world exhibitions as “the places of pilgrimage to
the commodity fetish” (in The Arcades Project, p. 7), where the public entered as
spectators hoping to be distracted. In highlighting the contradictions of these
structures, Benjamin hoped to expose the phantasmagorias of the 19th century and
awaken the public to their deceptions—the way they aestheticized products,
politics and art, alienating events, arguments and histories from lived experience.
In this sense, he takes on Marx’s aims of “waking the world… from its dream
about itself” (Frisby, p. 230). He also takes on Marx’s concept of the
phantasmagoria, which he uses to describe the way in which objects’ aesthetics
demand an amnesia of their origin and labour, instead cloaking themselves in the
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imagery of the viewer’s dreams and fantasies.
Beyond exposing the phantasmagorias of the 19th century, Benjamin advocates for
an awakening from their distractions, a concept deeply rooted in the nature of
experience. He wishes to rouse the collective from the narcotic effects of
modernity: historicism, aestheticisation, sensory alienation and commodification.
To do so requires an understanding of the forces that sedate the masses;
Benjamin’s work identifies shock as the primary barrier to experience and, more
broadly, to memory.
Narcotic of the masses: Shock and its impact on experience and memory
In developing the metaphor of narcotic historicism (and in his work on sensory
alienation), Benjamin draws heavily on Freud’s concept of shock. Freud (in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1921) characterises shock as the intervention of
consciousness during times of stress or trauma. During such times, the ego uses
consciousness as a barrier, separating present experience from past memory. In
blocking the synaesthetic system, shock prevents traumatic events from leaving
deep and enduring marks on memory.
It is important here to note that Benjamin’s body of work explores two—related
but at times contradictory—uses of the term ‘shock’: shock is, in his work, both
an aesthetic practice, and a barrier to experience within the surfeit of modernity.
This thesis will focus primarily on Benjamin’s second (and later) use of ‘shock’
as narcotic barrier to experience; however, it is useful to clarify this choice by
grounding it in Benjamin’s earlier writing on aesthetics, in which he is concerned
with narrowing the distance between a work of art and its spectator. In much the
same way he critiques the commodification of the object, Benjamin questions
(most clearly in his essay The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical
Reproduction, 1968c) the commodification of the artistic process and the potential
for reproductive technology (for example, technologies that offer the ability to
reproduce photos, films and prints) to undermine the authenticity of art. Art that,
like the dream-houses of the arcades, disguises its origins and holds its audience
at a distance, he argues, leaves the aesthetic experience vulnerable to
politicisation. Thus, in order to bring audiences closer to the artistic experience,
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Benjamin is captivated by the use of shock as an aesthetic practice, particularly in
theatre and film genres that “undermine the audience’s illusion” (in Ezcurra, p. 8)
through destabilising techniques such as montage, interruption, the abrupt
disruption of a tableau vivant or the abolition of the fourth wall. For Benjamin,
shock, as an aesthetic technique, offers the potential to awaken audiences to the
transformative potential of art.
While this thesis will return intermittently to the idea of shock as an aesthetic
process, it is Benjamin’s alternative reading of ‘shock’—as barrier to
experience—that is the focus of this chapter and indeed this thesis. As Mara
Polgovsky Ezcurra notes in her in-depth exploration of Benjamin’s nuanced
approach to the term On Shock: The Artistic Imagination of Benjamin and Brecht,
“shock appears as the primary experience of dislocation in modern life and as an
aesthetic practice to free art from the enslaving and exploitative dynamics of
commodity capitalism” (2012, p. 9, emphasis added). Yet, Ezcurra does not value
both interpretations of shock equally; she suggests that as Benjamin’s writing
evolved, he began to question “the liberating capacity of the shock experience” (p.
11) and that his later work on shock “acquires a new inflection” (p. 10).
Baudelaire (1938) is frequently presented as Benjamin’s most mature work on the
subject and Ezcurra—as do I—lends more weight to his conclusions on shock in
this later work, which suggests: “[t]he constant bombardment of perception in the
era of mass communication does not appear to be creating revolutionary subjects
but beings that are incapable of looking” (p. 11). It is this notion of shock—as
barrier to perception and experience—that underpins my work on the subject.
While Freud’s concept of shock is developed through accounts of extreme
physical and emotional trauma (for example accounts of war), for Benjamin
(particularly evident in Baudelaire), shock is the essence of modern, urban
experience. Buck-Morss’ (1992, p. 16) reading of Benjamin’s work suggests that
“under conditions of modern shock—the daily shocks of the modern world—
response to stimuli without thinking has become necessary for survival”. In
Benjamin’s construction of the metropolis and, particularly, the crowd, the
experience of shock is violent and constant. In manoeuvring through the Parisian
streets, the fláneur is at the mercy of the crowd’s movements, the city’s bright
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lights, the flash of photos and the onslaught of newspaper advertisements:
“moving through this traffic involves the individual in a series of shocks and
collisions. At dangerous crossings, nervous impulses flow through him in rapid
succession, like the energy from a battery” (Benjamin 1973, p. 251-252). This
constant exposure to shock—a state designed for the extreme but now deployed as
part of the everyday—he argues, has a substantial impact on memory.
In his work on Baudelaire, Benjamin makes much of two key distinctions in
memory and experience. First, he distinguishes between memoire volontaire, as
conscious remembering or active recollection of the past, and memoire
involontaire, an unconscious recollection that requires less complex psychic
work. In doing so, he also acknowledges two kinds of experience: Erfahrung and
Erlebnis. Erlebnis encompasses experiences that are lived and perceived but not
made conscious. As such, the experiences are characterised as being “less
weighty”, as distinct from Erfahrung, which are experiences that acquire the
weight of consciousness.
Benjamin argues that within the sensory deluge of 19th century modernity—the
metropolis, the crowds, the world fairs, the flash of the cameras—shock is
constant and the impact on experience is substantial. In order to protect the psyche
from bombardment, “the less do these impressions enter experience [Erfahrung],
tending to remain in the sphere of a certain hour in one’s life [Erlebnis]. Perhaps
the special achievement of shock defence may be seen in its function of assigning
to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost of the integrity
of its contents. This would be a peak achievement of the intellect; it would turn
the incident into a moment that has been lived [Erlebnis]” (Frisby, p. 260). The
protective mechanism of shock thus wrests these lived experiences [Erlebnis]
from their context and past, isolating them from historical experience:
Benjamin concludes that in giving Erlebnis, everyday lived experiences, the
weight of Erfahrung, Baudelaire poetically rendered what would otherwise
have remained unconscious, by putting it in the world for all to read.
(Weinbaum, p. 401)
Benjamin further explores the consequences of this poverty of experience on a
broader level in Storytelling, in which he investigates what it might mean for a
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culture not to be transmissible by narrative. He cites an example of a silent army
of World War I soldiers, returning muzzled, rather than enriched, by experience:
And there was nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been
contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare,
economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare,
moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to school
on a horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a countryside in
which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these
clouds, a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny,
fragile human body. (quoted in Buck-Morss 1995, p. 14 and Clift, p. 11)
The burden of the soldiers’ experience, which defies and resists representation, is
presented by Benjamin as a clash between the old world and an unrecognisable
and incomprehensible new world. In this way, the soldiers’ homecoming also
speaks to “modernity’s generalized crisis of experience” (Clift, p. 29). Many
factors are identified as being at fault in this demise of experience (the novel, the
rise of the middle class, the printing press and capitalism, for example), but
Benjamin is clear in identifying information as the most profoundly destructive:
We recognize that with the full control of the middle class, which has the
press as one of its most important instruments in fully developed capitalism,
there emerges a form of communication which, no matter how far back its
origin may lie, never before influenced the epic form in a decisive way. But
now it does exert such an influence. And it turns out that it confronts
storytelling as no less of a stranger than did the novel, but in a more
menacing way, and that it also brings about a crisis in the novel. This new
form of communication is information. (in Clift, p. 30)
Information, which is characterised as “understandable in itself”, subject to
“prompt verifiability” and “does not survive the moment”, poses a challenge to
the nature of temporality itself:
Benjamin draws attention to the temporal implications of this kind of
language by noting how value is accorded to information on the basis of
how little time it takes. By definition, he notes disparagingly, information
is transitory and short-lived: it is almost always rushed. So tightly wedded
to the present, information is produced and exhausted within the space of a
single moment, a moment disconnected and separated off from all other
moments. (Clift, p. 31-32)
Thus, in the context of modernity—the fetishisation of the commodity, the
amnesia of the object, the disengagement with historical memory necessary to
survive the sensory deluge of the city and the onslaught of information designed
not to outlive the moment—the very nature of time and experience is threatened.
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Benjamin’s modernity revisited
The cities, social structures, technology and objects that inspired both Benjamin
and Baudelaire’s works have, like the arcades before them, been decimated by
time. And yet, the “atrophy of experience” that fascinated both writers remains
(and is almost certainly more) relevant in the context of contemporary modernity,
in which the scope, sophistication and lure of the techno-aesthetic have intensified
and the flow of information grown faster and stronger. As cultural history and
memory scholar John Scanlan (2013) suggests: “in the century that has succeeded
Baudelaire, the shocks of the new have become more refined and more frequent”
(p. 252). These changes are even more significant when applied not just to
individual memory, but also the collective consciousness: “in contemporary life,
collective memory, as Benjamin understood it, is transformed” (Scanlan, p. 11).
There are, too, ideological parallels between Benjamin’s writing and the current
time, which strengthen the impetus to revisit his work in a more contemporary
environment. While the primary impetus for much of Benjamin’s work was the
context of the “moment of danger” of rising Nazism, other scholars have drawn
links between the dangers Benjamin sensed and the current time. James Martel
applies Benjamin’s trans-temporal perspective to the modern phantasms of “the
idolatry of commodity fetishism” to demonstrate that we are currently
experiencing an, albeit contextually different, “moment of danger” (p. 2), while
others have referred to a contemporary “crisis in perception” (Buck-Morss 1992,
p. 18) or “memory crisis” (Morris 2003, p. 300).
Susan Buck-Morss: Aesthetics to anaesthetics
In the early 1990s, Susan Buck-Morss revisited Benjamin’s theories of aesthetics,
modernity and historical materialism in the context of a very different time
period. Citing the era’s ubiquitous techno-aesthetic and its tendency to create
personalised phantasmagorias that disconnect or distract people from
experience—shopping malls, theme parks, video arcades, in-flight entertainment,
walkmans, gyms and “tourist bubbles”—she argues that aestheticisation has
become commonplace in a televisual world. Using Benjamin’s concepts as a
framework, as well as integrating insights drawn from medical literature, she
explores the impacts of modernity on the synaesthetic system: that is, the body’s
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sense-consciousness.11 Buck-Morss argues that experience is even more
problematic in the 1990s than the 1930s Parisian arcades in which Benjamin
situated his argument:
Being ‘cheated out of experience’ has become the general state, as the
synaesthetic system is marshalled to parry technological stimuli in order to
protect both the body from the trauma of accident and the psyche from the
trauma of perpetual shock. As a result, the system reverses its role. The goal
is to numb the organism, to deaden the senses, to repress memory, in this
situation of ‘crisis in perception’ it is no longer a question of educating the
crude ear to hear music, but of giving it back hearing. It is no longer a
question of training the eye to see beauty, but of restoring ‘perceptibility’.
(1992, p. 18)
As discussed, much of Benjamin’s work is concerned with the aestheticisation of
politics, objects and human experience and the effects of sensory alienation—a
lens through which human life and tragedy can be witnessed, at arm’s length, as
spectacle. Buck-Morss further suggests that the effect of this large-scale numbing
of the synaesthetic experience is not that objects are viewed through a tendency
toward the aesthetic, but an anaesthetic—the deluge of modernity bombards the
psyche and positions it in a constant state of shock, overstimulation and
numbness:
The dialectical reversal, whereby aesthetics changes from a cognitive mode
of being ‘in touch’ with reality to a way of blocking out reality, destroys the
human organism’s power to respond politically even when self-preservation
is at stake… (1992, p. 19)
The problem of experience is heightened by the sophistication of the
contemporary phantasmagoria’s illusion. The isolating distractions of
modernity—movie theatres and virtual reality games, for example—feel real, and
perception of them does not, neurophysically speaking, differentiate them from
other experiences. However, Buck-Morss argues their social function is
“compensatory” and their goal is “manipulation of the synaesthetic system by
control of environmental stimuli”:
It has the effect of anaesthetizing the organism, not through numbing, but
through flooding the senses. These simulated sensoria alter consciousness,
much like a drug, but they do so through sensory distraction rather than
chemical alteration, and—most significantly—their effects are experienced
collectively, rather than individually… As a result… the phantasmagoria
assumes the position of objective fact. (1992, p. 23-24)
11

Buck-Morss’ work is deeply rooted in the somatic—a factor which will be explored further in
the following chapter.
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A modern, modern anaesthetic
If the techno-aesthetic is powerfully real and far-reaching in Buck-Morss’
engagement with it in the 1990s, it is almost ubiquitous in the contemporary
landscape of the city. The mass media have become fetishes and commodities, to
say nothing of the dream-images of shopping centres and movie theatres. The
arcades have been replaced with shopping malls: a hostile landscape, actively
designed to induce ‘scripted disorientation’ through manipulation of spatial and
environmental cues (Amendola in Weiss-Sussex & Franco 1994, p. 91). Mobile
connectivity has developed to the point of technological dependence and
withdrawal (Jarvenpaa and Lang 2005). The advancement of visual and sound
technology has further blurred the boundary between fantasy and reality in the
arena of entertainment. Infotainment systems are increasingly personalised,
isolating and immersive; transport systems are designed to camouflage time and
distance; social media aestheticises narrative to the point of being able to ‘scroll
past’ unwanted information; and commodification has extended beyond the object
to encompass the body, with everything from virginity to human organs able to be
listed and sold online. The online world is its own techno-aesthetic: an entire
phantasmagoria to distract the senses, operating under the illusion of the real. The
defamiliarisation Benjamin describes as characteristic of the 1930s metropolis—
the dislocation, loss of sensory control and frequency of physical and psychic
shock—has, in almost every sense, been amplified by the sophistication and
ubiquity of technology. In the face of the excesses—what Harry Harootunian
(2000) describes as the “too-muchness”—of modern reality, the unifying
principles of experience are eroded. Scanlan suggests “[i]n the West we may
have become more accustomed to the constant upheaval, which is so normal as to
be unexceptional” (p. 32); however, in modernising societies, in which the rate of
technological change is further accelerated, this process is even more alienating:
[T]hose living in fast-changing, ‘modernizing’ societies the world over are
today undergoing the same kind of separation from the past, which will likely
result in a similar feeling of loss. The experience of the modern world thus
gives us the idea that there is a past from which we have become alienated.
Yet should it or could it be recovered, we suspect that this past would be the
very thing that was lost, the ‘memory’ of the vanished world that might
restore us to a kind of unity, a sense of belonging and being at home. (p. 32)
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Of all these unsettling and alienating changes, in the context of historical memory,
the most relevant to this discussion is surely the advent of the 24-hour news cycle
and its tendency to report events as a series of details and certainties “to shore up
for the rest of us the impossible sense of time’s and especially the past’s actuality”
(Morris, p. 29). Nichanian (2003) argues that this presentation of news through
the lens of historicism is especially true for events of collective significance and
memory. If Benjamin’s notion of information—that which does not survive the
moment—holds concerns for consciousness in the early 20th century, the
commodification, amplification and proliferation of news in the 100 years since
are indeed a new ‘moment of danger’. The phenomena Buck-Morss describes as
modern anaesthetics has resonances in work such as Susan Moeller’s Compassion
Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (1999)12, in which
the concept of compassion fatigue (usually applied to trauma medics’ detachment
from patients, in order to better cope with the emotional impact of their work)
explains how media exposure contributes to disengagement with international
events—that is to say, trauma as it relates to the Other. Here, again, there is
valuable context in Benjamin’s prehistory of modernity and the concerns he
expresses about the onslaught of information. In The Storyteller, Benjamin
differentiates between story and journalism by drawing attention to the
storyteller’s purpose: “it is not the object of the story to convey a happening per
se, which is the purpose of information; rather it embeds in it the life of the
storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening” (Frisby, p. 260).
If the production of modernity is visually destabilising, the intrusion of the media
into almost all corners of modern life is almost catastrophically unsettling.
Nowhere is the shock of modernity more constant and deliberate than in an era in
which ratings dictate success. Each news item competes with dozens of others for
space and attention, in the process both amplifying traumatic events for shock
value and aestheticising them. Electronic media provide “mass representations of
the image, not the object” (Buck-Morss 1995, p. 25) and just as design
camouflages commodity production, media production and ‘packaging’ of news
stories mutes events’ impact and, like the commodities of the arcades, obscures
12

We should again note the grounding of these concepts in somatic language: fatigue.
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stories’ production history—an amnesia of the news object and its origins. In the
process, viewers and readers are wrenched from historical time by the shock of
the experience of even distant witness and, by extension, the events are also
wrenched from permanent memory, ‘forgotten’ by the collective consciousness
even before they have become history.
Nevertheless, we try to witness. In Understanding Postcolonial Traumas, Abigail
Ward acknowledges that while the colonial trauma of slavery, forced migration
and colonisation is the site of most postcolonial research, more recent 20th- and
21st-century traumas are also worth addressing:
If we are still grappling with the traumatic legacies of the distant past of
colonization, it is perhaps unsurprising that we have not yet necessarily
come to terms with the more recent colonial and postcolonial traumas of the
20th century, including such events as the apartheid regime in South Africa,
the Algerian war, genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, and the asylum and
displacement of vast numbers of people around the world. However, in
attempting to understand both remote and more proximate traumatic pasts,
connection appears vital. (p. 181-182)
Yet this connection—which is regarded as a necessary condition for witness,
empathy and memory—is threatened by the surfeit of modernity, as both
Benjamin and Buck-Morss describe it, and as I experience it now. Although this
thesis and the novel that accompanies it are separate artefacts, the same
tensions—between the obligation to remember, and an amnesia of overwhelm—
drove both works into existence. My novel’s protagonist, Finn, is crippled by his
excess of memory in much the same way that I feel my own ability to process,
feel, and remember collapse under the weight of information-overload; Finn’s
condition is indeed the allegorical embodiment of my own ethical and digital
panic. As so I ask, in both documents, how we might do better. If we are to
witness punctual and contemporary trauma and then commit them to collective
memory, alternative ways of engaging with—indeed ‘awakening’ to, in
Benjamin’s terminology—the experience of the present must be explored.
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Chapter 2
Towards an empathic synaesthesia: referred pain, referred
sensation
We tell stories and we listen to stories in order to live. To stay conscious.
To connect one with another. To understand consequences. To keep
history. To rebuild civilization.
—Maxine Hong Kingston13
Within the context of modernity we return, then, to the question: how do we fulfil
the ethical obligation to witness in an age where the very nature of experience is
under threat? I contest that Buck-Morss’ conception of a somatic consciousness
can be applied to the structure and language of allegory, which enables the act of
witnessing to take place in a space that is both intimate and distant, personal and
outside of the self and simultaneously urgent and timeless. This, I will argue,
removes the shock-barriers for what I will call an intimate-distant witness, while
generating potential for what I will call empathic synaesthesia.
The privileged role of literature in trauma and witness
While many writers are sceptical about the healing power of literature,
narratologist Suzanne Keen (2011) argues that psychology has long elevated
narrative’s role in “restoring psychic and social equilibrium”:
…poet and novelist have an immense advantage over even an expert
psychologist in dealing with an emotion. For the former build up a concrete
situation and permit it to evoke emotional response. Instead of a description
of an emotion in intellectual and symbolic terms, the artist ‘does the deed
that breeds’ the emotion. (p. 70, original emphasis)
In inviting us into other worlds, Keen suggests (supported by a large body of
literature concerned with narrative and empathy), writers engage a reader in an
active dialogue with the narratives and traumas of others. Similarly, trauma theory
privileges the role of literature in testimony and witness, arguing that it is a mode
that applies to events that defy understanding and representation, “cannot be
simply forgotten (…) but neither can they be adequately remembered” (Radstone
13

p. 1.
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2007, p. 21). Felman and Caruth (1992) argue that traumatic narratives require
specific modes of telling, in formats that permit disruption, fragmentation and
violence and that collapse unity and totality:
Testimony [of trauma] seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a
memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled
into understanding or remembrance, acts that cannot be constructed as
knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in excess of our
frames of reference (p. 5)
To retell trauma, we must first rethink narrative; both “the referential dimensions
of narrative and the temporality by which they operate” (Cetinic 2010, p. 286).
It is in this rethinking of narrative that I offer my conception of allegory and its
potential to engage intimate-distant witness in empathic synaesthesia. This builds
on established (albeit limited) application of allegory to the testimony and witness
of trauma. For example, Ovando-Knutson (2008, p. 8) suggests that while
testimonial literature “focuses on achieving a mimetic representation of lived
experiences” the application of allegory to traumatic histories is much broader,
with implications for collective memory:
…works of fiction which divert from conventional narrative realism and
draw on allegorical modes are able to represent factual occurrences,
while at the same time develop other layers of signification that deal with
ideological and political forces at work during and after the dictatorships.
In this manner, there is an insistence on exposing the dark aspects of
history without necessarily providing a catalogued deluge of accounts of
human rights abuses. The allegorical components serve as a disruptive,
yet surreptitious force. Thus, such fiction evokes and/or preserves
memories in a way quite unlike testimonial literature.
In this chapter, I will contend that allegory (with its challenges to temporality and
territory and in its distancing of the trauma of testimony from its witness’ concept
of self) is a language that helps give voice to the unspoken and unspeakable
nature of trauma, both punctual and structural. This language is not simply
cognitive, it is also somatic. Allegory gives memory—contemporary and
historical—form; it serves to embody memory. In doing so, it offers the potential
for not just critical cognition but a kind of somatic understanding on the part of
the witness, while protecting the witness from the desensitising and aestheticising
influence of shock within the context of narcotic modernity.
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In order to consider the application of allegory to the current crises of memory
and experience, this chapter will:
1. Define the concept of allegory.
2. Establish the potential for allegorical stories to facilitate connection with
both punctual and structural trauma, through grounding the unspoken and the
unrepresentable in the somatic.
3. Establish the potential for allegorical narratives, in the context of narcotic
modernity, to circumvent the shock defence through territorial and temporal
distance, making possible an intimate-distant witness.
4. Examine allegory’s potential to facilitate empathy within the intimate-distant
witness. This empathic engagement, I argue, does not constitute direct or
proportionate understanding of trauma but something more complex:
empathic synaesthesia.
Finally, this chapter will establish the scope, limitations and methodology for the
textual analyses.
Allegory and its application to traumatic narrative
The application of allegory to trauma, memory and the objectives of historical
materialism is, of course, not new—Benjamin himself uses allegory to convey his
ideas14 and there is a broad and robust body of literature that seeks to distinguish
his perspectives on allegory from the many others who have worked to define and
explore the form. Indeed, allegory is not an easy term to define; as Kate Jenckes
(2002) says, it is one that is often “invoked nearly apologetically … so stretched
out as to be nearly unusable” (p. 67), while on the other hand it suffers from a
fractured specificity because it is understood differently within so many historical
contexts. Allegory can be interpreted through the lens of its medieval, baroque
and postmodern contexts or the scholarship of, for example, Benjamin, Jameson,
de Man, Borges, Sommer, Owens and many others. Discussion of the nuance of
the varying interpretations of allegory falls well outside the scope of this thesis,
and while the previous chapter drew extensively on Benjamin’s work on historical
materialism and modernity (and while Benjamin’s work on allegory will be
14

Most notably in the image of the angel of history in On the Concept of History and his extensive
discussion of allegory as the defining trope of the Baroque and modernity itself within Origin of
the German Trauerspiel.
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referenced in this discussion), this chapter does not presuppose or privilege a
Benjaminian notion of allegory. Rather, for the purposes of this argument and the
textual analysis that will follow, a more general understanding of the form is
sufficient.
The Quintilian definition of allegory as that which “presents one thing in words
and another in meaning” (2001, p. 451) is an often-quoted and useful one. Indeed,
in this instance, it is almost entirely adequate. From the Greek allos (ἄλλος) or
“other”, the form (or figure) of allegory conceals a secret; it “brings together an
object and an abstract meaning, one thing denoting the other” (Armond 2012, p.
855). Goethe (in Lehman 2008, p. 234) defines it as “the poet’s seeking the
particular from the general” and, while he compares it unfavourably to symbol,
which he sees as ‘whole’ compared with the fractured mode of allegory, it is this
critique—the fragmented nature of allegory—that lends the mode such promise
when applied to the narratives of trauma. Trauma literature privileges texts that
permit disruption, fragmentation, violence and breakdown of unity/totality. Thus
allegory, a genre of contradiction and fragmentation, is well suited to the nuance
and challenge of representing trauma (which defies representation and is
fragmented, cannot be made whole). As Armond (p. 861) describes it, “[a]llegory
is at once the cognitive, creative, and expressive medium of a century haunted by
an inescapable immanence and spiritual despair.”
As traumatic testimony, allegory is also well suited to subversion and rejection of
historicism, offering pathways to alternative readings, empathies and
histories/memories. Cultural theorist Tom Cohen (in Jenckes, p. 77) describes
allegory as an act of incision, “opening alternative itineraries to those of fixed
inherited narratives legislated by . . . historicist regimes”. In the hands of writers
such as Alejo Carpentier and José Saramago, Gloria Caballero-Roca (2008, p. viiviii) suggests, allegory “is a way of disrupting, transforming and subverting … the
temporal and territorial vocality of definitive histories and official languages,
mythologies and the politics … that typify the rhetoric of nationhood and
nationalism.” The temporal and territorial components of allegory are important
to this discussion, for both the temporal and territorial remoteness of allegory are
necessary to afford the reader (as witness) distance from narratives of historical
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and contemporary trauma. This will be discussed at length in this chapter and the
subsequent textual analysis. However, the mode’s temporal and territorial
ambiguity, when viewed through the lens of Benjamin’s historical materialism,
also offers subversive potential; as Caballero-Roca (p. vii) notes:
allegory transgresses limits and spaces, becoming a tool of expression and
verification of the past through the process of investigation and of research.
So being, allegory, a discursive material for the laying out of the past,
redirects the reader’s view towards a forgotten, ruined and decadent past
that awaits its redemption and incorporation within the historicist discourse.
Moreover, if testimony can only take place in relation to a witness, allegory is
particularly powerful because it can only be understood in relation to its reader. In
her quest to define allegory, Maureen Quilligan (1979) focuses on two
characteristics of the genre that are relevant to this discussion. Her first
observation is that allegory, as a genre that is both self-reflective and critically
self-conscious, is designed to make the reader self-conscious; it cannot be
defined, she says, except in relation to its reader:
He [sic] is a definite component of the form. It is, in fact, this strange
characteristic that most distinguishes allegory as a genre. Comedy, romance,
satire, tragedy, and epic are all categories that classify works essentially
according to the human emotions they evoke. We laugh at comedy, wonder
at romance, snort at satire, feel pity and terror at tragedy, and admire a hero
after reading an epic. The works’ forms are designed to evoke these
responses. After reading an allegory, however, we only realise what kind of
readers we are, and what kind we must become in order to interpret our
significance in the cosmos. Other genres appeal to readers as human beings;
allegory appeals to readers as readers of a system of signs, but this may be
only to say that allegory appeals to readers in terms of their most
distinguishing human characteristic, as readers of, and therefore as creatures
finally shaped by, their language. (p. 24)
As Quilligan presents allegory, it requires an active reader, one who may well be
changed as a result of their participation in the reading process. Allegory requires
a conscious engagement on the part of the reader (as witness) and as such falls
into the more weighty of Benjamin’s interpretations of consciousness, Erfahrung
and not Erlebnis. Here, the potentiality for experience is important, because the
more conscious experience may lead to more conscious remembering or more
active recollection. The complex psychic work of allegory lends itself to memoire
volontaire, rather than memoire involontaire.
Connection: Allegory and the somatic consciousness
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We return then to the question: how do we ‘awaken’ from the narcotic effects of
modernity? Can allegory offer an antidote to the crisis of experience and, perhaps,
pathways to more active engagement as witnesses to historical and contemporary
trauma? To explore this, I return to the work of Buck-Morss who, in her
methodology, grounds much of her discussion of the modern anaesthetic in the
language of the somatic, drawing extensively on medical literature and
terminology in her application of Benjamin to a 1990s crisis of perception. In
constructing her conception of the ‘modern anaesthetic’, she first deconstructs the
nature of experience through the lens of history, medicine and the body.
Rather than rely on what she calls the “limited concept” of the nervous system,
Buck-Morss focuses on the synaesthetic system as a form of sense-consciousness
“wherein external sense-perceptions come together with the internal images of
memory and anticipation” (1992, p. 13). She traces Benjamin’s notion of shock15
back to the patholigising of neurasthenia16 in 1896, which she notes is described
in similar terms to Benjamin’s shock, in the sense that it was defined as a deficit
in or reduction in the capacity for experience. Historically, the cause of
neurasthenia was given as “excess of stimulation” (sthenia) and “incapacity to
react to same” (asthenia) and it was treated by opiates (as well as a host of other
dulling agents: day-care for kids, sleeping aids, painkillers, tranquillizers and
cocaine). Put simply, a deficit of experience—overwhelm, excess—was not
treated, it was numbed. Moreover, Buck-Morss argues, the addictive lure of
anaesthetic (which protected patients from pain, and doctors from having to
witness a patient’s agony) spread: “Beginning in the nineteenth century, a narcotic
15

Like Ezcurra, Buck-Morss privileges Benjamin’s later work on shock in her use of the term;
Buck-Morss contends that for Benjamin, “shock is the very essence of the modern experience”
(1992 p. 16). In her most nuanced essay on the subject, Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter
Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered, she traces an extensive history of the definitional creep
of the term aesthetics, from a discourse of the body into a cognitive ‘experience’ that is distant
from the body and vulnerable to politicisation. Benjamin’s response to this, she says, is to
“politicize art” (1992 p. 5) and, while one of the techniques used to do this is shock (as aesthetic
practice), even this ‘shock’ is a device to awaken the audience from the sensory alienation of
modernity. She says: “He is demanding of art a task far more difficult—that is, to undo the
alienation of the corporeal sensorium, to restore the instinctual power of the human bodily senses
for the sake of humanity’s self-preservation, and to do this, not by avoiding the new technologies,
but by passing through them” (p. 5, original emphasis).
16
Neurasthenia was, for example, framed as ‘shattered nerves’, ‘having a nervous breakdown’ or
‘going to pieces’.
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was made out of reality itself” (p. 20); this is her ‘modern anaesthetic’:
Of course, the eyes still see. Bombarded with fragmentary impression they
see too much—and register nothing. Thus the simultaneity of
overstimulation and numbness is characteristic of the new synaesthetic
organization as anaesthetics. The dialectical reversal, whereby aesthetics
changes from a cognitive mode of being ‘in touch’ with reality to a way of
blocking out reality, destroys the human organism’s power to respond
politically even when self-preservation is at stake… (p. 18)
Buck-Morss grounds her approach to the contemporary crisis of experience (and
by my extension, memory) in the somatic; similarly, she turns to the body for a
solution—or perhaps, a partial solution. She suggests that the privileging of the
intellectual over the somatic is a necessary condition for the aestheticisation of
news, information, politics and art. As she sees it, a means of overcoming the
sensory alienation of aestheticisation (the modern anaesthetic) is apparent in the
origins of the word itself: the Greek aisthitikos, “perceptive by feeling”, which
she argues is “not art but reality—corporeal, material nature”, “a discourse of the
body” (1992, p. 6). The aesthetic Benjamin critiques, she argues, is a wholly
cognitive experience—disconnected from the somatic—and an answer to the
disconnect of modernity must necessarily involve connection with the bodily
experience, which is “not always, already culturally mediated”:
Ever since I can remember, my critical sense was nourished by bodily
sensations—tense muscles, clammy feet, shoes too tight, breath too tight,
holding back wanting to laugh—or to scream. Not feeling good in my skin
was my way of criticizing the definition my culture was giving to the
situation. Cultural meanings are sensed bodily as being wrong. Just plain
wrong. How else are people capable of social protest? (in Kester 1997, pp.
39-40)
If the aestheticisation demands amnesia of the object, a somatic consciousness
demands memory. Buck-Morss (1992) continues:
The critical power of art, or any cultural form, may not be perceived
universally, but if it is perceived, it hits you in the gut. Now this somatic
experience resists predatory reason, precisely because it can’t be stomached,
gobbled up by the mind. If experience leaves a nondigestible residue that
won’t go away, that is food for critical cognition. (pp. 42-43)
While Buck-Morss’ work is trans-disciplinary17, her interest in art and visual
17

Western cultural traditions have been sceptical of discourses of the body (Deanne Bogdan
[2003, p. 49] calls it the West’s “dualistic somatophobia”); however, advances in scientific
understanding of the body (for example, neuroscience, evolutionary biology and genetics)
increasingly situate understanding of the cognitive within the body. As Domenico Parisi (2011, p.
1) writes: “the idea that the mind is embodied and that to understand the mind it is necessary to
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culture is evident in her work on Benjamin. Like many others—trauma scholars,
included—Buck-Morss privileges the role of creative texts (in her case, art) as a
means of capturing and critiquing history and memory, and generating somatic
response and empathy. I wish to consider and expand her ideas within the realm
of allegory, which I argue gives body to history, trauma and memory. Of course,
all texts are embodied—writers offer their cultures, critiques, memories and
histories in physical form. However, allegory offers particular potential to
resonate with a somatic consciousness because it is, in definition, the embodiment
of the intangible. While the defamiliarisation of modernity (particularly the
aestheticisation of news and information) is characterised by a loss of sensory
control, allegory engages the somatic.
It is possible to characterise allegory as a mode that gives form or body to an
abstracted meaning. To add emphasis to the previous definitional quotations,
allegory “brings together an object and an abstract meaning, one thing denoting
the other” (Armond, p. 855); it is the “poet’s seeking the particular from the
general” (Goethe in Lehman, p. 234), an attempt to locate or reflect the intangible
within form or figure. Allegory’s somatic potential lends it power to ‘awaken’ the
reluctant (narcotised) witness from the shock of modernity. In the second
component of her aforementioned definition of allegory, Quilligan characterises
the genre of allegory as a language (a concept I will return to in the following
section) and I contest that it is not only a language but indeed a corporeal
language—a cultural form that (to borrow Buck-Morss’ terms) can be perceived,
that leaves a non-digestible residue, is food for critical cognition. Allegory is
memorie volontaire, an active remembering; it is Erfahrung, given the weight of
consciousness. For these reasons, I will establish (through application of these
concepts to my chosen allegorical texts), allegory is a form of critical cognition
capable of generating not just conscious experience and witness, but also
empathy. Buck-Morss (in Kester) establishes this potential:
…aesthetics18 is the body’s form of critical cognition, and that this sensory
take the body into consideration is being accepted by an increasing number of researchers and
constitutes the premise of many important current investigations.” Here, there is also overlap with
feminist theory and scholarship, which similarly privileges both the somatic and lived experience.
18
Buck-Morss’ definition of aesthetic, in this instance, is not that of Benjamin’s, but instead her
subversive reclamation of the term as “a discourse of the body”.
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knowledge can and should be trusted politically. It is empathy, rather than
sympathy, because it is capable of producing solidarity with those who are
not part of our own group, who do not share our collective identity. (p. 40)

Within this thesis, I call this somatic connection intimacy, and it is the first
component of my concept of the intimate-distant witness. While the term
intimate-distant witness is original to this thesis, the concept of intimate distance
is used in discourse on mindfulness, which Stanley (2012, p. 201) defines as a
practice of “becoming aware of experience; and paradoxically becoming
intimately distant with our experience.” Within mindfulness scholarship, intimate
distance is important because, as a psychological and social practice, mindfulness
“operat[es] simultaneously at the boundary of the individual/inner and
social/outer, collapsing such distinctions in practice, and radically undermining
the distinction between self and other.” ‘Intimacy’ is with the experience itself—
practitioners are encouraged to court close contact with their experiences and to
be connected to the minutia of lived experience. ‘Distance’ is the ability to
remove oneself from the experience; that is, to buffer the notion of self and one’s
identity (removing the ‘I’, ‘me’ or ‘mine’) as separate from the experience. It is
interesting to note that this discipline also uses the term ‘awakening’, which has
resonances with Benjamin’s work, and puts emphasis on compassion, which may
align with my discussion of empathy. In future, there is certainly scope for the
application and interrogation of my concepts through the lens of mindfulness and
the related body of literature on embodied cognition.
I define the original term ‘intimate-distant witness’ as a reader’s critical
engagement with representations of trauma within allegorical narratives through
embodied and somatic connection and the simultaneous protection of psychic
distance (through the narrative’s temporal and territorial distance), allowing the
reader to remain awakened to trauma and its impacts, even within the context of
narcotic modernity. The particular power of allegory is the somatic connection it
offers; this connection is, however, made possible only through the form’s
temporal and territorial distance, which I will argue circumvents the shock reflex.
A reader (as witness) may achieve somatic connection to the allegorical narrative
precisely because allegory positions itself outside the shock of modernity through
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generating temporal and territorial distance. The structure of the allegory affords
the reader an intimate-distance from the psychotic shock of its impact by cloaking
the nature of the trauma in another physical form and by alienating it from
temporal and territorial contexts, whilst still permitting resistance to historicism,
aestheticisation, sensory alienation and commodification. I contend that this
intimate-distance can be applied to the act of testimony and witness, through the
language of allegory.
Distance: Allegory’s temporal and territorial remoteness
I will examine narrative distance through two lenses: the temporal and territorial.
Temporal remoteness
While the techno-aesthetic threatens temporality and space, allegory offers
frameworks to transport traumas from their temporal settings as events that are
both urgent and timeless. In contrast to information and news, which as Benjamin
conceived it is “tightly wedded to the present” and “does not survive the
moment”, allegory wrests events from time, and thus from history; for Benjamin,
the aims of allegory and historical materialism are entwined. The mode’s
disruption to temporality also resonates with the goals of trauma theory, which
“exposes the inadequacy of traditional models of accounting for historical
particularity. Trauma theory enables a rethinking of the referential dimensions of
narrative and the temporality by which they operate” (Cetinic, p. 287). Moreover,
it answers to some of the criticism of trauma theory’s focus on punctual, Western
traumas at the expense of structural traumas or intercultural experiences of
trauma. Indeed, temporal disruption is especially relevant in non-Western and
non-historical traumatic contexts; in non-Western traumas, because the
experience and perception of time can be so radically varied across cultural
contexts, and in non-historical (structural) traumas because violence, trauma and
marginalisation is not anchored to a single location or temporal moment, nor even
a series of moments and landscapes. In these contexts, trauma is unmoored in
time, ongoing:
A prominent motivation for the conflation of structural and historical trauma
is the elusiveness of the traumatic experience in both cases. In historical
trauma, it is possible (at least theoretically) to locate traumatizing events.
But it may not be possible to locate or localize the experience of trauma that
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is not dated or, in a sense, punctual. The belated temporality of trauma
makes it an elusive experience related to repetition involving a period of
latency. (LaCapra 1999, p. 724-5)
While I acknowledge that there is a robust body of literature (from Benjamin to
Goethe, and a substantial contemporary interest) unpacking the temporality of
allegory, for this argument it is sufficient to acknowledge that because allegory is
representational, its temporal landscape is also representational. Allegory places
trauma in its own temporal context—someplace timeless, a not-now that is
nonetheless urgent, offering the reader (as witness) distance from it. While the
reader may take comfort in the not-now of the narrative, there is nevertheless the
capacity for what Caruth calls urgent empathy: “a new mode of seeing and of
listening—a seeing and a listening from the site of trauma—is opened up to us…
and offered as the very possibility, in a catastrophic era, of a link between
cultures” (in Cetinic, p. 288).
Territorial remoteness
Similarly, allegory creates a subjective space for simultaneous connection to and
remoteness from the sites of trauma—an intimate-distance from punctual and
structural trauma—through territorial distance. In contrast to news and
information, which shocks in part because it is too much and too close, allegory is
territorially distant. Allegory’s landscape is representational—its ‘space’ cannot
be located geographically; indeed, we do not expect to locate it, because allegory
does not operate under the sign of the real. The premise of allegory thus offers the
psychic protection of territorial distance. As Amy Cooper (p. 797) indicates, this
representational element is usually “bi-leveled” and spatial—a relationship
between the signifier and signified: “We are used to thinking of writing as
representational, but in spatial rather than temporal terms; the representation
stands-in for something that is not ‘here’ but ‘there’”. Indeed, in the case of
allegory, a narrative’s territorial representation is more remote even than a distant
‘there’. If the geography of an allegorical narrative is representational—a
landscape signalling some other, more abstract, meaning—it is not ‘there’, insofar
as it is not a specific location. The landscape of allegory is simply not-here.19
19

The distinction between here and not-here need not be an exclusive binary. Cooper later draws
on Mitchell (1986) to mount an argument that both can be perceived at once: “a paradoxical trick
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Intimate-distance: Allegory and witness
As symptomatic of the broader techno-aesthetic, information (and news) is
“understandable in itself” and subject to “prompt verifiability”—it happens in
places we know, territories we recognise. Indeed, the closer an event is, the more
news coverage it is given (Lin and Margolin 2014); proximate events are more
shocking, more unsettling and (in the long term) more likely to saturate the
senses. Similarly, the desensitising shock of news and information has only
increased as the speed of its arrival has accelerated. If information “does not
survive the moment” and the techno-aesthetic is “tightly wedded to the present”
then we are all trapped in the relentless ‘now’ of global happenings, unfolding
beyond our control. We are, as Benjamin and Buck-Morss suggest, experiencing a
‘crisis of experience’, flooded by the deluge of others’ traumas, which shock the
psyche in their too-closeness, too-recent, too-muchness. Moreover, if persistent
shock is capable of generating an atrophy of experience, it is only because we see
that experience as our own. For the psyche to engage the protective barriers of
shock (to seek refuge in desensitisation and aestheticisation) it must first perceive
a threat to the self. That is, trapped in the modern anaesthetic, we must hold
events at arms’ length precisely because we perceive them as temporally and
territorially proximate and threatening.
In contrast, allegory’s territorial distance (not-here), coupled with temporal
remoteness (not-now), is important because it allows the reader, as witness, to
experience the text as intimate-distant witness while distancing one’s sense of self
(not-me). As embodiment of trauma, history and memory, the temporal and
territorial distance of allegory situates the traumatic narrative in the body but not
the self, which heightens opportunities for critical cognition, without triggering
the shock reflex. The somatic connection—the intimacy—to the narrative is
important, but it is only possible through the simultaneous distance of the
narrative’s distant and representational temporal and territorial setting.
The distance of allegory isn’t only contained within the allegory itself (the
of consciousness, an ability to see [something] as both ‘there’ and ‘not there’ at the same time” (p.
57). We will return to this notion in the conclusion of this thesis.
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signifier), but also the signified. In classifying allegory as a language, Quilligan
extends the Quintilian idea that allegory “means one thing in the words, another in
the sense”. Instead of allegory standing in for single ‘other’ meaning
underpinning a text, what allegory offers, Quilligan suggests, is “the possibility of
an otherness, a polysemy, inherent in the very words on the page; allegory
therefore names the fact that language can signify many things at once” (p. 26).
Again, what this plurality of reading offers the reader is distance, and once again
this distance is an intimate one. The scale and scope of the allegorical trauma can
be understood and also felt, in the body—they can be experienced. There can be
an intimate connection on the part of the reader. But in removing the sense of self
from the reading, allegory offers intimate-distance; simultaneous connection and
remoteness.
LaCapra, in particular, says the act of witnessing traumatic events necessitates
‘empathic unsettlement’, which:
should register in one’s very mode of address in ways revealing both
similarities and differences across genres (such as history or literature). But
a difficulty arises when the virtual experience involved in empathy gives
way to vicarious victimhood, and empathy with the victim seems to become
an identity. (1999, p. 699)
Empathic unsettlement, LaCapra suggests, “in the attentive secondary witness
does not entail the identity; it involves a kind of virtual experience through which
one puts oneself in the other’s position while recognising the difference of that
position and hence not taking the other’s place” (p. 272). Allegory, in removing
the self through its intimate-distance, allows such connection, while respecting the
distance between the experience of witness and the experience of the one giving
testimony. I call this the intimate-distant witness. It is the engagement of the
critical consciousness of the body without engagement of the self.
It may seem, perhaps, counterintuitive to offer a genre of intentional distance (that
is, one that protects the psyche through permitting distance) whilst drawing on
Benjamin’s work as a foundation. While I acknowledge that Benjamin’s work on
the politics of aesthetics privileges authentic connection to art through the
abolition or lessening of distance between art and audience, the aesthetic genres
he explores are indeed genres that facilitate connection through some distance.
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For example, Ezcurra examines Benjamin’s admiration for Brecht’s approach to
theatre, which employed mechanisms to strip “events of their self-evident,
familiar qualities, making them strange, and allowed the audience to observe their
underlying causes. The process involved a moment of shock or astonishment,
through which the audience realized its own previous state of unawareness” (p. 6,
original emphasis). Brecht’s rebellion against a “theatre of illusion” employed
techniques, Ezcurra argues, that were a “distancing mirror” designed to allow
closer perception; it is this technique that so entranced Benjamin. Similarly, my
conception of allegory as a genre of intimate-distance advocates separation only
in order to achieve connection. Contradictions, such as that of intimate-distance,
are welcome tensions within Benjamin’s work; indeed, Benjamin was himself
captivated by the term “correspondence”, which he appropriates from
Baudelaire’s poetry, as “incorporating gaping distances and differences as well as
affinities.” (Sussman 2003, p. 175). This term could also, perhaps, be applied to
the intimate-distance of allegory.
Empathic synaesthesia and the intimate-distant witness
The question must be asked: if allegory holds the shock-impacts of its testimony
at a distance from its witnesses, can the impact of such narratives be adequately
felt, challenged and experienced—adequately witnessed? I contend that they can
be, though the impact is not as simple as stimulus and sensation. Where Benjamin
is concerned with modern aesthetics, and Buck-Morss critiques the modern
anaesthetic, I wonder if allegory can generate a less literal, synaesthetic response:
what I call an ‘empathic synaesthesia’.
Like Buck-Morss, I draw on medicine and the somatic to offer an alternative
sensory consciousness, that of synaesthesia: “a condition in which stimulation in
one sensory modality also gives rise to an experience in a different modality”
(Sagiv 2005, p. 3). Derived from the Greek syn (union) and aesthesis (sensation),
the term synaesthesia is often used to describe a wire-crossing of the senses: when
a sound is smelled, or a colour is heard. However, synaesthesia can also be a kind
of referred pain, or a referred sensation: something that is felt in one bodily
territory, as a result of stimulus applied to another part of the body. Even
medically, it is sometimes couched in terms that approach empathy—one of the
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earliest reported cases of synaesthesia (Myers 1911) is described as a “sympathy”
between auditory and visual experiences. There are definitional resonances, also,
with the fractured and fragmented nature of allegory, and synaesthesia is a
concept that underscores the possibility of plurality of experience, while aligning
with many of the values of historical materialist. Neurologist Richard Cytowic
(2018, p. 4) explains synaesthesia thus:
Imagine the whole of perception being like a crystal sculpture. It breaks.
The shards scatter. Think of each shard as a modality, an indivisible unit
representing one aspect of perception. We are now free to reassemble the
sculpture any way we like, but even if we tried to glue it back exactly the
way it was, we would certainly stick together a few shards that previously
didn’t go together.
There is some precedent for the application of synaesthesia to the ways we engage
with fiction. Robert and Michèle Root-Bernstein (1999, p. 306) suggest that all
creative work is based on a kind of synaesthesia: “This is more than a mere
combining of senses. This is synthetic knowing—a combining of sensation,
feeling, memory, and rational thought. All creative work is based upon this.”
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive assessments of synaesthesia in literature
is Diana Mary Eva Thomas’ Texts and Textiles: Affect, Synaesthesia and
Metaphor in Fiction (2016), which explores a readers’ capacity to imaginatively
understand the descriptions on the page, particularly with respect to touch.
“Literary synaesthesia”, including analogy, simile, personification and metaphor,
when coupled with a reader’s sense-memories and consciousness, has the
potential to evoke a powerful response.
Without having the orange in our hand or in sight, we can picture the colour,
appreciate the texture of the skin (pitted or smooth), how it is perceived in
our hand, how it will feel and look as we peel the outer skin away (thick or
thin). We can bring to mind the smell and feel of the covering of pith and
the way in which the texture of the flesh will feel if we bite into it. We know
how it will taste (sweet or not, depending on the variety of orange) and how
it will look, orange or red (if it is a blood orange), and how the juice and
flesh will taste as it is chewed and swallowed. We can imagine the juice
running down our arm making it sticky to the touch. This sensory image can
be developed and broadened through thought and memory in an explosive
example of how the brain can work. (p. 37)
Using the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins and philosopher Brian Massumi,
Thomas links literary synaesthesia to affect, arguing that the intensity of
synaesthetic writing (particularly synaesthetic metaphor), through including the
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senses, “translate the text so that it is received in a physical way” (p. 55). “The
text creates a context of intensity (suggested by synaesthetic writing) and the
reader’s body responds to it. It is the transmissibility that enables the writer to
transfer affect to the reader.” In an increasingly mediatized world, she argues,
where affect is manipulated, there is potential in this kind of writing for a more
authentic experience, something approaching empathy:
[T]he part of the brain that registers the sensation of pain does not need to be
stimulated for us to experience empathy with those who are experiencing it.
The empathy we feel … does not rely on our direct experience of pain but on
our knowledge of how the pain feels from our own experience, strengthened
by our sensitivity to the feelings of others. When we read, we are not being
subjected to pain but our bodies experience an affective intensity (p. 62-63).
If this affective, even empathetic, response is possible at the level of a
synaesthetic metaphor (as a single image that stands in for an abstract concept),
the capacity for allegory (as entire narrative representative of abstracted
traumatic experience) to generate an affective or empathic response in the reader
is also possible. Allegory, in its intimate-distance, offers opportunities for an
empathic synaesthesia on the part of witness—where the emotions, sensations
and effects of a trauma can be felt, not necessarily in the same place or the same
way, but with a nevertheless disruptive sense of pain and persistent echoes of the
past, captured and felt within the present. This is a somatic consciousness—a
perception by feeling, in both Buck-Morss’ senses of the word. Moreover, it is a
consciousness premised on multiplicity of experience, as Lynn Robertson and
Noam Sagiv (2005 p. 239) reiterate:
Synesthesia invites us to imagine a world of experience different from that
in which most of us live. It fascinates us because it offers a case where
qualia—those essentially private, subjective experiences—can be shown to
differ substantially between individuals, or at least to differ in the conditions
in which they arise.
My second original term, ‘empathic synaesthesia’, applies the metaphor of
synaesthesia to the ways a reader, as witness, may engage with traumatic
narratives. I define empathic synaesthesia as a process by which allegory, through
both its somatic connection and temporal and territorial distance, can engage a
reader as intimate-distant witness in a somatic, but nonetheless contextually
different—referred—response to the trauma of others. The intimate-distant
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witness can experience20 (from an intimate-distance) synaesthetic connection to
the traumatic narrative while maintaining and respecting the boundary differences
between the act of testimony and the act of witness. The intimate-distant witness’s
trauma is not the same as that evoked in the narrative’s testimony because, after
all, narrative is always representative, cannot correspond to what is being
signalled. The reader’s pain is a referred pain: felt in another way, another place.
Nonetheless, it can be somatic, and it can be conscious and active: Erfahrung,
with the potential for memorie volontaire. Within allegory, punctual and
contemporary trauma can be synaesthetically (corporeally) experienced, with
potential for the effects to be felt as empathic synaesthesia and collective
memory. Within this thesis, I will further develop both original concepts
(‘empathic synaesthesia’ and the ‘intimate-distant witness’) though their
application to my chosen texts, as examples of allegorical approaches to traumatic
history.
Methodology for textual analysis
I turn, now, to a methodology for locating these concepts within my chosen texts,
as examples of allegorical representations of punctual and structural trauma. In
doing so, this section will also outline the scope and limitations of the textual
analyses, in three parts: temporal and territorial distance, somatic connection and
capacity for empathic synaesthesia.
Territorial and temporal distance
I have outlined a number of arguments for the application of allegory—as a mode
of contradiction and fragmentation—to the narratives of trauma and the act of
engaging readers as traumatic witnesses. In order to interrogate the mode’s
potential to ‘awaken’ us from the narcotic effects of the techno-aesthetic and to
consider the texts as acts of traumatic testimony and witness, I will establish the
ways the allegorical elements of each novel offer the reader distance, as
protection from psychic shock. To do so I will ask:
20

To support the use of the term ‘experience’, in this instance, I offer Susan Sontag (2001, p. 2122): “Art is not only about something; it is something. A work of art is a thing in the world, not
just a text or commentary on the world. … Which is to say that the knowledge we gain through art
is an experience of the form or style of knowing something, rather than a knowledge of something
(like a fact or a moral judgment) in itself.”
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•

What is the territorial setting for the text, and how does the territorial
setting offer psychic distance to the reader, as traumatic witness?

•

What is the temporal setting of the text, and how does the temporal setting
offer psychic distance to the reader, as traumatic witness?

Somatic connection
An emerging body of research in the sciences and social sciences aims to connect
reading with a range of cognitive and neurophysical responses, including
empathy. One such experiment (Kidd and Castano 2013) uses one of my chosen
texts (The Tiger’s Wife) to establish that literary fiction improves readers’ Theory
of Mind, an ability to understand others’ subjective states, which helps support
empathic response. I must note, however, that the methodological framework for
this thesis is textual analysis and as such reader response cannot be discerned or
implied. Instead, the central concern of this thesis is allegory’s potential to evoke
empathic synaesthesia through temporal and territorial distance and somatic
connection. To do so, I will examine how such an intimate-distant connection is
established within the somatic language of allegory, drawing on examples from
the texts, guided by the following questions:
•

How do the allegorical elements of the text embody trauma, either
punctual or structural?

•

How are the fragmented, silent and invisible forces of trauma given
corporeal form in the text?

•

How might the embodied nature of the allegorical elements appeal to a
reader’s (as intimate-distant witness) critical (somatic) cognition?

To contain the scope of this section, discussion will be confined to the allegorical
elements of each text and, where there are many allegorical elements that might
support discussion, the most relevant will be chosen.
Empathic synaesthesia
Finally, textual analysis of each novel will examine the text’s potential to
‘awaken’ the reader, as traumatic witness. It will ask:
•

How does the combination of somatic intimacy and temporal/territorial
distance within the text’s allegorical elements engage the intimate-distant
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witness in empathic synaesthesia?
The answers to these research questions will be explored in each of the three texts
(The Tiger’s Wife, The Natural Way of Things and The Memory Addicts). Then,
the broader implications across multiple texts will be addressed in the thesis
conclusion.
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Chapter 3
The silent and the deathless: punctual trauma in The Tiger’s
Wife
…I think that mythmaking is one of the great successes of humanity as a
species, and it’s something we naturally do to cope with strife and
stress, to access the past, to make things that seem massive in scope
more personal and approachable to us. The problem with this is: what
do you do with a story that has already become legend by the time it
reaches you? It’s kind of like witnessing something unexplained—
sometimes, the impulse is to accept it, subscribe to it religiously;
sometimes, to disavow it, which of course takes all the magic of it,
making it a story again.
— Téa Obreht21
Context
Téa Obreht’s novel The Tiger’s Wife is comprised of three strands, braided
together. The “spine” of the novel is the story of Natalia Stefanovic, a young
doctor travelling across the border that has recently split what used to be her
country into pieces. Natalia and her childhood friend Zóra are tasked with
immunising children who have been orphaned by her new-country’s soldiers; to
do so, the two women must navigate a landscape of fresh and distant trauma. En
route, Natalia finds out that her grandfather has died, at which point the narrative
splits. Natalia says:
Everything necessary to understand my grandfather lies between two
stories: the story of the tiger’s wife, and the story of the deathless man…
One, which I learned after his death, is the story of how my grandfather
became a man; the other, which he told to me, is of how he became a child
again. (p. 30)
These narratives—the story of the deathless man, which Natalia’s grandfather told
her, and that of the tiger’s wife, the story “he perhaps wished he had” (p. 333)—
become the second and third strands of the novel. Both narratives are allegories
(in some respects grounded in Slavic and Germanic mythology, in others entirely
21

in Haritou 2011, n.p.
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Obreht’s own). However, it is the story of the tiger’s wife that is given more
weight in the text, and, of the two threads, it is the more potent articulation of the
enduring trauma of war and its aftermath. Thus, it is this narrative thread—the
story of Natalia’s grandfather’s village of Galina and the tiger’s wife—that will be
the focus of this chapter.
While the novel is not autobiographical, it has been called “emotionally
autobiographical” (Raljević, 2016, p. 3), and the author’s background does
provide helpful context in identifying the historical traumas the work’s allegories
seek to interrogate. Obreht is a Slavic-American writer with mixed ethnic22 and
religious23 heritage, much like Natalia, who says: “I am not with the other side. I
have no side. I am all sides” (p. 297). Obreht spent the first seven years of her life
with her mother and maternal grandparents in Belgrade, then moved to Cyprus
(and later Egypt) a year after the (ex)Yugoslavian wars broke out in 1991. She
returned to Belgrade at the age of twelve and writes under her Slovenian
grandfather Štefan’s surname.
While the landscape of The Tiger’s Wife24 is culturally and geographically
ambiguous, there are recognisable historical parallels and references. Most
obviously, the novel references the German-led attack on former Yugoslavia
during World War 2, the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the various Balkan
wars and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War. The Slavic
location and character names (not to mention food, folklore and traditions), place
the narrative identifiably within the Balkan region. This chapter will discuss the
ambiguity of the novel’s territorial (and cultural) setting in depth, but it is clear
that the novel can be read as an allegory for war and its aftermath in the Balkan
region (though not a specific war, nor a specific region).

22

Obreht has Bosniak and Slovene ethnicity (Raljević).
Obreht’s grandmother is Muslim, her grandfather is Roman Catholic and her stepfather is
Serbian Orthodox (interview in Shephard 2012).
23
henceforth TTW, in part to distinguish between the title and the character of the deaf-mute girl,
who is referred to as “the tiger’s wife” throughout the second half of the novel; any references to
the character will still be spelled out in full.
23
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It is also worth noting that the Balkan wars have not been served well by
international media. Media coverage of the breakdown of former Yugoslavia and
the establishment of death camps in Bosnia in 1992 is explored at length as a case
study in Susan Moeller’s Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease,
Famine, War and Death (1999); indeed, it is her primary example in the chapter
discussing public (particularly American) responses to media coverage of war.
Moeller argues that under-reporting of the Balkan wars was driven by compassion
fatigue (p. 259), quoting CBS anchor Dan Rather: “Most of our fellow citizens
cannot locate Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia on a map, much less understand what’s
going on there. And they don’t seem to care…” The Balkan conflicts were
complex, geographically and culturally distant, required deep historical context,
spanned complex racial and religious issues, and endured—without hope of end,
or neat resolution—well beyond the attention-span of a fast-paced news cycle that
eventually moved on to cover the Somalian famine. Despite strong journalistic
commitment to providing visual and narrative evidence of war crimes and
conditions, the inability for Western citizens to connect resulted in the conflicts
being dropped from the new agenda altogether. Moeller quotes a Washington Post
editorial published during the conflict:
For those who look back at World War II with perplexity, who wonder
and can’t grasp how the world stood by, it is now possible to observe
several forms of inertia that are playing a role. For Americans, it’s all too
easy to view the Yugoslav tragedy as a far-off, impenetrable … ethnic
muddle, a source of clever words like ‘balkanization’ to apply to other
regions and of endless, ponderous place-names. The many-sided politics
of the war are in fact stupefyingly complex, and talk of possible military
action, such as easing sieges by bombing Serb artillery emplacements
bogs down swiftly in practical and political calculations. (p. 288-289)
Against this generations-long tide of compassion fatigue (as Moeller calls it, in
this instance, “compassion avoidance” [p. 279]), TTW is an impassioned call to
witness; as allegorical depiction of the Balkan wars and their traumatic impacts, it
takes the memory of this series of punctual, historical traumas and reimagines it in
a format that facilitates intimate-distant witness and empathic synaesthesia. In
doing so, however, the novel also admits to the challenges, burdens and barriers a
witness must face. At several points, the book comments directly on the trauma of
the historical witness; even as the war rages around the characters, they find
themselves closing their eyes to its impacts. The desensitising and aestheticising
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impact of shock, the mass defamiliarisation, the sense of overwhelm and
numbing—the shock-impacts of the exposure to enduring trauma (outlined in this
thesis in the context of modernity, but apparent here in the case of punctual
trauma) are given form within the novel. First, teenage Natalia’s and her friends
watch the war from the distant-proximity of the City, using its presence to justify
their unruly behaviour—smoking, hoarding contraband, breaking curfew:
Those first sixteen months of wartime held almost no reality, and this made
them incredible, irresistible, because the fact that something terrible was
happening elsewhere, and at the same time to us, gave us room to get away
with anarchy. Never mind that, three hundred miles away, girls sitting in
bomb shelters were getting their periods at the age of seven. In the City, we
weren’t just affected by the war; we were entitled to our affectation. (p. 34)
Years later, when the bombing of the City makes the luxury of distance
impossible (when the war has, finally, after almost a generation of baleful
predictions, arrived at their doorsteps), residents still seek the only kind of psychic
distance available to them: a constructed (albeit flimsy) one.
All of it was going on outside, somehow, even when the sound of the bombs
hitting started coming in through the open windows, and even when you
went outside, you could tell yourself it was some kind of crazy construction
accident, that the car, flung seventy-five feet into the façade of a brick
building, was just some kind of terrible joke. (p. 273)
Natalia’s mother chooses to watch it through the lens of the television screen, “as
if keeping [the TV] on would somehow isolate her from the thunder outside, as if
our city’s presence on the screen could somehow contain what was happening,
make it reasonable and distant and insignificant” (p. 274).
And yet, despite the barriers to witness, the text calls on its readers to do just that;
the novel’s opening scene underscores the imperative to do so. Four-year-old
Natalia is visiting the tigers at the zoo with her grandfather—a ritual that is, at
various times, burdensome, nostalgic and eventually, after her grandfather’s
death, a painful absence. But on this day, there is a kind of magic in the tigers,
“awake and livid, bright with rancour”, until, with terrible suddenness, the
dustpan man puts a hand through the bars to touch the tiger’s fur. What follows is
quick, loud and bloody, an image so potent that it will forever be seared in
Natalia’s memory—it is, in fact, her first memory. And, although she has not
chosen to look, she is not an accidental witness: “My grandfather has not turned
away. I am four years old, but he has not turned me away, either. I see it all, and,
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later, there is the fact that he wants me to have seen” (p. 4). With the benefit of
hindsight, Natalia does not wish her grandfather had protected her childhood self;
she does not admonish him for subjecting her to the pain of seeing. Instead, from
the distance of adulthood, she looks back into that cage and tried to understand
what happened there, and why. By implication, Natalia invites the reader (as
witness) to look with her.
As this chapter will explain, the nature of trauma—often unseen, unspeakable,
inherited and punctuated with absence—is such that even those closely affected
have difficulty witnessing it and conveying its impacts. However, the act of
witness is indeed possible and we must find ways to do so, particularly in the
context of narcotic modernity. This chapter will explain how the ambiguous
territorial and temporal setting of TTW provides the necessary remoteness and
somatic connection for a reader to engage as intimate-distant witness; articulate
how the barriers to witness and testimony within this narrative are embodied
within Natalia’s narrative arc; and establish how the embodiment of trauma
within the allegorical narrative of Galina and the tiger’s wife generates the
potential for empathic synaesthesia with the events of this series of punctual
traumas and their far-reaching impacts.
Territorial and temporal distance in The Tiger’s Wife
Territorial distance
While it is clear the novel is set in the Balkan region, a more specific geographic
or cultural location is impossible to establish, despite the novel’s disarming sense
of geographic particularity. TTW’s various townships are named and placed with
such careful specificity (“It was a small seaside village forty kilometers east of the
new border” [p. 20], “Past the villages of Kolac and Glog, where the seaward
slope was topped with new hotels, pink and columned, windows flung wide and
the laundry hanging still on the balcony lines” [p. 137]) that is tempting to fetch
out the map and search for them. However, although some towns and landmarks
reference the real, as Obreht presents them they are both imaginary (fictionalised
or simply fictional) and deliberately disorientating; “even a native of the region
will get lost in time and space trying to define those signifiers” (Raljević, p. 10).
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The author’s intentionality regarding the geographic displacement of the novel is
evident in the text itself, particularly its (frequent) references to “the City”, which,
unlike the townships and villagers, is never named yet consistently capitalised, as
if to warn the reader not to try to geolocate the narrative. It is set somewhere, but
not-here.
Of course, aspects of this geographic displacement can be read as a function of
the novel’s historical context. The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia was a
protracted and complex carving up of land, icons, culture and identity; in the
years following the war(s), its residents navigated a landscape that was suddenly
unfamiliar, irrevocably changed. In TTW, this rewriting of geography is most
clearly illustrated in the image of Natalia and Zóra’s map, a relic of the old
country and their sentimentality for it:
We had an old map, which we kept in the car years after it had become
inaccurate. We had used the map on every road trip we had ever taken, and
it showed in the marker scribbling all over it: the crossed-out areas we were
supposed to avoid on the way to some medical conference or other, the
stick-man holding the crudely drawn skis on a mountain resort we had loved
that was no longer part of our country. I couldn’t find Zdrevkov, the place
where my grandfather died, on that map. I couldn't find Brejevina either, but
I had known in advance that it was missing, so we had drawn it in. (p. 14)
Nevertheless, the townships’ geographic ambiguities are not only a legacy of war,
they also add territorial distance for the reader. At times the sense of displacement
that permeates the novel’s space is mythologised—again, with a sense of
intentionality. The village of Galina, which will be the focus of much of the
discussion in this chapter, “does not appear on a map … My mother could tell me
nothing about it; my grandma had never been there” (pp. 96-97); this reads as an
almost-conspiratorial hint to the audience about the unplaceable nature of the
narrative: it is not-here.
Temporal distance
The novel also gives the illusion of specificity when it comes to its temporal
setting. From the first page, as the narrator shares her earliest memory, she is
careful to situate even this nostalgia-laced reminiscence within a specific
chronology: “It is autumn, and I am four years old” (p. 1). Indeed, almost
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everything in the novel is time-stamped in some way: the war (“twelve years
ago”), the bombing (“a few years before my grandfather died”), the apothecary’s
hanging (“more than sixty years ago”). However, the narrative chronology is an
entirely personal one; it is tethered to the events of Natalia’s life but kept adrift of
any broader temporal anchors. An external (national) chronology can only be
discerned through establishing the year of the narrative’s telling, and the
narrator’s age—and this is made difficult because there are dual temporal settings,
even in Natalia’s story. There is her journey to the village of Brejevina—a
narrative thread that, at least initially, reads as if it were set in the present.
However, this time marker is also consistently undercut. It is not-now, even when
it seems like the temporal setting is contemporary, because of a persistent
hindsight that hints at some later, or even future, telling.
This temporal ambiguity, which is established in the first chapter, allows
childhood to bleed into adulthood. Natalia’s in-scene visit to the zoo is layered
with realisations she has only come to as an adult. Of the tigers, she says:
Striped-lashed shoulders rolling, they flank one another up and down the
narrow causeway of rock, and the smell of them is sour and warm and fills
everything. It will stay with me the whole day, even after I have had my
bath and gone to bed, and it will return at random times: at school, at a
friend’s birthday party, even years later, at the pathology lab, or on the drive
home from Galina. (p. 2)
And of the dustpan man’s post-injury outburst, she says: “At the time, I believe
this is fear, but later I will know it as embarrassment” (p. 4). While this voice of
hindsight initially reads as compatible with Natalia’s journey to the village of
Brejevina as a young doctor, it continues to interrupt the apparentlycontemporaneous narrative threads, also, hinting persistently that the narrative
pieces can only be put together into a coherent whole with the benefit of an
unspecified amount of time: “…it reminded me that I was the prisoner of a rite I
no longer felt necessary. I didn’t know at the time that the rite wasn’t solely for
my benefit” (p. 32), this future-narrator Natalia, says, or: “Having sifted through
everything I now know about the tiger’s wife” (p. 91, emphasis added). Again, the
now, is also not-now.
The text’s temporal displacement is also apparent when Galina (her grandfather’s
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birthplace and the location for the allegory of the tiger’s wife) is introduced. Here,
the narrative shifts abruptly to a fatalistic second-person voice. “To get to Galina,
you must leave the City at daybreak,” (p. 96), it begins. “You have a map, but it is
useless”, “already your radio is picking up news from across the border, but the
signal is faint, and the voices are lost to static for minutes at a time.” In its
fatalistic presentation, the reader’s journey to Galina is foreseeable and certain.
Again, the not-now is undercut and the temporal displacement is intentional. It is
soon, perhaps, or at least inevitable.
Even at the end of the novel, when Natalia has gathered all the allegorical pieces
and put them together, the narrative’s temporal distance is unclear. “Eventually, I
will know enough to tell myself the story of my grandfather’s childhood” (p.
334), Natalia says, from an uncertain temporal perspective. The only clue to the
true chronology of the book (established in the final chapter, through this line:
“People who talk about my grandfather’s death now talk about the boys from
Zdrevkov” p. 333, emphasis added) is that Natalia’s friend and companion Zóra
now works at the Neurology Institute in Zurich and has a son who “has reached
that age where he understands objects best by hiding them up his nose”. The
overall effect is one of temporal disorientation.
Impacts of territorial and temporal distance
One of the advantages of the temporal and territorial distance and displacement
afforded by the fictional(ised) landscape and chronology is the capacity it gives
the novel to simultaneously reassure readers, as traumatic witnesses, that the
narrative is not-here and not-now. The geographic distance serves to separate the
reader from the factual realities of the historical traumas it comments on. The
comfort of psychic distance protects readers from the disengaging (and disremembering) forces of psychic shock. Instead of a literal investigation of the
Balkan war(s), Obreht gives us an apparently much safer story (in the sense that it
is less likely to induce psychic shock), set in a place that is overtly not-here, notnow and in fact not-real. This distance enables the readers, as intimate-distant
witness, to connect, even when that act of witness must take place within the
context of a real world saturated by the numbing impact of more than a decade of
coverage of conflict within the Balkans—unending trauma, reported on night after
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night, war after war.
Moreover, the novel’s territorial distance and the language of the allegory serve to
universalise the narrative (not-here, as I will discuss later, could-be-here, or at
least could-be-somewhere-like-here), and remove many of the political, religious
and cultural labels that might prevent empathic engagement, particularly with
respect to the Other. The bloody dismantling of former Yugoslavia was not a
single war, but a series of wars, complex and catastrophic and fraught with
historical and cultural and religious context. As such, the territorial and temporal
distance of the novel is also ideological and political and, as Obreht (in Shephard,
n.p.) acknowledges, represents a deliberate decision not to comment (or indeed,
side with) any specific political agenda:
“I was really interested in human stories, rather than political specifics. I
deliberately didn’t put real place names or historical events—what
happened here or there—or particular conflicts because what I’d been
exposed to and what I’d come to understand was the aftermath of it, rather
than the war itself … the fallout, rather than the particulars.”
Somatic intimacy in The Tiger’s Wife
The wars’ aftermath and fallout, while tangibly imprinted on Natalia’s strand of
the narrative, cannot be articulated to a reader (as witness) only through Natalia’s
perspective. Even with a distance of time and hindsight, Natalia is unable to
adequately name or interpret the traceless traces of her trauma, or that of the
people she encounters. Instead, it is within the imaginative language of allegory
that these traumas find their most poignant representations. This section will first
explore the narrative barriers to witness and testimony within this punctual
trauma, before establishing the somatic intimacy embodied in the allegorical
narrative of the tiger’s wife and the village of Galina. This simultaneous
connection and remoteness positions the reader as intimate-distant witness. I will
then investigate the ways this somatic connection might enable empathic
synaesthesia.
The impossibility of human witness
Natalia’s narrative provides context for the novel’s more imaginative allegorical
strands and is an important grounding force in the text. The allegory of the tiger’s
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wife (and the deathless man, which is less central to this discussion but
nevertheless shares parallel functionality) can only be understood within the
context of Natalia and her former country’s stories. However, Natalia herself
faces substantial barriers to witness and, as an act of testimony, this strand of the
narrative alone cannot represent the traumatic aftershocks of the war. The
narration very rarely acknowledges Natalia’s fear or horror; distant bombings and
more closely-felt encounters with the reality of war are narrated by Natalia with
glib resilience. She necessarily holds the wars and their impacts at a distance; she
is numbed by their frequency and closeness. In Natalia’s matter-of-fact retelling,
the horror of war is simply fact—it cannot adequately be experienced by her and
her peers, and it is thus impossible to transmit to a reader through her perspective.
For example, she characterises the disappearance of her classmates with stark
simplicity:
On one hand, life went on. Six or seven kids from my class disappeared
almost immediately—without warning, without goodbyes, the way refugees
tend to do—but I still trudged to school with a packed lunch. (p. 33)
Description of the destruction of the social order of the City is similarly detached:
[The Administration] were going for structure, control, panic that produced
submission—what they got instead was social looseness and lunacy…
People would close their shops for lunch and go to the pub and not return
until three days later. You’d be on your way to the dentist and see him
sitting on someone’s stoop in his undershirt, wine bottle in hand, and then
you’d either join him or turn around and go home. It was innocent enough at
first—before the looting started some years later, before the paramilitary
rose to power—the kind of celebration that happens when people, without
acknowledging it, stand together on the brink of disaster. (p. 34)
Within the phase without acknowledging it, Natalia captures the paradox of
trauma. The war is everywhere—its impacts creep into her decisions, her
relationships, her psyche. However, its trauma is not—cannot be—acknowledged.
There are simply no words to contain the region’s experiences. There are rare
occasions in the text when the reality of the war is closer. When there is a rap at
the door, Natalia unwittingly lets in a representative of the Administration—the
hat, she calls him, signalling her ideological dissent through the quiet rebellion of
not giving him a name, not even capitalising his moniker. When he begins taking
an inventory of valuables in the family lounge room and asking questions about
her grandmother’s links to her Muslim-aligned birthplace (Sarobor, which has
been razed to the ground) Natalia, for the first time, feels overt fear: “My neck
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had stiffened up and drops of cold water from the towel were running down the
outside of my leg” (p. 46). The war has finally arrived, in some tangible way. But
even this contact with historical circumstance is fleeting; Natalia’s grandfather
sends the hat away and installs a deadbolt on the door, which provides both
physical and psychic protection. At least in narrative terms, the war is once again
held at arm’s length. The tone of detachment returns. Instead, we are left to intuit
the impacts of the war in two places: absence and silence.
‘The absence of classmates’
Despite efforts from the City’s citizens, the Administration and institutions to “go
on as before” but the war is nevertheless apparent, most palpably through
absence. For example, the landscape of Natalia’s classroom is punctuated with
absences—absent classmates, absent books, absent younger children who have
been moved closer to the bomb shelters. The most intimate absence is that of
Natalia’s first boyfriend Ori, though his disappearance cannot be adequately
named or mourned or spoken. The young man, who hangs around at the dock with
his three-legged mutt (a somatic absence, which I will explore further shortly),
wins her over with a Walkman and bootleg cassettes.25 He is her first kiss, and
they date for three months until “Ori, like many boys around that age,
disappeared” (p. 40). And when, after three nights waiting in their café to return
his Walkman to him, she is told he won’t be back—he’s been drafted, or fled the
draft—his absence lingers only briefly, but carries weight. Natalia says: “I kept
the Walkman, slept with it, which must have been some expression of missing
him, but the reality of his being gone wouldn’t sink in until other things went
missing.” When Natalia finally speaks the loss of him aloud to her grandfather,
there is little to say, except: “He’s gone” (p. 54).
Ori is not the only thing missing, gone, disappeared. After the war reaches the
City, the zoo is closed, there is no spinach at the markets, the streets are empty
and abandoned shopfronts dark. Natalia’s father is mentioned only once, in the
hat’s questions from the Administration, to which her grandfather responds
25

Music and pop culture are also an absence within the text. For Natalia, Ori’s music is a
welcome change from the Administration’s outdated folk songs. “Without knowing I was missing
them, I waned Bob Dylan and Paul Simon and Johnny Cash,” Natalia says (p. 39).
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simply: “There are no other men living here” (p. 45). The City is thick with
absence, as are the outlying townships. This is true, also, of Zdrevkov, where
Natalia’s grandfather died (another loss, an absence that haunts the narrator and
underpins the entire narrative of mourning); indeed, the grandfather’s absence is
underscored when the clinic that has his body loses his belongings. When Natalia
arrives to recover his watch and glasses and beloved copy of The Jungle Book,
she finds more absence—a man sleeping outside a house: “his right leg was
missing, a glaring purple stump just below the knee” (p. 138). In the tavern, the
barman’s “prosthetic arm dangled weightlessly from his elbow on metal joints”,
as he serves “a huge salt-and-pepper man [with] an eye patch and a burn-stippled
face” (p. 139). In this landscape, the war manifests in corporeal and cultural
absences; the missing limbs of soldiers are a somatic reminder of all the men who
will not return. Zdrevkov’s residents are forever haunted by what is no longer
there, and what cannot be recovered. Yet the narrative presents even these losses,
and that of Natalia’s grandfather, as distant and detached, factual absences that
cannot be adequately processed. When Natalia lies awake the night she learns of
her grandfather’s death, she is unable to dream him into being, or to mourn him:
“I hadn’t learned to think of him as dead yet, hadn’t processed news that seemed
too distant to belong to me, not even when I tried to bring it closer by thinking of
his absence from our house” (pp. 79-80).
‘The suddenness of it pushed me into silence’
So much of the traumatic impact of war, as it manifests in TTW, takes place in
silence—it is unspoken, unspeakable. Natalia understands this only when she tries
to respond to Fra Autun’s suffering with words. He is talking about his brother
Arlo, whose name is evoked often but not explained—another absence haunting
another village, this time Brejevina. Arlo’s dog, Bis, a “beautifully stupid blackheaded dog” (p. 22), is a prominent character in the village. Fra Autun’s parents’
house and the makeshift orphanage at the monastery and the cemetery are all
littered with imperfect paintings of the unlikely hound: “a lot of people took to it
after the war” (p. 267). It takes a long time for Fra Autun to talk about what
happened to his brother. Arlo was fifteen the year before the war started and made
friends with some boys who took him camping. A week later, Fra Autun tells
Natalia, they found him dead in the dumpster at the front of their house.
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“…that whole week he was gone, Bis sat next to the dumpster and didn’t
move, and we all thought he was waiting by the road for Arlo to come back.
Except we had it wrong—he was waiting for us to find Arlo. … So—we
found out a few years later that those kids he had gone camping with served
with the paramilitary on the border. And now, people paint Bis.” (p. 268)
Upon hearing of Arlo’s death, Natalia considers, “trying to think of something to
say to that, something besides I’m sorry…” but eventually she does say it, I’m
sorry, “and regretted it immediately, because it just fell out of my mouth and
continued to fall, and did nothing” (p. 268). She realises how inadequate words
are to express her sympathy and sadness (and the guilt of knowing the murderers
were from her side of the border), understanding, perhaps, why the villagers chose
to paint Bis, over and over, instead:
I wanted to say I knew, but I didn’t know. He could have said your
paramilitary, but he didn’t. I kept waiting for him to say it, but he didn’t,
and then I let him not say anything, and I didn’t say anything, either … (p.
268)
In this way, characters’ personal and historical traumas are often carried in
silence, and the stories they narrate about themselves and each other are
constructed around—or instead of—gaping omissions, which cannot be given
voice. Natalia’s grandfather shares a childhood memory about playing house with
a little girl who one day made him oleander leaf soup, poisoning him until the
apothecary arrived and intervened to save his life. But he never mentions “the
winter of his own illness, a fever that ripped through the village—despite the
apothecary’s best efforts, my grandfather was the only child under the age of
twelve to survive it, six buried in snow, his entire generation, even Mirica of the
oleander leaves” (p. 102). A realisation that her grandfather has also lost children
dawns on Natalia suddenly, as she stares at dozens of pictures of Bis:
Sitting in that hot, moist room with the dogs in all shapes and sizes and
colors spread out in front of me made me remember how, for years during
the war, [my grandfather] had collected my old things—dolls, baby clothes,
books—to take to the orphanage downtown. He would take the tram there
and always walk back, and when he came home I knew not to disturb him.
They had lost children themselves, my grandparents: a son and a daughter,
both stillborn, within a year of each other. It was another thing they never
talked about, a fact I somehow knew without knowing how I’d ever heard
about it, something buried so long ago, in such absolute silence, that I could
go for years without remembering it. When I did, I was always stunned by
the fact that they had survived it, this thing that sat between them,
barricaded for everyone else, despite what they had been able to cling
together, and raise my mother, and take trips, and laugh, and raise me.
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(pp.129-130)
The anecdotes of personal contact with the war, personal loss, personal absence
always arise like this, organically, in the midst of another story, as if the trauma is
casual or perhaps just inseparable from the everyday, itself a horrible normal. In
the midst of another trauma (the night her family cabin burns down), Natalia
hypothesises that the only way to live with pain is a kind of amnesia of it. “My
mother always says that fear and pain are immediate, and that, when they’re gone,
we’re left with the concept, but not the true memory—why else, she reasons,
would anyone give birth more than once” (p. 166) she thinks, as she hoses the
walls to try to protect them from the fire. Looking back, she is intellectually aware
that there must have been “tremendous pain” the night of the fire, that it was
unbearable. But she cannot call back the memory of the pain, only disjointed and
absurd images, and when the neighbours tell the story, they silence their own
pain, also:
Eventually, as they always do, people would find a way to extract humor
even from that evening. They would laugh openly about it, make jokes
about the barbeque up at Slavko’s place—the pigs and the chickens and
goats cindering down in their pens as the night wore on—and nobody would
ever mention that they had five or six hours as the fire wound closer to get
the animals out, to stop the screaming that would eventually rise over the
deafening noise of the fire. Nobody ever mentions that, at the time, they
were so absolutely certain of more war that it was easier for them to let
livestock burn where they stood than to save them, only to have our soldiers
return and take it all from them again. (pp. 167-168)
There are no words to represent the trauma of war; the characters cannot tell that
story. The burden of representation is simply too great for the landscape of the
real, punctuated as it is with absence and silence. And so the trauma manifests in
other ways, is given allegorical body. Natalia’s grandfather, who enacts his own
wartime trauma through trying to reclaim and renegotiate the rituals lost to the
past, returns to the zoo. He guides us to the tiger, who guides us back further,
through one trauma and back to all the ones buried before it, into an imaginary
and allegorical landscape in which trauma may be embodied and the corporeal
consciousness awakened in order to generate empathic synaesthesia.
‘The tiger did not know that they were bombs’: The tiger as allegorical
embodiment of trauma
Without a language to explain or excuse or understand the happenings around
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him, it is the tiger whose visceral horror and fear gives body to war’s trauma and
invokes the intimate-distant witness’ corporeal consciousness. When, in 1941,
German bombs rain on the city:
The tiger did not know that they were bombs. He did not know anything
beyond the hiss and screech of the fighters passing overhead, missiles
falling, the sound of bear bellowing in another part of the forest, the
sudden silence of the birds. (p. 91)
The tiger begins to starve, alone in his zoo cage, foreshadowing the loss of
security that will later fall over the rest of the City: “[t]hat hunger … had burned
in him a kind of awareness of his own death, an imminent and innate knowledge
he could neither dismiss nor succumb to. He did not know what to do with it” (p.
91). His legs give out, he cannot move, cannot react. He is stripped of even his
animal voice—unable to find the sounds to express the pain and fear, unable to
make sound at all. Alongside the allegorical tiger, we must wander through the
City as rubble shreds his feet, past looters, smelling the “scent of death that clung
to the wind” (p. 93), walking for days through marshland clogged with the dead.
The bombs have marked the tiger; he’s been hit by shrapnel, sending rubble into
his flank and head: “bits that would gnaw at his flesh for weeks until he got used
to the grainy ache of them when he rolled on his side or scratched himself against
trees” (p. 91). The tiger is forever changed by what he has been through,
physically sickened by the dead. “Bodies lay in piles by the roadside and hung
like pods, split open and drying, from the branches of trees” (p. 94) and the tiger,
who has lost his hunting instincts, waits for them to fall, scavenges them until his
fur is diseased with mange. He limps on, searching for safety that no longer
exists. It is, of course, not the first trauma that the land he travels through has
seen, and it will not be the last. But where he takes us is to Galina, a town that
becomes a broader allegory for a country at war, in fragments, and in pain. In
particular, I will focus here on two aspects: the intergenerational nature of trauma,
and what Natalia’s grandfather calls the unravelling nature of the war: that is, the
dual burdens of trauma’s persistence, and its suddenness.
Galina, a site of intergenerational trauma
The landscape of Galina is one that betrays its brutal past. It is forsaken:
populated with ramshackle houses, doorless inns and a silent grey church with an
empty parking lot. There has not been a petrol shipment in weeks and abandoned
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houses are being reclaimed by trees and vines. The sun glints off the “last
surviving window of the monastery” (p. 97), where for centuries villagers
(proficient in battling bears, snow and dead ancestors) had been taking refuge
from “the first sign of a Turkish horde”. It is not a village that welcomes
outsiders: “[e]veryone will be at the tavern, sitting on the open benches of the
porch; everyone will see you, but no one will look at you”. (p. 98)
It is into this community that the tiger’s wife arrived, some seventy years before
the narrative’s not-now telling. The tiger’s wife is Otherness personified. The
villagers have no name for her (her husband, Luka, has forgotten it and cannot
ask) so she is referred to simply as the deaf-mute girl by her neighbours. Her
disability arouses mocking (the village children follow her into town, yelling
unheard obscenities at her) and suspicion (they agree that her presence “was
intended to hide something, because a deaf-mute girl could not reveal the truth
about the assorted vices [Luka] was presumed to have” [p. 211]). In a landscape
where race, culture and religion are fraught battlelines, the tiger’s wife carries the
intersectional trauma of her deafness and her Mohammedan background, which
even Luka realises means “she would remind them too much of the last war, their
fathers’ fears, stories they’d heard of sons lost to the sultan” (p. 211).
Although she has arrived as the bride of Luka, the butcher, the tiger’s wife is
isolated from the village. She is subjected to a string of male violence; her fatherin-law tries to rape her, her husband beats her, the bear-catcher tries to kill her.
There is also the more subtle, structural fear of showing the villagers who she is,
of hanging Turkish silks in her house. Eventually, the village’s curiosity grows
into suspicion—it is indeed her Otherness that causes the village to turn on her.
When she befriends the tiger—the only creature who, in his silence, understands
and witnesses her—the village’s suspicion deepens, and they eventually attack her
and the tiger. However, the tiger’s wife is not the only villager who suffers. As the
narrative advances, it unpicks a complex tapestry of intergenerational trauma,
looking further and further back at the inherited roots of each character’s flaws
and actions, interrogating their motivations. In its structure, the allegory of the
tiger’s wife examines each character in turn, tracing back the traceless traces of
trauma, bringing them to the surface and giving them form, so they may be
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experienced, felt, by the intimate-distant witness.
In Galina, trauma is everywhere. Even Natalia’s grandfather (who, as a tigerobsessed child, befriends the deaf-mute girl) comes from a legacy of trauma: his
mother died in childbirth, his midwife grandmother (who has the “hands of a
labourer”) had already raised six children, half of whom were not hers, and he is
the only child of his generation to have survived the illness. Within the village,
there is also Dariša the Bear, who—angered at his inability to capture the tiger—
beats the tiger’s wife almost to death. But to understand him, “you have to go
back to his childhood, to things no one in the village had heard about” (p. 240).
His life, too, is one characterised by absence and silence: “All around him, he felt
only absence, as wide and heavy as a ship. The absence of people on the street,
the absence of his father…” Dariša’s most traumatic childhood absence was “the
absence of certainty” that his gravely ill sister Magdelena would be alive when he
returned home on any given day and even this is eventually replaced by another,
worse, absence. She dies; his father suicides not long after.
The allegory of Galina gives form to the invisible wounds of intergenerational
trauma. Characters’ actions are not forgiven or condoned, but they are
contextualised by their backstories, which reveal the complexity of their flaws.
This is most clearly illustrated in the lives of two men: the deaf-mute girl’s
husband, Luka, who beats her, and the apothecary, who kills her. Luka, as he is
initially presented, is a cruel and terrifying figure, always wearing an apron
soaked in blood. “Something about that apron made the townspeople
uncomfortable. They were, in one capacity, all butchers themselves …” but the
villagers don’t understand why Luka “didn’t at least change to conduct his
business transactions, didn’t do his best to smell like something other than the
sour insides of cows and sheep” (p. 111). Luka is the perpetrator of the book’s
most direct and graphic violence, repeatedly beating his wife, who suffers his
heinous attacks in her silence. Later, we learn what Luka was like as a boy, the
sixth son of a cruel and violent man, “the only person in the house, it seemed,
who ever laughed and never at the right thing” (p. 190), a veteran soldier of three
different “armies”, all casually chosen for siding against Turkish forces. Luka,
too, is Othered by the village; he is “too soft”, “too easy in his manner”, too
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interested in writing love songs and “[t]oo eager to strip naked and bathe with
other young men in the mountain lake” (p. 192). At the age of 14, he is locked up
with a knife and a bull that has pepper in his nostrils; when he fails to kill the
animal, it gores him. Later, he is tricked out of the only happiness he has ever
experienced when his intended bride (a friend whose desire to remain a virgin
forever surely stems from yet another trauma) leaves him for another man and he
is married to her deaf-mute child sister. His songs—his only ticket out of the
village—are stolen from him too. And so—alone and robbed of his future—he
unwittingly remakes himself in the image of the man he so hated: the father
whose “tendency to overlook cleaning his apron, or to eat bread with blood-rusted
nail beds” he has been trying to distance himself from his whole life (p. 191).
Luka, in the aftermath of his traumas, becomes a reflection of his father and the
allegorical embodiment of intergenerational and inherited trauma. So pervasive is
it that is shapes, identifies and eventually consumes him.
Across town, the apothecary is also the product of a spiderweb of grief and
trauma. He is found as an orphaned child wandering the rubble of a destroyed
monastery after “four days of siege and slaughter.” The invading Turkish forces
spare him because of his (Mohammedan) name, imprinting on the apothecary a
complex relationship with his culture and identity. “Saved by his name once, he
did not expect it to save him again” (p. 308), so when he is met by a band of
hijackers, he lies and tells them he cannot remember what he is called. He is
rechristened, but “the new name meant nothing: changed once, he would change it
again and again. Yet his old name, and what it had meant, would follow him,
unshed, for the rest of his life. … The name brought uncertainty, the awareness of
a certain kind of betrayal whose consequences he would always anticipate. Like a
vulture, the name sat between his shoulders, keeping him apart…” (p. 308).
The spectre of his name and Otherness follows the blacksmith to Galina, where—
as an outsider—he must work harder to gain the villagers’ trust. He cannot speak
his fear when the deaf-mute girl arrives, “how the villagers’ treatment of her must
have reinforced his need to keep himself a secret, to keep them mesmerized and
unsuspecting, however ashamed he must have been for neglecting to intervene on
her behalf” (p. 313). His vulnerability is reinforced when he is unable to save a
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whole generation of village children from illness, and the locals stop seeking his
services: “He was, and always had been, and outsider, and when his dependability
failed, he had felt his hold on the village slipping” (p. 315). It is this cultivated
fear of the outsider that prompts the apothecary to poison the tiger’s wife; it is the
only way to win the village back and reclaim his own security amongst them.
Nevertheless, the betrayal he has been anticipating his whole life finally catches
up. When German soldiers sweep through the village, it is the apothecary who is
hung, as a “pointless example” to the village by two men from the next village
who are “asked—not forced—to carry out the executions” (p. 320). The
apothecary, who is never named, only known by his occupation, is an outsider,
even in death, not even buried in the graveyard.
There is a fatalism in the roles Luka and the apothecary both play, despite the
ways they respectively rebel and struggle against, but then succumb to, forces that
are apparently larger than themselves. The reader, as intimate-distant witness,
must inhabit both men’s inescapable, defining intergenerational trauma. In giving
the concept intense somatic form, the allegory of Galina transmits the experience
to the reader, who—trapped inside the perspectives of the two men—comes to
reluctantly agree that the characters are not wrong to fear and expect the sudden
and terrible onset of something else, the next stage of a war that cannot end.
A territory of terrible Suddenness
On the eve of the total destruction of Sarobor, the grandfather has a conversation
with the deathless man, who believes that generally, suddenness is the better way
for a person to die:
“Doctor, if your life ends in suddenness, you will be glad it did, and if it
does not you will wish it had. … You do not prepare, you do not explain,
you do not apologize. Suddenly, you go. And with you, you take all
contemplation, all consideration of your own departure. All the suffering
that would have come from knowing comes after you have gone, and you
are not part of it.” (p. 297)
And this is, perhaps true of an individual death. However, it is not true of war. As
the deathless man acknowledges, in war it is the suddenness that is terrible:
“[t]here is going to be a lot of suddenness, Doctor, over the next few years…
They are going to be long, long years” (p. 297). The psychic impact of this
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cumulative suddenness is that it can be expected, feared, relied upon. TTW takes
place in a landscape where suddenness is a terrible inevitability and this traumatic
awareness impacts all the characters.
For example, Dariša the Bear first understands the burden of expected suddenness
when he sees his sister have a fit: “Looking at her, he suddenly felt ambushed,
stifled by the soundless arrival of something else that had eased into the room…”
(p. 242). From that night onwards, his life is not the same—he knows her death is
inevitable, must wait for it and try to prepare for it. “Death, winged and quiet, was
already in the house with him. It hovered in the spaces between people and things,
between his bed and the lamp, between his room and Magdalena’s—always there,
drifting between rooms, especially when his mind was temporarily elsewhere,
especially when he was asleep” (p. 242). He spends his evenings searching for it,
and when it finally arrives, it is both sudden and expected. Magdalena collapses
and hits her head while Dariša is tying his shoe. And then, there is more terrible
and predictable suddenness: “Afterward, other things collapsed in small piles
around him—the kingdom went first, and the wars that united it into a new one
bankrupted his father, who hanged himself from one of the many bridges that
spanned the Nile, far away, in Egypt” (p. 248). After this, there is the Great War
and the poverty that follows, the difficulty of eking out a living from “the pockets
of the rich who fled or died or went broke, assumed other identities, adopted other
kingdoms” (p. 249).
Traumatic suddenness manifests in the arrival of the war: “For weeks, the City
had been trying to process the suddenness of the war, the actuality of its arrival”
(p. 277). For Natalia, her grandfather’s illness also seems to arrive suddenly.
During the bombing, he begins to change his rituals, trading “the rituals of
comfort” for “the preventative rituals that come at the end of life”. His patients
start dying, he trades his TV shows for naps, he stops eating the rich foods he had
always loved. Natalia says: “It happened while I wasn’t looking, but Grandma
was preparing separate meals for him now” (p. 275). None of this suddenness is
comforting, because none of it is unexpected. As each character encounters
trauma for the first time, they grow distrustful of the world, inclined to expect the
arrival of some other cruelty. The grandfather embodies this sentiment when he
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realises the villagers will kill his beloved tiger: “[he] felt the inevitability of
disaster run by him like a river against whose current he was completely helpless”
(p. 305).
Galina, and its unending war(s)
It is not just that war and its atrocities are reliably sudden, it is also that they do
not end. In the allegorical landscape of Galina, echoes of past traumas linger. For
example, the battle of the tiger and the bear endures: “To this day, on such and
such a night, you can still hear the ringing of their battle when the wind blows
east through the treetops of Galina” (p. 302), just as the memory of previous
traumas are still raw and fresh, certain to be re-lived and repeated. Even Natalia’s
grandfather, who is the novel’s most hopeful character, acknowledges this
eventually, on the night of the Sarobor bombing: “This war never ends… It was
there when I was a child and it will be here for my children’s children” (p. 297).
It is a realisation Natalia comes to, also, as her City is bombed.
Now, in the country’s last hour, it was clear to him, as it was to me, that the
cease-fire had provided the delusion of normalcy, but never peace. When
your fight has purpose—to free you from something, to interfere on the
behalf of an innocent—it has a hope of finality. When the fight is about
unravelling—when it is about your name, the places to which your blood is
anchored, the attachment of your name to some landmark or event—there is
nothing but hate, and the long, slow progression of people who feed on it
and are fed it, meticulously by the ones who came before them. Then the
fight is endless, and comes in waves and waves, but always retains its
capacity to surprise those who hope against it. (p. 281)
Perhaps the best evidence of the empathic potential of allegory in the text is the
weight the author gives it within the narrative. The damage wrought by war is not
understood in the facts of the war, which were the focus of media coverage of the
conflicts—the number of deaths, the damage, the lasting economic and health
impacts. It is not information—that which does not survive the moment—that the
writer uses to appeal to a reader’s understanding. Instead, she turns to allegory
and the somatic; the psychic stress of war’s infinite unravelling is rendered most
powerfully in the allegory of the tiger Zbogom, trapped in the zoo. He is a
descendent of Galina’s tiger, whose own legacy of trauma must also have been
passed down generations, and he is unable to cope with the aftermath of the war:
Months later, for weeks and weeks after the bombing ended, Zbogom the
tiger continued to eat his own legs. He was docile, tame, to the keepers, but
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savage on himself, and they would sit in the cage with him, stroking the big
square block of his head while he gnawed on the stumps of his legs. (p. 300)
There is no cure for the tiger’s condition, no way to stop him. They try tying his
feet, making him a collar, pacifying and protecting him in every way possible. But
the tiger cannot be convinced that there isn’t yet something terrible coming.
Eventually, the only solace for the animal is in death and even then, the trauma
continues, is inherited, cannot be put to rest. Other tigers continue to enact it:
They say the tiger’s mate killed and ate one of her cubs the following
spring. To the tigress, the season meant red light and heat, a sound that rises
and falls like a scream; so the keepers took the remaining cubs away from
her, raised them in their own houses, with their own pets and children.
Houses without electricity, with no running water for weeks on end. Houses
with tigers. (p. 300)
The infinite unravelling of war affects all characters in TTW—we know it affects
them, although they rarely give voice to its impacts. However, it is within the
allegorical form of the tiger that we feel, with our sense-consciousness, the
impacts most closely. The tiger, as embodied traumatic memory, facilitates
somatic connection for the reader, as intimate-distant witness.
Empathic synaesthesia in The Tiger’s Wife
The allegorical framing of the village of Galina, the tiger and the story of the
tiger’s wife gives body to the complex historical trauma of the Balkan wars. The
novel shrinks an entire region’s trauma into the not-here of a fictional village,
Galina, so that it can be seen without enacting the shock reflex, while also holding
it at a reassuring temporal distance: not-now. The territorial and temporal distance
enables intimate-distant witness, while simultaneously universalising the narrative
and giving events urgency. Through the allegorical components of the book, the
region’s pain—which is impossible to speak, perceptible only in silence and
absence—is felt, synaesthetically, a refereed pain. It can be experienced in the
story of Galina, the violence against the tiger’s wife, the tiger’s confusion and the
town’s intergenerational trauma and psychic angst. In attaching these allegories to
the more realistic thread of Natalia’s recollections of the war, the reader’s
empathic synaesthesia can be transferred to an understanding of the book’s
historical context.
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Where factual reporting on the Balkan conflicts may numb the senses, TTW has
the potential to awaken readers to their enduring impacts. The novel’s somatic
intensity and allegorical interpretation demand active witness, situating the
experience as Erfahrung and increasing the potential for such an understanding to
be committed to collective memory as memorie volontaire. And, while the
allegorical landscape of the novel is haunted by the unending trauma, it invokes
this memory not just as act of testimony and witness but also a traumatic warning.
In TTW, the reason the war doesn’t end is that trauma mutates into fear and then
hatred. The narrative presents this—for example, in the way the village turns on
the tiger and the tiger’s wife—as inevitable; the villagers don’t understand her, or
the tiger, or even themselves. But the intimate-distant witness has the power to
resist this inevitability—indeed, the tiger offers a means of resistance:
The tiger saw the girl as she had seen him: without judgement, fear,
foolishness, and somehow the two of them understood each other without
exchanging a single sound. (p. 218)
The village, who have been trained to predict the sudden arrival of trauma, have
learned to fear the Other, which arrived in the form of the deaf-mute girl and her
tiger:
[B]ecause that winter was the longest anyone could remember, and filled
with a thousand small discomforts, a thousand senseless quarrels, a thousand
personal shames, the tiger’s wife shouldered the blame for the villagers’
misfortunes. So their talk about her was constant, careless, and unburdening
… Truths, half-truths, utter delusions drifted like shadows into
conversations he was intended to overhear. (p. 215)
Fear also colours the villagers’ perception of the tiger—they see it as a devil, a
spectre of the death they have learned to expect, the terrible suddenness that is
always around the corner. “[T]hey did not know … that the tiger was concrete,
lonely, different” (p. 217). The allegory of the tiger’s wife’s violent ending is the
product of intergenerational trauma, the expected suddenness of tragedy, and the
inevitable continuation of the war. And it may endure further. In Galina, even
now, as Natalia tells it, they do not let their children out after dark, and they
cannot tell you why. The village, which can be read as an allegory for the Balkan
region, is trapped in an endless cycle of brutality. It is those who are different—
Othered by race, sexuality, religion—who become the focus of a fear that has
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been sharpened by generations of trauma:
If the situation had been different—if the people of Galina had been more
aware of their own ephemeral isolation, more conscious that it was only a
matter of time before the war tightened around them—their regard for the
tiger and his wife might have been more cursory. Isn’t it strange, the might
have said, here is a kind of love story, and then moved on to some other
point of gossip. But they attached their anxious grief to the girl so they
could avoid looking past her to what was coming. After her death, their time
with her became the unifying memory that carried them into the spring,
through the arrival of the Germans with their trucks, and later their railroad,
which the villagers were made to build…. and even further than that. (p.
335)
As the last line of the quote implies, there is still more to come, in part because
the village still misunderstands the tiger, has poured their fears and pain and
anxious grief into him, too. But to the grandfather, the story’s absent teller, the
tiger is not a source of fear, but the allegorical representation of innocence stolen,
cast away from the village “in a glade where the winter does not go away”:
He has forgotten the citadel, the nights of fire, his long and difficult journey
to the mountain. Everything lies dead in his memory, except for the tiger’s
wife, for whom, on certain nights, he goes calling, making that tight note
that falls and falls. The sound is lonely, and low, and no one hears it
anymore. (p. 336)
Trauma may be invisible, unspeakable, but in its allegorical form it can be
witnessed by an intimate-distant reader. The somatic language of allegory gives
the tiger, as representation of historical trauma, form and voice. For the intimatedistant witness, the tiger can, by process of empathic synaesthesia, be seen and
heard. He can be felt, too. The Balkan wars are no longer “far-off and
impenetrable”; the tiger’s cry may be temporally and territorially distant but it is
nevertheless close and urgent. For, as the novel proceeds, the comfort of its
geographic and temporal distance grows colder. After all, not-here is only
comforting if it is a real place; allegorical distance carries with it, always, a threat.
It-could-be-here. If something is un-placeable in time and space, it could be
anywhere. It could even be here.
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Chapter 4
‘You need to know what you are’: structural trauma in The
Natural Way of Things
…somehow the kind of visceral nature of the prose or the story or
whatever gets them in the gut, in the body rather than in the intellect.
And I had that response from a lot of people, actually, that it was sort of
that they felt as though they were reading it with their body. And I felt
like I was writing it with my body half the time.
— Charlotte Wood26
Our bodies tell us things that our heads don’t know, or we don’t want to
know about—that we suffer, we are vulnerable, we will die. Or,
paradoxically, that we will survive. Regardless of the emotional and
mental anguish, our bodies force us to go on. Our bodies remind us that
we are animals, that we are connected with a non-human world, like it or
not. I find that strangely moving and satisfying.
— Charlotte Wood27
Context
I have argued that allegory, as embodiment of history and trauma, facilitates
somatic intimacy and empathy, whilst allowing the (territorial and temporal)
distance to mitigate the psychic shock response. Charlotte Wood’s The Natural
Way of Things (henceforth TNWOT) is a particularly somatic narrative. Indeed,
the body is the central force in the visceral book, which can almost physically be
felt, smelled, which needs to be washed off. It has been widely cast as “dystopian
fable” (Wyndham 2015) and “an allegory of thuggish misogyny then evolved into
a far stranger and more challenging feminist parable” (Powers 2016). It gives
stark and brutal allegorical form to the often intangible, invisible forces of
gendered oppression and violence; however, the novel also has roots in a specific
punctual trauma.
26
27

in The Garrett 2018, n.p.
in Edwards 2013, p. 56.
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Wood’s initial intent was to write a novel about the Hay Girls Institute in
Parramatta, New South Wales (Australia), “a place of secondary punishment for
‘incorrigible’ girls who the authorities considered needed ‘extra training’”
(Parragirls n.d., n.p.). From 1961 to 1974, the facility housed up to 12 girls at a
time. These girls (and they were, in fact, girls, not yet adults) were transported
from the state prison under cover of darkness and sedated on arrival, before being
locked in a “scrubbing cell” for the first ten days. They were made to wear
institutional clothing, their hair was cropped short and they were brutally
disciplined as their days were filled with hard labour: laying and breaking up
concrete paths, digging, scrubbing. In Hay, there could be no visitors, no mail, no
schooling and no privacy; the girls were not allowed to speak without permission.
Wood says (in Wyndham, n.p.): “Nothing that happens in my book is anywhere
near what happened to those girls. The girls were talked about as sluts and ‘they
deserved to be there’. One reason many of them were there was they had been
sexually abused or assaulted in some way and they told someone about it, so then
it was ‘they are promiscuous’.” Thus, although the novel’s conceptual origins are
a punctual trauma—the Hay Institute for Girls—this instance of historical
violence can only be understood through a structural lens. Wood continues: “One
of the things I found heartbreaking about that place was the girls were blamed for
something that was done to them, that weird sick psychology of a culture that
says, ‘You’ve been assaulted so let’s lock you up’. I started having my ears and
eyes open for every political sex scandal and scapegoating of women.”
And indeed, the instances of scapegoating women were frequent. Dianne Brimble,
Kristy Fraser-Kirk, Monica Lewinsky: the women whose names became more
infamous than the men with whom their lives—and, in some cases, deaths—were
entangled, widened Wood’s focus. In a news sense, the stories might have been
fleeting—one scandal eclipsed by another—but the degradation of women
involved in sexual scandals or accusations is a pervasive cultural presence, and
the men involved shared the spotlight only briefly; they were rarely punished. The
women, on the other hand, were objectified, questioned, humiliated in the media.
And then, they dropped out of the public consciousness. “I realized that in all
these cases… the women just disappeared. In a storytelling sense, they vanish”
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(Wood in Baum 2015, p. 47).
TNWOT is, in some sense, a response to that cultural absence. It asks, what
happens to a woman who speaks up, after it is all over? The answer Woods
evokes is a prison in outback Australia where ten women wake, drugged, to find
themselves indefinitely and unlawfully detained. Although they are strangers,
they soon realise that they already know each other’s stories; they have all been
involved in public sex scandals. And now, they have been imprisoned, not with a
view to reform (there is no lesson to their toils, no hope of freedom through
repentance) nor to make an example of them (no one knows they are there). They
are punished simply for hatred of what they are and what they have done—or,
rather, what has been done to them.
This chapter will first analyse the temporal and geographic distance provided by
the novel’s allegorical structures, then its embodied and somatic approach to
giving visceral form to the structural trauma of misogyny and gendered violence.
TNWOT is rich with metaphor, and the opportunities to apply my theoretical
frameworks in the text are too numerous to be contained within the scope of this
chapter. Thus, I will focus on two key facets of the female experience,28 as
illustrated in the novel: the subjugation of the female body, and the systematic
silencing of the female voice. Finally, the analysis will focus on the way in both
its corporeal intimacy and (limited) territorial and temporal distance, the book
also gives form to the structural nature of these traumas.
Territorial and temporal distance in The Natural Way of Things
In contrast to The Tiger’s Wife, TNWOT offers a much closer geographic parallel
and almost no temporal detachment. There is just enough distance to provide
(albeit limited) psychic comfort and to underscore the novel’s allegorical intent,
but the not-here and not-now of Obreht’s novel are much closer to not-quite-here
and not-quite-now in Wood’s. As a result, the somatic experience of reading this
28

It is important to acknowledge that the novel interrogates gender in binary terms (the men and
the girls) and so this duality will be the focus of my discussion; however, I recognise that this is a
false binary, and there are representations (and thus, readings of this text) outside this duality that
are not within the scope of this chapter.
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text is an uncomfortable one, particularly with respect to the novel’s apparent
contemporaneity.
Territorial distance
Wood’s imaginative rendering of Hardings International’s prison29 is
ambiguously located in outback Australia. Because the characters are drugged
prior to their arrival, the reader can have no way of knowing how far the
ramshackle sheep station is from the nearest town or city—only that it is remote
enough to offer no chance of external salvation. Verla, the character for whom
location is the most persistent concern, spends her first days fixated on the
question: where are we? “Outback is the first word that comes to her. Then
rubbish tip” (p. 19).30 Then, “It cannot be the outback, where Verla has never
been. Has anyone? The outback is supposed to have red earth. This earth beneath
her boots is not red. You could not even call it earth; just threadbare ground, grey
dust, gravel” (p. 20). Beyond the acknowledgement that Hardings is situated in an
Australian landscape, TNWOT provides no further geographic clues. With few
exceptions, it also veils its characters’ geographic pasts (the girls remember
family, beaches, houses, but not specific or named places) and the one imposition
of the external world in the form of a hot air balloon flying low over the landscape
is fleeting and, perhaps, imagined. Rather than shielding the reader, the ambiguity
of the location lends the narrative a murky, geographic potentiality; it is indeed
not-here but Hardings could be anywhere, which means it could be nearby.
Temporal distance
The temporal distance offered by TNWOT is even thinner. The opening lines offer
a promise of distance, ambiguous in their sense of time and space: “So there were
kookaburras here. This was the first thing Yolanda knew in the morning” (p. 2).
However, this temporal distance is consistently undercut throughout the narrative.
When the women are given uniforms to wear, the clothes appear as artefacts of
another time—one they cannot pin down. In various reflections, they are referred

29

Henceforth, the ‘prison’ will be referred to as Hardings; while the facility is not named in the novel,
this discussion necessitates a means of referencing the location.
30
Italics within all quotations from TNWOT are all original emphasis, and will be discussed within this
chapter.
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to as of the 1950s, Amish, colonial, “out of some hillbilly TV show from the
eighties. Or even older” (p. 23). Nevertheless, while the way the characters are
hobbled by their clothing (and the oppressive and out-dated value structures they
represent) is archaic, the women’s responses to the uniforms are decidedly
modern. Woods has stated (in Wyndham, n.p.) that the book is set in a “near
future”; however, evidence from the text suggests its chronology is very near
indeed, if not contemporaneous. Throughout, the women reference contemporary
pop culture (for example, The Bachelor, Rihanna, Gaga and Lana Del Ray) and
their stories recognisably echo those of contemporary women.31 This is not, like
TTW, a timeless novel; it is an urgent one, and the familiar chronological setting
creates an uneasy belatedness. Before the novel begins, the worst things, as I will
argue later, have already happened, and they have happened outside the
electrified fences that trap the women in Hardings.
Somatic intimacy in The Natural Way of Things
TNWOT embodies the (structural) cultural forces of misogyny with urgent intent
and corporeal impact. In this section I will focus on the ways the novel
imaginatively realises two oppressive forces within the allegory of Hardings—
subjugation of the female body and systematic silencing of the female voice—to
encourage empathic synaesthesia. The broader forces of oppression can be felt in
the embodied traumas of the novel’s women. TNWOT is a visceral evocation of
the body; the women’s trauma is consistently situated in their bodies, and the
reader must thus co-inhabit their increasingly damaged female forms, must move
around in their skin and bones, whilst they are broken with force and blistered in
the sun and withered by starvation, as they grow rank with blood and sweat and
fluid. While examples of somatic connection within the text are frequent, this
section will focus on three allegorical representation of structural trauma: the
oppressive structures of beauty, as seen in the enduring motif of hair; dissociation
from the body through the trauma of sexual violence (past and future); and the unmendable impact of traumas, embodied in Hetty’s doll.

31

“Poor, cruise-ship Lydia” (p. 55) seems an obvious facsimile of Diane Brimble, the Queensland
mother who died of a drug overdose and was assaulted by eight men while unconscious, while
Verla’s narrative parallels Monica Lewinsky’s (her politician lover gives her a copy of Walt
Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, the same book gifted by Bill Clinton).
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‘Each enemy hair’: The oppressive structures of beauty
Hardings is a place of collective loss and trauma, but when the women arrive, the
first thing that is taken from them is their hair. They are shorn. Yolanda is
circumspect as the long, dark tresses she has been admired for are hacked off:
She looked down at the floor. Hair was only hair, as it fell. But there was so
much of it, first in shining straps, then little glossy black humps so the
floorboards were covered in small dark creatures, waiting to be brought to
life there on the ground. (p. 15)
As the novel illustrates, hair is not only hair—not in this allegorical reflection of a
world where female beauty is both armour and liability. Almost immediately, the
shorn Yolanda is treated differently. Her captor Teddy—whose oily dreadlocks
brushed Yolanda’s shoulders as he wielded scissors and razor—is immediately
transformed by her loss. He tells her to: “‘Shut up.’ And then experimentally, as if
testing the word, as if he’d never said it before, had just learned it, added, ‘You
slut’” (p. 16). Without their hair—the symbol of their femininity—the women are
little more than animals; it’s obvious as soon as Teddy puts down the razor:
All the stoner’s placidness was gone now; he shoved her … and Yolanda
went sprawling, exactly as a sheep would totter down a slatted chute into
the shocking light and shit and terror of the sheep yard, until she found
herself in yet another room. Full of bald and frightened girls. (p. 17)
Even as the narrative constructs the women’s hair as a totem of power and beauty,
one that must be taken away from them, it is also a source of disgust. Teddy
complains incessantly about his ex, but the worst he can say about her is that she
was hairy. “Way too hairy. In general. Teddy likes them natural but, let’s face it,
some of them are, like, really hairy. Both Boncer and Teddy shudder in disgust,
looking at the girls where they sit slumped in the dirt” (p. 74). Just as the women
are punished with removal of their hair, they are also punished with its regrowth:
In the first month, early on, they all scratched through their tunics as their
pubes grew bristling back, pulled up their skirts to ram a hand into their
pants, raking like mad at their crotches, some more horrified than others at
this sprouting hair, all over. Joy cried; she had never even seen her own
fully grown pubes, her mother took her for waxing as soon as they began to
appear (p. 114).
Nowhere is the women’s internalised shame at their own natural bodies more
evident. For Joy, Lydia and Izzy, hairlessness becomes an obsession. They spend
their days “descending on each enemy hair when one emerged” (p. 183) and
despise the others for their hairy calves, the down on their upper lips, their
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armpits. This shame is not one inflicted on them by Hardings; the women arrived
with this fear, this hatred of their female bodies and the shame of what their body
is (or might become). The girls32—although they enact the aftermath
differently—are united through their traumatic pasts, but their trauma started long
before their assaults. They (and their bodies) were subjugated by social norms
long before they were subjugated by men. Yolanda had seen it up close; her
mother ran an illegal waxing business out of their lounge room.
Their childhood was the buttery smell of wax, the sound of sharp little rips
and hissing breath as their mother tugged lumps of wax away and the
women quietly gasped. … It was Yolanda’s job afterwards to melt the gobs
of wax in the little battered aluminium pot on the electric stove, to fish out
and throw away the cotton strops and to sieve the hot wax through the
pantyhose into the big tin. … All the coarse black hairs and the pale fine
ones too, caught there in the stocking mesh. (p. 27)
Verla knows, too, the shame that begins in puberty: “Junior school days come to
Verla; the hot shameful moment of learning that other girls knew things you did
not. That you were ugly, contemptible” (p. 82).
The women’s—girls’—lives are full of bodily traumas: waxing, whispering,
shaming words. These are not casual assaults; neither the text nor the women take
them lightly. They are given similar narrative weight to more ostensibly
substantial traumas: the assaults they have endured and the public shaming after,
the violence of the prison. The women know that all these things are somehow
connected. Yolanda puts the pieces together on the first day:
It was something to do with her, she knew, not [her brother] Darren. It had
something to do with the hairlessness of the women on Gail’s bench, the
squirming babies, with all the creams and lotions, with their whispering to
her mother, What a beauty, but meaning something adult and uneasy and
expectant.
And it was to do with this place, Yolanda knew; with her presence here in
this line of bewildered, trudging girls. (pp. 30-31)
In making this connection explicit, the novel widens its allegorical focus to
comment on the systemic structural forces of female oppression, making each
iteration of it—the language, the beauty standards, the shame—inescapably
violent and visceral and central to the women’s incarceration and treatment. The
novel demonstrates the hateful violent potential behind these structures, learned
32

The text uses this term, in italics, to describe the women. This will be discussed later in this
chapter.
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long before Hardings. Physical norms are terrible for those who are ugly; terrible
for those who are beautiful. Yolanda, the most beautiful, has known the
oppressive potential of beauty long before she was capable of understanding it.
People have been whispering about it most of her life.
That girl of yours, my god. Sometimes it was people in the street who
stopped and said, What a beauty. Made jokes about the touches of the tar
brush and how exotic and when she’s a teen and locks and keys and boys.
(p. 29)
Each woman’s beauty is a prison, as is her ugliness. She cannot win. The
Hardings women grow dismayed at their growing ugliness: “They see themselves,
each other, afresh. Filthy, grey-toothed, pock-skinned, lice-ridden. Their tunics
colourless, torn, frayed and stinking. Their rotting brown boots. And how their
skin has thickened with the cold and the wind and the sun, their lips blistered,
their cheeks rasped” (p. 252). However, just as they fear what happens if they are
thought ugly, the women fear, too, the structural violence of beauty: of being
wanted, demanded. Eventually, if they are not careful, of being taken.
‘The body was separate’: The trauma of sexual violence
Of course, the narrative’s central trauma is the reason they have been gathered in
this prison; they have all had scandalised sexual encounters with men. They have
slept with a Cardinal, shared a bed with a principal, been assaulted on a plane.33
There is poor, cruise-ship Lydia and Leandra from the army and little Joy, “the
girl the whole country could despise” (p. 55) who has not sung a word since a
sleazy encounter on a reality TV music competition. They share this trauma—
their bodies have all been subjugated to male desire—but the untraceable traces of
trauma, its influence and aftermath, are most clearly illustrated through Yolanda’s
relationship with her body. She has been gang-raped by a football team, the men
taking turns as the others watched on. For her this is not a single, punctual
event—she relives it, over and over. The narrative renders the past assault an
urgent and inescapable happening, it is not over. Yolanda is returned to it, often;
the memory re-assaults her as she is marching, hunting, as she makes a doll for
Hetty. Her life is split in two by the rape and she allows herself to think of the
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The passive tense in these descriptions is intentional; it echoes the way the dominant culture
frames the sex scandals women are undone by in passive tense, with the male absent from the
narrative, as if the happenings were inevitable, could have involved any man.
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person she was before it only once: “The old her, that was, the Yolanda of a
lifetime ago” (p. 269).
Yolanda’s rape extends beyond her own experience; this, too, is portrayed as a
structural concern, one that cannot be separated from the culture that allowed it to
happen, the way it has defined her by “her troublesome body” (p. 52). For
Yolanda, there is a small measure of comfort in the shedding of her beauty at
Hardings:
There were no mirrors here. Strange, but she could almost forget her body,
that marvellous thing. She used to stand before the mirror, wondering at it. It
was something, all right. Must be, to cause such a fuss. She would stand
there staring at it, trying to understand, to see it as they saw it. Filling her
hands with the bosoms, cradling the soft belly. Parting herself gently for a
moment with her fingers. V for victory. That was a joke, any rate.
Was it the softness, perhaps, that made them want it so much? And hate it so
much? The body was separate from her, it was a thing she wore. The things
that were done to it had nothing to do with her, Yolanda, at all.
But afterwards she was told it wasn’t the body, it was her own desire. What
did she think she was there for, a cuppa Milo? She was up for it one
hundred percent, all that jazz. But how could she be, she wanted to scream
at them, when she wasn’t even there? She had floated out from herself, and
away. She wasn’t even there. Still wasn’t, when she let that night come back
to her. (pp. 51-52)
And of course, it is not just the rape that is the trauma, but what—even as it was
happening—she knew would come after. In remembering it, she says: “She did
not move, she did not cry out, she would be blamed” (p. 223). Like the other
women, there is the fear of not being believed, or being labelled (liar, golddigger, someone who had it coming). There is the added trauma of telling her
boyfriend Robbie, who had cried “unreachably” when he’d found out, then
“walked away and did not speak a soft word to her again through all that
followed”. The violence is personal and collective, punctual and structural. And
for all of the women, it is not over.
The spectre of rape haunts all the women. With the exception of Yolanda’s
flashbacks, sexual violence is never depicted on the page in TNWOT, but the
threat of it is a live undercurrent to the interactions between the women and the
guards, especially Boncer. Once again, this is made both personal and structural.
On the first night, when Teddy and Boncer discuss who they would sleep with, it
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is a single word that first puts Yolanda on alert: “She freezes in her hard iron bed
the first time she hears the world girls” (p. 58); here, again, implied rape cannot
be separate from a culture that permits and excuses it. Boncer can’t sleep with the
women (it’s not his moral compass that prevents him; there’s a financial bonus if
he doesn’t) but he persists in speculation about which girl he’d fuck which
presents as threat or eventuality. “You’d feel sort of soiled after… Definite sluts …
But if you did, which one would you?” (p. 58) And even Teddy, who insists on
saying made love, who is here only to fund his backpacking, makes the possibility
of coercive sex seem inevitable. “We’ll have to watch ourselves down the track
though, I s’pose,” he says, embodying the women’s fears, forcing the reader to
inhabit with them a landscape where the threat and fear of sexual violence is a
palpable presence on every page. Eventually, as Boncer grows angrier, more
desperate, the girls’ actions illustrate the extent to which fear and threat is its own
prison. They remove the bolt from the outside of their doors and fasten them to
the insides. “They locked themselves in at night now.” (p. 201)
‘Torn, then savagely repaired’: The enduring impact of trauma
Perhaps the starkest embodiment of trauma in TNWOT is the way it marks the
women permanently, stripping them of their empathy for each other and scarring
even their imaginations. Such is the extent of the enduring damage of what has
been inflicted on them—both within the prison, and before—that when Yolanda
and Verla try to make a doll, they cannot help but make one that is grotesquely
deformed by their collective but distinct traumas; “slowly the doll’s misshapen,
ugly body grew out of the shames and degradations of their own” (p. 221):
It was the size of a large toddler. Its head was a swollen rabbit-leather ball,
made of uneven crescents sewn together in difficult, lumpy stitches with
rabbit gut. Its legs and arms were socks stuffed with the dry grasses from the
paddocks. Its body wore scars made with stitches: it appeared somehow
tortured, or burnt. The charred-looking nipples made of black rabbit-gut
whorls; the distended vulva torn, then savagely repaired. (p. 226)
The women’s own bodies and psyches have been torn and savagely repaired, and
they know that there is no way for them to be whole again. The visions of who
they used to be haunt them—most clearly illustrated by their discovery of their
own hair, shoved in a plastic bag. “They still purred and whispered excitedly
about their hair, the ponytails they had taken to their beds, nuzzling them,
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winding them between their fingers, tucking them beneath their pillows, into
their nightdresses. They had been given new life, new hope, from these tendrils
of their girl selves. If the hair was found, other parts of themselves might be
recoverable too” (p. 229). But Yolanda, whose trauma is perhaps the most
expansive, has already learned that the past cannot be recovered. When her hair
is returned, she is unmoved: “[t]he foreign shampoo scent makes her draw back
from it. It no longer has anything to do with her” (p. 220). She cannot return to
who she was. She cannot be made whole by some distant part of herself.
However, this is not to say that a self cannot be re-built. Yolanda finds a
subversive agency through the reclamation of her body, a re-formation of it in
another image entirely. When both guards and prisoners are at risk of starving,
she finds power in the act of hunting rabbits and the hair and blood she is hated
for become part of a proud identity. Even as Boncer yells crude slurs at her, she
hangs the traps on her leash-belt (the image of oppression now part of her
freedom), “swaying already with her armour, smelling of hair and blood” (p.
159). The other women find flashes of this power, also. Hetty, who is initially
appalled by Yolanda and Verla’s gruesome doll, recognises her own trauma
reimagined in its battered form: “she was beginning to recognise what Verla and
Yolanda knew, what all the girls would know: that these were battle scars.
Something in this embroidered war paint compelled” (p. 226). What Yolanda
has known, what the other girls (especially Verla) begin to understand is that
there is, within this hated and battered and stared-at and invisible body, an
opportunity not unlike that outlined by Buck-Morss: for critical cognition, for
the sensing of danger, for resistance. Yolanda, the strongest of the women
(“stronger than me”, Verla remarks, twice) has been made fierce by her trauma.
She knows what is to come, because it has already come. She was the only one
to have sensed danger at the moment of her capture: at that moment, it was her
body that could be trusted:
…even at that point her mind didn’t actually know, her dumb dog’s mind
was trying to believe this shit—but oh, her body knew. Like always, her
dumb dog’s body knew, and … it was what her body knew that refused to
take it this time, that pushed her up out of her chair towards the door, and
then the large hands came gripping and it was her body kicking like fuck
and spitting and screaming. (p. 93)
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This sense of corporeal awakening is revisited at the end of the novel, which
celebrates the body’s potentiality as warning. When Verla is on the bus—riding
towards a salvation that is not safe for her—it is her body that senses danger, “a
seeping, a deathly bleeding of something rotten” (p. 307) inside her, her own
corporeal consciousness. “[S]he hears but the fresh, living rhythm of a beating
heart, of surging blood and paw thrumming over the earth. Verla feels this pulse,
urgently, in her body...” (p. 310). Eventually, “two words force their way
through everything in Verla, pushing through all these months, through failure
and fear and degradation, fighting through this last defeat. They thrust up
through Verla’s centre, bursting into flower in her mouth. Two words: I refuse”
(p. 311).
‘Shut up, slag’: Systematic silencing, embodied
For Verla, the political staffer who is “clearly the educated reader’s surrogate”
(Powers, n. p.), the entire narrative pivots on a single question: what am I? What
is the female experience—what does it mean, who defines it, why is she punished
for it? The question shifts into focus almost immediately, disrupting Verla’s
fixation on finding out where she is and crystallising the narrative thematically.
On her first day at Hardings, she wakes, groggy (p. 18):
She runs her tongue over her teeth, furred like her mind. She hears her own
thick voice deep inside her ears when she says, ‘I need to know where I am.’
The man stands there, tall and narrow, hand still on the doorknob, surprised.
He says, almost in sympathy, ‘Oh sweetie. You need to know what you are.’
You need to know what you are. Verla returns, incessantly and obsessively, to the
question, trying to piece together an answer from the dual brutality of the prison
and the landscape, her relationship with her politician boss Andrew, and from her
past. But, right there at the beginning, the first answer she finds is the allegorical
underpinning of much of the narrative:
In the days to come she will learn what she is, what they all are. That they
are the minister’s-little-travel-tramp and that-Skype-slut and the yuck-uglydog from the cruise ship; they are pig-on-a-spit and big-red-box, mollnumber-twelve and bogan-gold-digger-gangbang-slut. They are what
happens when you don’t keep your fucking fat slag’s mouth shut.
The women are prisoners of their sex, punished for what they have done—or,
more accurately, in most cases, what has been done to them. But the crime (a term
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I borrow ironically) for which they pay the highest price is not their actions but
their words. They had the gall to speak about what has happened to them, and that
is the unforgivable burden they carry. If there is a lesson to be learned at
Hardings, it is this: keep your fucking fat slag’s mouth shut. And so the novel’s
allegorical incarnations of misogyny give body to the systematic silencing of
women. It is a silence that takes many forms: the women are silenced with the
leather truncheon, with their clothing, with the words used to describe them and,
ultimately, by each other and their own fear.
‘Strange prairie puppets’ clothes’: Clothing as silence
Soon after they arrive, the women are issued with a uniform—a stiff canvas
smock, coarse calico blouse, hard brown leather boots and long woollen socks.
The underwear is ancient, sweaty—none of it breathes in the heat. At night, they
wear the same itchy “dead-moss” nightdress. It is all from another era, one they
cannot identify, and it serves to strip the women of their identity, to remind them
that there is no self, they are only girls. In their new clothes, their reduction to
body, thing, girl is totalising: “He looks at them again, appraising them in their
stiff, weird clothes. Curious objects” (p. 13). The women must wear what has
been laid out for them, even as it chafes them, even as it reeks. Verla describes the
garments as “these strange prairie puppets’ clothes” (p. 12); these are not the
clothes of action, they are the clothes of enacting others’ unfathomable desires.
The worst of the costume is the stiff bonnet, which scratches against their newlyshaved heads, blinkers them. More awfully, it stops them talking. Yolanda (pp.
48-49) marvels at the gruesome ingenuity of it: “If you wanted to talk to someone
you had to swing your head right around and then all you saw was the side of
their beak. It was clever, really. Even when you got up the guts to talk, it put you
off”. The bonnets are pervasive, defining—even in their own eyes, the women
become their bonnets. It is not the girls, but the bonnets who arrive at dinner,
those first nights: “The bonnets point back at their bowls, in silence.” Then, “The
bonnets listen…. Then the bonnets begin to nod with her, to bob and jerk ... They
begin mouthing inaudible questions” (p. 63). Within the confines of their roles
and their costumes, the women cannot find or see each other, cannot even find the
selves they were before captivity. In the early days, it is not the men, or the
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electric fence or the back-breaking work in the hot sun that sharpens their anger
and deadens their spirits; it is the bonnets. So, when they can, one by one they
burn or bury their bonnets, except a few who keep them as protection from the
fierce sun, trading one brutality for protection from another. Verla can understand,
but only from a distance; for her, (p. 115) “that limp, stinking thing felt more like
a prison than this whole place”.
“… as if they were to blame for the stick in his hand”: Violence as silence
The silencing of the Hardings women is not just cultural or psychological, it is
also physical—a fact made brutally clear on the first day. They are all there
because they dared to speak up but it is Barb, the almost-Olympic-swimmer,
whose crime is, more than any of the others, most directly connected to her
refusal to be quiet in the face of mistreatment. “Fast lane to the Olympics, they
said, till she had to open her mouth about the ‘sports massages’... And then the
whole team called her some slurry from Cronulla and that was it, no Olympic
Dream for Barbs” (p. 67). As Boncer marches the girls—chained together,
sobbing, their feet bleeding into their socks—towards a distant and unreachable
horizon, it is Barb who has the audacity to speak, once more. When the guard
mumbles, Yolanda “knew better than to answer” but Barbs back-chats (p. 24):
“What? We can’t hear you”. Then, and perhaps this is worse, she closes her eyes
against the sun and mutters something under her breath.
The punishment is quick and brutal. Boncer brings the force of his strength and
the leather truncheon onto her face, breaks her jaw. They all cry out as she falls,
shrieking in pain, because her silence will become theirs. Boncer turns to the
women, aggrieved “as if they were to blame for the stick in his hand”, while Barb,
the physically strongest of them, writhes in pain. Later, she sits mute while the
others eat, clutching her swollen face. She is broken and silent: “To look at her
now it is hard to remember the sheer physical charge she used to have, ploughing
freestyle through the water. … Now across the table her broad shoulders hunch,
and she can barely open her mouth at all” (p. 67).
Like some povo bogan bush pig: Language as silence
Perhaps the most profoundly difficult aspect of the disempowering imposition of
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silence, as embodied allegorically in the novel, is the language—violent, brutal,
repulsive—used to shame and diminish the women, and the way it begins to seep
into the female perspectives, which become echoes of the misogynist voices that
haunt them. At times the women’s internal voices are indistinguishable from the
men’s; they borrow the terms of their oppression to silence each other.
The slurs used against the women are frequent. There is Boncer and Teddy on the
veranda, sneering at the women as they hang rags and underwear, stained red with
their blood, in the sun: “Ugh, pigs, shark bait, raw steak. Ah, gross—look out, it’s
a wounded clam” (p. 121). And the “drug-fucked lowlife in the muscle T-shirt”
who preyed on Lydia at a party, refusing to use her name; she was “that thing,
that black ugly dog” (p. 112). And the people who came to take Yolanda away,
with their “there’s a good girl smiles” (p. 92), and Boncer yelling at Nancy, the
only woman who isn’t a captive “For fuck’s sake you’re worse than them” or
snickering at Teddy “You so are, a fucking hippie faggot” (p. 57). These are
sticky words—they follow after the women, they cannot shed their impact. At one
point, Verla almost sees them, as if the words themselves are embodied. They
certainly have form and consequence:
You need to know what you are, this Boncer had said to her. In the cicadas’
rhythmic shrilling the words hover, almost visible, in the air. The words and
the cicada noise become Verla’s own pulse trying to answer, every nerve in
her responding to this membrane of noise pressing in. She cannot know
where she is, or why, and yet something in her knows her survival depends
on this electric white question. What am I? (p. 37)
Frequently, gendered slurs are structurally separate from the rest of the narrative.
They are italicised, distinct from the other dialogue—as if the narrators cannot
bear to repeat them without signalling their rejection of the terms. Even when the
language of misogyny appears in-scene, it is bereft of the quotation marks that
signal other dialogue, as if the words do not belong to the speaker, are echoes of
something far-away. But, within the perspectives of Yolanda and Verla, such
terms are not always held at arms’ length. Both Yolanda and Verla internalise the
names they are given. Yolanda describes herself, in the opening pages (p. 5):
“Yolanda Kovacs, nineteen years eight months. Good body (she was just being
honest, why would she boast, when it had got her into such trouble?).” Later,
when she asks Boncer to take her to the rabbit traps, we see his words echoed in
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her gestures:
‘You wanna eat rabbits. Like some povo bogan bush pig.’
She folded her arms, covering her povo bogan bush pig tits, but he still took
a good long look (p. 141).
Verla is astute enough to understand how unfairly she’s been judged for her affair
with a politician (who has yet to pay for his part in everything). “You can lead a
whore to culture” (p. 38), someone told her, in the comments of an article about
it—but she holds herself aloft. She is different from the other women, she reasons,
those words are not about her: “Verla is not a child nor a prostitute nor a ward of
the state whose parents have abused or abandoned her. She is a parliamentary
intern, a rightful citizen, and she cannot be held in this place” (p. 38). But she,
too, has internalised a misogynistic master narrative, and it colours the way she
sees the other women. She is not sympathetic to their conditions; Verla blames
them for their plights, none more so than Hetty:
The Catholic cardinal, the never-published photographs of almost-underage
Hetty, just sixteen and, it was said, lying like a fat happy baby in the purple
satin and gold brocade. What the cardinal had seen close up, Verla knows
now, was Hetty’s wet red mouth, the coarse black eyebrows, potent with
some ferocious carnality. He saw what Verla could see now, that Hetty was
a little muscled dog that knew how to bite, and how to indiscriminately
fuck. If she were a male the pink crayon of her dick would always be out.
People have thought this about Verla. She knows that; she read the
comments at first. They’ve more or less said it to her face. But with Hetty it
is true. … Hetty is repulsive, a liar. Hetty can be blamed. (p. 65)
Gendered slurs infiltrate the other girls’ perspectives, too. They are trained to
expect them. When their ‘rescuer’ arrives at the end of the book, they wait for the
barrage of insults:
The man takes a step towards them. He says, ‘You poor, poor girls.’
They stiffen … They strain to listen, but it is true, he has not said you sluts
fat dogs bitches slurry. Said poor girls. (p. 302)
It is not Hardings that has taught them these words; they were fluent in this
language, long before they arrived. Even when the men are not there, the women
silence each other, borrowing from the language that traps them to trap each
other. It slips into their deepest and most internal thoughts, is unquestioningly part
of the lens through which they view their own captivity and that of their fellow
captives. On that first night, as they share their own stories, the borrowed-words
are threaded through their whispers:
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Verla remembers another close-up: the Sunday-night interview, Izzy’s
smooth peachy face and her big glassy blue eyes filling the screen, the
furrow between her soft blonde eyebrows. The airline CEO hurrying his
wife and children onto a first-class flight to Europe. Izzy’s soft trembling
voice speaking of her ruined career, of justice that must be done. And
beyond the screen, behind it all, the voices of girls everywhere snorting into
their vodkas, not as if he even raped her, sneering, all that for a snapped bra
strap! And imagine him going for a little fatty like that! Quite pretty in the
face though, it was argued; Mile-High Izzy could maybe be a plus-sized
model if she wanted. But still. (p. 71)
As their frightened voices echo through their prison, the women forget to hold the
words apart from themselves—the italics bleed into text. The men’s words, the
headlines, the hateful comments—all of those words become their own. And in
this way, as in so many others, their voices are silenced, overshadowed. Indeed,
so powerful is the idea of language and silence throughout the narrative, that the
prose that explains the novel’s title34 meditates on the grammar of oppression
directly, wondering would happen if the women were found, or the media put
their disappearances together:
The Lost Girls, they could be called. Would it be said, they ‘disappeared’,
‘were lost’? Would it be said they were abandoned or taken, the way people
said a girl was attacked, a woman was raped, this femaleness always at the
centre of things, as if womanhood itself were the cause of these things? As
if the girls, somehow, through the natural way of things, did it to
themselves. They lured abduction and abandonment to themselves, they
marshalled themselves into prison where they had made their beds, and
now, once more, were lying in them. (p. 176)
Only a whimper: The effects of silence
The novel embodies not only the process of gendered silencing but also its
impacts; evidenced most clearly in Yolanda, whose arrival at Hardings is the
beginning of a gradual disappearance into muteness. The first time she speaks
within the prison, her throat is ragged “as if something had been forced down her
gullet while she slept”; it hurts. Gradually, she stops speaking. By autumn, her
voice is “dull in her throat; she had not spoken in days” (p. 180). What is the point
of speech, when your words are not your own, and no-one will hear you, anyway?
By the time she encounters the women’s one chance at salvation in the form of a
low-flying hot air balloon, her voice is a low croak—when she tries to call for
help, nothing happens:
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She would cry out, We are prisoners. Get help. She panted, running and
running to keep up. But no words came, only a whimper… Help us, she
tried to cry out. Could they hear her panting breath? Surely they must see,
must hear her … She bellowed then: a noise, a wounded sound, not human.
They cheered … And there was a pop and they were drinking champagne.
Yolanda roared her trapped-animal’s cry. ‘Bye-bye,’ they called, laughing
and waving and clinking their glasses. (pp. 239-240)
She would cry out, tried to cry out. And when she finally does roar, something
desperate and primal, a message that’s inarguably simple and clear in its intent,
the people in the balloon call to her that it’s a nice morning. They cheer on her
desperate run, laugh and clink their champagne glasses, hearing only what they
think she might have said. It is, perhaps, not a surprise. After all, she has called
for help before—they all have. They were raped and assaulted and made to feel
uncomfortable and lesser, subservient. And they were disbelieved, or blamed, or
mocked. They were held responsible for the things that were done to them.
After this brush with salvation, Yolanda retreats into almost-complete muteness.
However, here the novel offers a partial antidote to the weight of her oppressive
silencing, a way to be heard. Yolanda’s silence is not passive; it is an act of
resistance. She finds another language, one that captures all the things her first
tongue cannot:
It could not be said, even if Yolanda still used her voice, but increasingly
she found things beautiful out here in the paddocks. This pink sky, these
starry cobwebs. Tunnelling out under the fence, into the teeming bush. Not
returning to her old life, never back there, but inwards, downwards, running
on all fours, smelling the grass and the earth as familiar as her own body.
She dreamed of animal freedom. (p. 237)
Like a scar that would make worse ones: Structural oppression, embodied
It is not just silencing and trauma that is embodied with TNWOT, the structural
nature of gendered oppression is a specific focus. Indeed, it is in this regard, as
well as its contemporaneity, that the novel is most clever and most disturbing.
While many allegorical interpretations of trauma focus on the punctual, Wood’s is
a structural trauma—one without beginning, nor end, one without clear
boundaries. As allegory, the world of TNWOT embodies this complexity also: in
the ambiguous distance of Hardings as the oppressing force, in its interpretations
of masculinity and in the decay of the male body within the prison.
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Hardings: a corporate oppression
It is of narrative importance that the women are not held by a man, they are
imprisoned by a structure—one that is distant, never seen and only briefly
described. Hardings International (representative of corporate oppression) is an
ambiguous security firm, whose motto is emblazoned on the crockery used by the
women (and their male guards—for within this structure, all must eat from the
same tables): ‘Dignity & Respect in a Safe & Secure Environment’. There is
paperwork—admissions papers, incident reports, inventories—and a chain of
command. The corporation has no conceivable agenda; all that is clear is that its
words are hollow. There is no respect here, this is not a safe and secure
environment—for women or men.
In the early days, as the women shuffle about in their ghastly uniforms the two
men are not entirely comfortable with the roles in which they have been cast,
either: they, too, shift uneasily in their costumes. Teddy, a dreadlocked, psylliumhusk eating vision of casual misogyny personified, is embarrassed: “He shifts in
his blue boiler suit, big black boots on his feet. The suit and boots look new. He is
uncomfortable in them” (pp. 12-13).35 Boncer—vile, violent, quick to exercise his
power—shows early signs of distress, too. Even as he marches the girls for hours
in the unrelenting sun, even as he beats them, he is being punished for the
punishment he has been asked to enact. He suffers under the same sky: “When
Boncer turns around, wheezing, his face is red to the roots of his greasy black hair
and his upper lip shines with moisture. He does not look well” (p. 33). The girls
may be hotter and more uncomfortable than he is, as Verla acknowledges, but
Boncer is hot and uncomfortable, too. And when he raises his truncheon to hit the
girls, the stick itself appears to have its own legacy of inherited pain and violence,
its own carried-down trauma: “its hard, lumpily stitched seams like a botched
wound … like a scar that would make worse ones” (p. 25).
Almost none of the male characters in TNWOT are sympathetic—and importantly,
the men who love and are loved by the women are complicit in their
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incarceration. Verla’s politician lover most likely turned her over; Yolanda’s dear
brother and ex-boyfriend were the ones who betrayed her. The only sympathetic
man is Verla’s invalid father, and he has also been silenced, not by the disabling
forces of socially constructed gender, but by illness. He is mute, has one
remaining word in his vocabulary—bloody—but Verla can tell when he says it in
gratitude “and she would silently tell him everything as they wheeled and strolled,
eased by his warm dumb animal presence, and the fact that he loved her
effortlessly, the fact that he was her father” (p. 248). In his wordlessness, it is he
alone who understands the things she cannot say. And yet, this is not a text that
holds individual men responsible for the structures of gendered oppression—it is
the distant, disembodied force of Hardings who is to blame. The electric fence
that pens in the women traps the men, too. There is no love nor kindness nor
comfort within this misogynistic dystopia for Teddy nor Bonner. They, too, are
trapped within its fences, bereft of the essentials needed to sustain them, and
beholden to the paralysing forces of history: “Lines of men and boys marched to
open graves and shot at the edge, falling in so nobody has to tire themselves
moving bodies” (p. 34).36 And they, too, entered the prison of Hardings without
knowing what would come next.
In fact, within the compound that becomes all their prisons, the men’s bodies
decay, too, brutalised by their own traumas and violence. Their bodies wither, and
they are made ugly by what has happened here. Teddy, who was once beautiful
(at least until he starts complaining about his ex, the women agree)—“the golden
skin of a surfer … delicate face … Teddy walks the prickled ground and rough
floorboards always barefoot, protected by his beauty”—grows gaunt. His hair,
once a “turban”, “a crown”, thins, “spindling out from his head” (p. 150). And
Boncer, who was always ugly, grows uglier. Yolanda sees it in is white-knuckled
hold on the leash: “Saw his skinny pale mosquito-bitten wrists. Saw, finally, what
Boncer was: a stupid, ugly child, underfed, afraid. She saw his pocked old acne
scars” (p. 142). There is no escape for Boncer and Teddy—nor redemption,
nothing to learn—except that the power they thought they had, the power they
thought the system had given to them, is hollow also. They, who had so foolishly
36

Here, however, Verla also acknowledges that there are worse fates than death. “No women in
these lines,” she says, “they are kept for other purposes.”
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thought they were guards, are prisoners, too.
Empathic synaesthesia in The Natural Way of Things
TNWOT is a novel that demands witness. And, reassured by the territorial and, to
a lesser extent, temporal distance, the reader can experience gendered oppression
from the protective cover of intimate-distance. The allegorical world of Hardings
may be temporally and geographically closer than TTW, but there is also the
psychic protection of a more personal boundary. In addition to the not-quite-here
and the not-quite-now, the reader also has the comfort of distance from self: notme. These conditions give readers scope for empathic synaesthesia, one that is
born of the body—an empathy that extends to 10 girls who are vastly different
and, in many cases, not particularly likable; as the early pages demonstrate, they
have certainly lost their empathy for each other, even before the traumatic
violence of Hardings forces them apart further. However, even through the
women’s flawed perspectives, a girl can be ignored, shamed, discounted, but her
body cannot be denied. When Nancy, the female jailer who unites all the girls in
their hatred of her, dies, it is her body that reminds them of her humanity:
They have hated Nancy, wished her dead, laughed without mercy when they
knew she suffered. But now she lies there in her girl’s bare skin, they see
she is only one of them, just skinny bone and sunken flesh, and for the first
time they wonder if she has a mother too, somewhere in that little town she
came from once, if somewhere a flatmate is still complaining about her
unpaid rent, if the hot-bread shop owner ever asked where Nancy went. (p.
271)
The same is true of Hetty, the despised girl, whose dead body cannot be hated.
Even brutal Boncer’s failing limbs inspire a moment of kindness from Verla, his
murderer: “He has brought it on himself, but Verla cannot help taking his pale
hand in hers, holding it. The skin is dry and cool. It slides, loose over his bones.
She thinks of all the times she held her father’s sad old hand, and for a fleeting
moment she holds Boncer’s to her lips” (p. 293).
Similarly, the destruction of the girls’ bodies demands witness, elicits empathic
synaesthesia from readers. We understand their referred pain, the echoes of their
traumas; not only those that are inflicted in the moment but also the distant and
the punctual and the structural traumas, the wounds that have been cast before
they were prisons, the ones that will never heal whole. Throughout TNWOT, the
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structures of oppression are enacted in visceral, grotesque form. In giving the
oppressive forces and their consequences body, the women’s pain can and must
be witnessed. It cannot be dismissed. It has form and consequence; its trauma has
both voice and physical presence. This is not a pain that can be understood only
intellectually; it must be felt, experienced and re-experienced through the
perspectives of the women and their female bodies. It is an appeal to our critical
cognition, direct engagement of our empathic synaesthesia; it implores the reader
to engage in Erfahrung, to commit events to memorie volontaire.
The empathy generated by TNWOT is perhaps a particularly powerful empathy,
because it allows witness and engagement with the invisibility and silence of
structural trauma. The women arrive, oftentimes themselves blind to the ways
they have been hobbled and wounded by the culture they have been taken from.
Verla, who when presented with the church spires of Barcelona, the gore of
crucifixions, is “nonplussed in the face of all that Spanish slaughter and violence,
for what could she, ripe with willingness, with risk, with being chosen, even have
known of suffering?” (p. 39). But, with its blurry territorial and temporal borders,
TNWOT allows the girls and readers to see, hear and feel those structural forces
and their consequences. The temporal and territorial nearness (or potential
nearness) of Hardings is essential to the allegory’s impact because the text is not
concerned with a single, punctual happening, but a structure of interconnected
happenings and their historical and cultural roots. As allegorical artefact and
embodiment of the impacts of a toxic culture, the society that perpetuates the
misogynistic value structures must necessarily be close in order for the
consequences of those disempowering value structures to be felt. This is an
approach I have adopted in my own novel, which also exploits the somatic
potential of allegory. My protagonist, Finn, embodies the (structural) pressure of
information overload and its devastating impacts on compassion, thought and
memory—the effects of which are felt, physically, throughout the novel and
consistently grounded in the character’s physical experience. I also apply these
concepts to the embodiment of the structural forces of gender and mental illness
within the allegory of the Island of Lorne.
Once again, I note that the allegorical elements of TNWOT facilitate empathic
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synaesthesia on the part of the intimate-distance witness, by protecting the psyche
from the forces of shock and allowing the reader, through temporal and territorial
distance, opportunities to connect. However, the narrative’s ultimate power
derives also from the ways it eventually undercuts this distance; like TTW, the
distance the reader is afforded is not absolute. The flimsy not-quite-here and notquite now of the book’s temporal and geographic distance ultimately offer little
comfort. The threat is not in the (not-quite-here, not-quite-now) confines of
Hardings prison—or, at least, not only in the prison. It is also back home, in the
world the women left and must return to or escape from. A world that looks
uncomfortably like our own, here and now.
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Chapter 5
‘Not enough was still better than nothing’: The Memory Addicts
and the burden of re-experience
Context
The central concern of this thesis is our potential to safeguard both experience
and memory against the backdrop of narcotic modernity. The Memory Addicts
(henceforth TMA) explores similar territory through the lens of creative practice
by giving physical form to the information-overwhelm described in the opening
chapters of this discussion, both pathologising the excesses of modernity and
exploring the limits of human memory. The novel’s protagonist, Finn
Darlington, is the embodiment of the surfeit of modern experience: ‘cursed’ (as
he sees it) with hyperthymesia, his perfect autobiographical memory is a
constant assault on his psyche, continuously pulling him out of the present and
into an often unwelcome past. Finn’s condition is rare; however, he inhabits a
world obsessed with memory, albeit in contextually very different ways.
Thousands of ‘blinkers’ are abusing a dopamine supplement intended to treat
Parkinson’s to re-experience their memories and, as the addicts’ health begins to
deteriorate under the influence of the drug, they find themselves ‘lost’ in time,
unable to distinguish past and present.
When conceptualising TMA, my original intent had been to create a fictionalised
memory condition—a kind of ‘forgetlessness’ that echoed the burdens of
contemporary overload. However, neuroscience is often stranger than fiction and
such a condition exists. When first reported in 2006 (Parker, Cahill &
McGaugh), it was named ‘hyperthymestic syndrome’ based on the Greek
thymesis (‘remembering’) and hyper (‘more than normal’); it is also variously
referred to as hyperthymesia, piking syndrome and has more recently been
termed Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). ‘AJ’, the woman at
the centre of the initial research on the condition, describes her memory (p. 35)
as follows:
My memory has ruled my life… . It is like my sixth sense … It’s like a
running movie that never stops. It’s like a split screen. I’ll be talking to
someone and seeing something else … Like we’re sitting here talking
and I’m talking to you and in my head I’m thinking about something that
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happened to me in December 1982, December 17, 1982, it was a Friday,
I started to work at Gs (a store)… When I hear a date, I see it, the day,
the month, the year… I only have to experience something one time and
I can be totally scarred by it … I can’t let go of things because of my
memory … it’s a burden.
Thus, the details of Finn’s condition (the uncontrollable onslaught of memory,
the competition between past and present, the anchoring of memory to specific
dates) are grounded in the psychology and neuroscience research about HSAM.
In contrast, the blinkers’ symptoms and the Dopastal drug they are taking are
entirely fictional, though both are well within the realms of scientific possibility.
There are indeed dopamine drugs to treat Parkinson’s disease, and there are
strong connections between dopamine and memory.37 In order to explicitly
connect the novel to the aims of this thesis, once the novel’s temporal and
territorial distance have been established, this chapter will discuss Finn’s
memory condition and the blinkers’ memory addiction as embodiment of the
shock of narcotic modernity, before exploring the text’s key allegorical thread:
the Island of Lorne. First, however, I must establish context for the allegorical
thread, which is grounded in boarding houses as transinstitutions.
Context: Transinstitutionalisation and boarding houses
The allegorical landscape of the Island of Lorne (where five women living in a
decaying lighthouse disappear one at a time) embodies the punctual and
structural traumas of transinstitutionalisation in boarding houses, while also
exploring inherited memory and intergenerational trauma. Within the novel,
Finn’s perfect autobiographical memory does not extend to his childhood, which
means he knows nothing about his mother, who died when he was two, under
circumstances so unspeakable that his grandmother has never given him the
details. When he begins to see flashes of her, the recollections are vague and
sinister—he sees an island, a decaying lighthouse, and a series of disappearing
women—and they’re also entirely unfamiliar, to the extent that Finn begins to
suspect they are inherited memories.
37

It is worth noting that the link between legumes and dopamine is also grounded in scientific
plausibility. Fava beans, broad beans and other legumes are a rich source of levo-dihydroxy
phenylalanine (L-dopa), which is the precursor to dopamine and is used commercially to treat
Parkinson’s symptoms (Mehran & Golshani 2013).
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By way of context for what is signified by this allegorical thread, boarding
houses were a response to deinstitutionalisation policies, which were enacted in
most industrialised countries (including Australia, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America), primarily in the 1970s and 1980s. The policy
movement against institutionalisation of people with mental illness(es) and
intellectual disabilities was motivated by a complex interplay of financial and
humanitarian goals and, while the specifics varied substantially between and
within nations, the policies nonetheless share enough commonalities to be
discussed holistically here. A core justification for deinstitutionalisation was
growing concern about the detrimental effects of institutionalisation on patients.
For example, sociologist Erving Goffman (1961) found the psychological
impacts of institutionalisation (such as shared sleeping quarters, communal
towels or clothing, rigid meal or leisure schedules and coercive approaches to
medication or treatment) included ‘curtailment of self’, ‘role dispossession’, loss
of ‘physical integrity’ or a sense of safety, loss of self-determination through
indignity, isolation and segregation. Certainly, the closure of asylums did
provide many former patients with freedoms and a quality of life that had not
been possible within institutions and also served to expose abuse and other
issues within the mental health system. However, deinstitutionalisation policies
and their implementation have attracted widespread criticism; as a result of lack
of planning, lack of transition support and the stigma of mental illness and
intellectual disability within the community, many former patients experienced
reinstitutionalisation or transinstitutionalisation (in nursing homes, crisis
accommodation, boarding houses or prisons), or became homeless.
In her comprehensive exploration of boarding houses as transinstitutions in
Australia, social work scholar Gabrielle Drake (2010) interviewed 40 people
who had direct experience with boarding houses in New South Wales (Australia)
as residents, proprietors or community or government workers. Drake charts the
rise of boarding houses in Australia, which were often established by psychiatric
nurses in response to the needs of former patients. However, many boarding
houses developed institutional regimes and rules, without being subject to the
same regulatory scrutiny as mental health facilities had been. Participants in
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Drake’s research spoke of overcrowding (five or six people to a room and up to
ten sharing a bathroom), filthy living conditions, isolation, strict routines,
institutionalised eating processes and inedible food, communal washing and
clothing, assault and sexual assault, abuse and overmedication. Rates of death
and illness were high and, in the event of a death, residents were regularly
excluded from the grieving process. One participant, from a community
organisation (p. 160), said:
A lot of the boarding house residents have known each other for 20 or more
years and they are friends. To have one of your good friends die and not be
able to grieve. To not have a funeral or a service. At X (boarding house)
when a person died the proprietor did nothing about a service. He didn’t
even tell the residents. All of a sudden that person just isn’t there.
Although boarding houses were located within the community, residents did not
experience social integration. One participant (community organisation, p. 176)
spoke about a client who had not left the property in five years, while others
described the coercive financial control some boarding houses exercised over
residents, by intercepting pensions directly. Another described the isolation and
lack of freedom residents experienced (p. 175):
They might come and go but they can’t leave there because where else are
they going to go? Even when they go for a couple of days they need to go
back because that’s where their ciggies are. It’s like that domestic violence
issue where I don’t have access to my money, food or shelter so I just go
back there. There are many ways to control a person. One is a physical
barrier, like doors and big grounds and fences but that’s not the only way
you can imprison someone.
The trauma of boarding houses as transinstitutions presents representational
challenges, beyond the aforementioned challenges of testimony and witness
within a culture of overwhelm. The trauma, threats, restrictions and isolation
experienced by residents were often invisible, felt internally but not always
externally obvious, and rarely recorded. This chapter will first establish the
temporal and territorial distance of TMA, then examine how somatic intimacy is
established, first in the book’s depictions of narcotic modernity (through Finn’s
condition and the blinkers’ addictions) and then in how the allegorical thread of
The Island of Lorne (which embodies the punctual and structural trauma of
boarding houses, as well as inherited memory and intergenerational trauma).
Finally, the chapter will discuss the potential for the reader, as intimate-distant
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witness, to engage in empathic synaesthesia.
Territorial and temporal distance in The Memory Addicts
Territorial distance
Part One of the novel takes place in an unnamed (Western) city that is not given
a specific national landscape. Nevertheless, there is plenty about the location
may feel familiar to readers—the City Metro platforms and tunnels, the innercity parks, Finn’s apartment, which smells like oil and chicken from the
takeaway restaurant downstairs. The city may not be here, but it is (or could be)
near.
However, as Finn sets out to recover his buried memory-traces and find out what
happened to his mother, the landscape he traverses becomes increasingly distant
and territorially ambiguous. First, he journeys out of the city (through “the
smoggy industrial wastelands … broken up by small fishing towns and
plantation pine forest” [p. 48]) to find Bellamy. Together, they travel into the
increasingly remote desert, which Finn finds alien and frightening:
He wouldn’t have been able to describe the landscape to anyone—there was
so little that was familiar. The only thing he could say about it was that it
seemed empty. Finn tried not to think about all the things that could go
wrong in a place like this, but news clips and stories cycled through his
mind anyway: a truck driver who’d died of thirst less than 2km from safety
(May 2, 2004), a teenager who’d been stung by two striped death adders
(January 24, 2012), a carload of backpackers who’d been murdered by a
psychopath posing as a ranger (August 19, 2017). (p. 68)
Some of Finn’s territorial displacement is ignorance, but part is Bellamy’s doing;
Finn is drugged on the way to the campsite and sleeps through any landmarks
that might geolocate the narrative. But even within Bellamy’s perspective, the
narrative is territorially ambiguous, and the novel’s flora and fauna conspire to
protect the narrative’s location. The majority of plants mentioned in TMA (for
example, wraith trees, tendonwoods, bloodbarks, Petrov bush and urchin grass)
are fictionalised, as are the animals (kettle birds, sand fox, squad beetles, striped
death adder). The desert is not somewhere known, or even knowable—it is
elsewhere.
In part, the fictionalised landscape is a device to sidestep the politics of a
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specific national history. At one point, it references a colonial past—the land has
a past and a memory—however, this is discussed only in broad terms:
… Finn leaned against the trunk, tracing the red markings on the bark with
his aching fingers. The blotches looked painful, gashes in the surface. In
fact, the whole landscape seemed wounded, he thought: the red dust that
congealed like blood when you spilled water on it, the trees like skeletons
on the horizon, the plateau’s face, jagged and broken. It was as if the land
had too much memory, too. (p. 187)
In disguising the novel’s location and politics, TMA also universalises its
concerns about the disconnect between humans and land/nature, which is
explicitly referenced by Bellamy when he discusses plant-based medicine. For
example, he thinks: “You give someone a chunk of dried willow-bark to chew
on and they look at you like you’re a maniac, but they’re perfectly happy to
swallow an Aspirin, which is essentially the same thing”(p. 80). and the human
tendency to privilege the intellectual over a somatic consciousness. Where
Rosemary and Bellamy inhabit the desert landscape comfortably, respecting its
dangers but admiring its potential, Finn’s attitude reflects a broader social legacy
of suspicion of nature. For example, the names used for the fictionalised trees
within the novel echo the West’s construction of desert and other landscapes as a
topography of fear,38 which Bellamy (pp. 81-82) explicitly underscores: “The
horizon was silhouetted with tendonwoods and bloodbarks and wraith trees. The
stupid names people gave things when instead of learning to understand a
landscape, they feared it.” As in TTW, the intentionality of TMA’s fictionalised
geography provides psychic distance for the reader. After all, while it may echo
some characteristics of colonised landscapes, elsewhere is definitely not-here.
Of course, the most distant landscape within the novel is the allegorical territory
of The Island of Lorne; however, this distance is not necessarily as comforting as
the not-here of the desert. In contrast to the desert, Lorne’s plants are
recognisable and knowable: pandanus, bougainvillea, specific kinds of palms.
Lorne is indeed somewhere. However, the contradictions that are inherent in
Lana’s landscape soon become apparent to both the reader and Finn, who grows
increasingly frustrated that he cannot anchor his mother’s memories to a tangible
38

For example, I live on Australia’s Gold Coast, where nearby landmarks include Point Danger
and Mt Warning.
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location by exploring the plants, animals and other details:
The disappointment was raw, almost physical. Finn felt it rush through his
limbs. It wasn’t just the crabs, every time something on the island didn’t add
up, he’d think about the other details that seemed incredible. The cupboard
of food that no one seemed to cook, the way Teddy just appeared. In the
sunken memories, Finn only saw the bad things, and without the bits in
between, the context, the whole fabric of the place threatened to fall apart.
(p. 142)
The unreliability of the allegorical landscape of Lorne is an increasingly
uncomfortable thread in the novel and the psychic distance offered by the
island’s remoteness gradually wanes. As Finn begins to suspect that his mother
was never on an island, the intimate-distant witness can no longer hold her
trauma at arm’s length. Lorne is indeed somewhere. But not necessarily
elsewhere, like the city and the desert. It could indeed be here.
Temporal distance
Like TTW, the central chronology of TMA is personal; at least ostensibly, it is
Finn’s chronology that anchors the book. This is established in the prologue
when the onset of Finn’s hyperthymesia (like all his memories) is time-stamped:
September 2, 1999. Finn was nine. Given that adult-Finn is 29 (“next year, he’d
be turning 30” [p. 12]), an astute reader might discern that the novel is set in
2021: a future, but a very near future. Not-quite-here. However, while Finn uses
dates to orient himself within his surfeit of memory, the effect on a reader may
well be the opposite: that of temporal disorientation. The unrelenting stream of
memory and time floods the senses, numbing a reader to their impact. Moreover,
the complex and conflicting relationship each character has with time challenges
the nature of temporality itself. The temporal landscape of TMA is one in which
time, too, has become a commodity—capable of being aestheticized, controlled,
even lost altogether.
Maeve exists in a state of temporal amnesia: she confuses night and morning and
her past and present have begun to blur as she slides deeper into her Dopastal
addiction. She thinks (p. 24), “Finn was kind to her but whenever he was around
she felt her heart beating too fast, as if something terrible were going to happen.
Maybe it had already happened. It was so hard to tell had and will apart.” Even
her physical presence seems suspended between competing timescapes—old age
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has snuck up on her suddenly. For example, “Maeve could feel the weight of
time in her bones, a force that seemed to betray her over and over. It was there in
her hands every morning, the swelling that made buttoning her clothes an agony,
and in the wrinkles that swallowed her freckles when she caught her reflection in
the subway carriage windows” (p. 11). Later, as Finn describes Maeve, “her
freckle-dusted face somehow seemed old and childish, all at once” (p. 18).
Rosemary is, in entirely different ways, adrift in time—she is caught in an
eternal present, the spontaneity that is the cornerstone of her personality
rendered as terrible in excess as Finn’s surfeit of memory. Bellamy, too, is
trapped by time, doomed to infinitely relive the day of his worst mistake in the
same unchanging caravan, while simultaneously running out of time to save his
daughter. Lana’s perspective is suspiciously bereft of any clear time markers and
even Finn, who is the novel’s temporal anchor, becomes increasingly unreliable
when it comes to time. He begins to narrate Lana’s (past) memories in the
present tense and in the time-less desert landscape, where he has no watch and a
growing addiction, he loses whole days. At one point, when Bellamy asks Finn
when he took his last synthetic dose, he responds: “Yesterday… Or the day
before last week” (p. 198). None of the characters has a reliable sense of time;
indeed, time itself is unreliable. Even the novel’s landscapes betray a sense of
temporal deceit; for example, the city is one that pretends to be older than it is
(“Ghost tours were stupid, especially in a city so young it barely had a history”
[p. 26]), the pharmacy masquerades as an old-fashioned apothecary (which, to
Maeve, “felt like a lie” [p. 16]) and in the desert, even the most ancient history
feels recent (for example, “[t]he absence of traffic was a deep layer of quiet, but
in its place were cicadas and birds and the wind whispering ancient secrets,
sometimes soft, sometimes angry” [p. 99]).
Such is the timescape of trauma—one in which the effects are ongoing and
unending, where the past carries weight in the present (and the future), can even
be passed down generations. In this traumatic reality, the things that have
happened to the characters aren’t over yet. Thus, while the temporal distance of
the novel provides some psychic protection for readers (even not-quite-now is a
little removed from now), the structure of the novel and the characters’
perspectives eventually undercut this protection. Because, when it comes to
102

trauma, even not-now can be felt now and the past is neither buried, nor is it far
away. For Finn, it is a constant and intrusive presence, for Bellamy it is an
imminent threat, for Rosemary it is inside her even when it is hopelessly out of
reach. When Maeve finally claws her way back to the past she has been yearning
for—albeit to the wrong memory—it is as real and potent as the present:
From somewhere intimate and distant, the details shifted into focus. The
scratches on the armchair where the cat had sharpened its claws, and the
way the green fabric pooled in one corner. Maeve felt the warmth of a rough
pair of hands around her. She was a tiny mess of red curls and pale cheeks—
oranges and cream, her Da had called her. She’d all but forgotten that, she
thought, as she slipped deeper into the memory. So deep it didn’t feel like
the past at all. (pp. 35-36)

Somatic intimacy in The Memory Addicts
This section will explore the ways TMA gives body to both the surfeit of narcotic
modernity and the punctual and structural trauma of transinstitutionalisation
within boarding houses. This, I will argue, enables the reader, as intimate-distant
witness, to connect with the often-invisible oppressive forces of
transinstitutionalisation (particularly isolation and insecurity) and its intersection
with gender and mental illness. The surfeit of modernity will be explored
through the metaphor of Finn’s condition and the blinkers. The trauma of
transinstitutionalisation will be explored through the allegory of Lorne,
specifically: the island and the whale as representative of isolation; the threat of
crabs, water and disappearance; and intergenerational and inherited trauma.
‘Everything felt like too much’: The surfeit of Finn’s condition
Finn is the embodiment of narcotic modernity, as it has been outlined in the
early chapters of this thesis; his life is an assault of memory and information.
Within the text, each of Finn’s recollections is italicised to distinguish them,
stylistically, from his present experience. However, his memories nonetheless
impose themselves on his consciousness, both interrupting and challenging his
ability to be present (or, indeed, to experience). He busies himself with the
endless task of returning lost objects, but whatever escape he finds in this labour
is short-lived; his memory always finds him:
Finn had a fleeting moment of peace, but he was a tram and two busses from
home and there was nothing left in his pockets to return. His hands felt
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heavy. He barely made it to the corner before a memory came for him: his
grandmother (May 18, 2006), pulling a cinnamon teacake from the oven to
find it had sunk in the middle. “Let me make another,” she’d said, as he’d
cut them both thick slices and they’d sat on the porch and eaten it, still
warm. The cake was soft in the centre and crunchy on top and the salt from
the melted butter lingered on Finn’s tongue each time he swallowed. “Let
me do it over,” she kept saying, even as he took great, greedy bites. “I can
do better.” (p. 15)
For Finn, the onslaught of unwelcome memory is so disorientating that he has
developed strategies to cope, ‘anchoring’ to objects and counting backwards
from 20 to ‘awaken’ himself into the present:
Finn thought he knew what the officer meant but he asked anyway, to be
sure, fishing in his pocket for something to anchor to, anything to disrupt the
memory of Maeve’s tiny body flailing on the dirty platform floor. 20. 19.
18. (p. 37)
He also navigates his own compassion fatigue, avoiding as many of the burdens
and shocks of trauma as he can to protect himself from traumatic moments’
inevitable memory. This is, in part, why (with the exception of Maeve) he
detests the blinkers; he anticipates his memory of them, knows he will be
haunted by their pain and longing. When he knocks over a blinker in the
chemist, “[h]e tried not to look at her face as she went down—another awful
thing to remember” (p. 45). For Finn, the relentless onslaught of memory is
profoundly alienating and debilitating. Eventually, in much the same way
narcotic modernity affects citizens of the techno-aesthetic, Finn’s condition
impedes his ability to process information, to protect his sense of self, to be
empathetic to others and to experience within the moment. For him, “There was
no space to think, only to feel, and everything felt like too much” (p. 87).
‘People who were already half-gone’: Dopastal and memory addiction
Within the metaphor of the blinkers, TMA pathologises the modern obsession
with memory. The blinkers’ reality is—temporally, territorially but also
ideologically—not a distant leap from ours: a world in which social media is
tasked with memorialising (and aestheticising) even the most personal moments,
privileging the act of commemoration over that of experience. In the modern
techno-aesthetic, even the act of perception is mediated through a screen; the
constant urge to document is a kind of personal historicism and, not dissimilar to
Benjamin’s criticisms of a broader historicism, this record-keeping of our own
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histories also fixes the past as static images, preventing alternative perceptions
and readings of our memories. We are in danger of idealising the past, like
Maeve, who upon returning to her childhood (p. 36) found it changed: “All those
years of trying to get back there, to the day of the pudding, and it wasn’t a
pudding at all. Just toast and jam—a simple, ordinary meal pushed out by some
other day’s memory.” Journalist Charlie Lyne (2016) characterises the current
zeitgeist as “an age of nostalgia” (n.p.), and certainly the proliferation of pop
culture remakes, fashion throwbacks and music re-releases (even the popularity
of cosmetic surgery, which is a re-making of oneself in the image of a past self,
an attempt to reverse the personal passage of time to reclaim lost youth) suggests
a cultural movement towards romanticisation of and escapism into the past.
Indeed, some suggest (Bradic 2015, n.p.) there is even a “new nostalgia” where
memories and moments are filtered, blurred and edited on social media to appear
instantly aged, and past photos, memories and moments are re-shared and
revised before they have the chance to grow fuzzy with time.
Of course, in TMA it is the blinkers who are most overtly affected by the lure of
the past. For Maeve, her memory addiction is a persistent hunger that she
struggles to articulate or understand: “It was a feeling that came from
somewhere deep and urgent and it was there all the time: when she collected
cans to sell for coins or washed her hair in the station bathroom sink” (p. 22).
She is not alone—the rate at which the addiction has taken hold of the fictional
city is evidence that in the world of the novel, the collective consciousness is
yearning for a lost past:
[N]ow there were hordes of them looking for black-market Dopa to relive
days they wanted to have over again or revisit people they’d lost. Once they
were hooked, the past became more real than the present and they found
themselves stuck in strange cycles of time—loops and repetitions. It was
hard to watch. (p. 19)
Maeve knows that she is reviled for her addiction: “She could see the way the
pharmacist was looking at her. It was the way everyone looked at you when your
shame and pain and weakness were written all over your body” (p. 16).
However, the yearning for the past that defines the blinkers is present, even in
characters who have never taken Dopastal. Mr Moores, who breaks down when
his dead dog’s collar is returned to him and who cannot bear to smell his wife’s
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perfume, knows something of the past’s pull, as do ‘the Hunters’ who return to
the Lost and Found in search of unremarkable lost objects. Finn finds the same
yearning lying dormant inside him. He acknowledges a kinship with Maeve’s
addiction early in the novel: “[S]ometimes, when he caught her reflection in the
shopfront windows, there was something there in Maeve he recognized. Her
longing. Which was worse than loss, in a way, because there was nowhere to put
it” (p. 19). If the plight of the blinkers is an uncomfortable one it is perhaps
because it is only their tremors and baldness that separate them from us; their
longing for a past they have been separated from is almost certainly, in
moments, desperately familiar.
‘Forsaken far-away place’: Lorne Island as embodiment of trauma
Just as it is for us, in the grip of the techno-aesthetic, the act of witness is not
easy for Finn; in fact, even Lana seeks distance from her own experience. The
first thing she does when she arrives at Lorne is to aestheticise her experience,
establishing psychic distance from her unfolding trauma:
…the moment Lana saw the mouldy walls and peeling blue door without a
lock, she realised what she’d done. She’d washed up in another
underfunded shithole, lonelier and further away than any of them. She’d
made a mistake. And now all she could do was tap her finger against her
thigh and say a number under her breath.
It was an old trick, as stupid as it was inadequate, but the tapping and the
counting made things feel far away, like they had already happened, and
Lana needed that. Even in this forsaken far-away place where women could
disappear, she needed distance. (p. 85)
It is not only tapping and numbering that provide distance; Lana’s entire
experience (and memory, as perceived through Finn) of Lorne House is veiled in
the allegory of the Island of Lorne, affording her, Finn and the reader (as
intimate-distant witness) some protection from the psychic shock of her reality.
This section will examine how the allegorical thread of Lorne embodies the
punctual and structural traumas of transinstitutionalisation through its
exploration of isolation and entrapment and its depictions of the threats against
the women (specifically embodied through the crabs and the rising water).
‘An ocean in between’: Isolation and entrapment
There is much about Lorne that is unpleasant. The derelict lighthouse is filthy
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and Lana must share the overcrowded room (and her clothes, time and privacy).
And yet, while Lana initially perceives her arrival on the island as frightening, it
is not overtly dangerous—indeed, it is the isolation of Lorne that is its most
pressing menace. Lorne’s remoteness is the factor that invites all the other
dangers into the women’s lives. Thus, the allegory of the island allows the
burden of isolation to be a central character in the lives of the five women who
are trapped within a system they are unable to break free of.
The island’s dangerous remoteness is, perhaps, most clearly illustrated through
the broken telephone. When she first sees it, Lana rushes towards it, clamouring
for “the comfort of the dial tone” (p. 102) but the phone has been out of order
for years. Instead of a safety net or a line to salvation, the telephone-line-tonowhere is simply a reminder of all the ways the women of Lorne are cut off
from the world. They cannot call the police when Joanne goes missing, cannot
plead for help when Therese dies. Lana cannot call Teddy, or even know when
he will arrive. They are adrift; they have only each other to rely on, and even
amongst each other they cannot give voice to the things they are going through.
And so, the phone becomes a place for Lana to pour her grief and yearning, a
way to mourn what she has lost or is losing: “[T]here was something comforting
about being able to whisper into the hollow phone line the things she couldn’t
say: that she missed Jo, that she hoped she was alright. That she was scared” (p.
145). When she speaks into the phone, Lana does not expect an answer; indeed,
therein lies the trauma of her isolation, she knows that help will not arrive. “Late
at night, she’d sneak out, and sometimes she’d call Teddy and sometimes she’d
call Jo and sometimes she’d call Maeve, never expecting an answer, just looking
for a place she could whisper into the void. “Come back” (p. 156). The
women’s seclusion at Lorne reflects that of boarding houses. As one community
organisation worker describes them (in Drake, p. 163), boarding houses were
(and, in some instances, still are) places where help does not always arrive, even
when residents have access to services and communication:
Abuse is prevalent but no one will go to the police station… I remember
once talking about a person who had been assaulted and the police officer
said, “of course they can come up to the police station and they can bring
the manager with them”. But we said, “what if it is the manager”? … No
one will ever report it to the police. Even when you say I will move you
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today and you don’t have to go back ever, I’ll arrange for your stuff to be
packed. They’re community-institutionalised.
On Lorne, the burden of the island’s remoteness is two-fold: the residents cannot
call for help, and they cannot leave. At one point Teddy confirms that Lana is
financially beholden to Lorne’s distant and mysterious structures (there is no
person responsible for her entrapment, only a system). However, it is not money
that is the real barrier to her escape (as things become worse on the island, she
would surely leave, whatever it cost her)—it is the ocean. The women’s isolation
and distance, the great body of water they’d have to swim through to find
themselves back in the worlds they inhabited before entering the fish traps
(“That’s what everyone who’d been inside the system called them—fish traps.
Places that were easy to enter and almost impossible to leave” [p. 86]) is
prohibitive. The women don’t have the tools to navigate the distance to the
outside world and, although Nancy risks swimming away, her chances of
making it back to the mainland structures of community are slim. Moreover, the
women operate under the impression that they have chosen their imprisonment
on Lorne. They have made choices: “It might not have been a real choice, but
they’d given her a piece of paper and she’d circled a name and now there was
an ocean in between her and the one person who could help her” (p. 92). Such
is Lana’s internalised sense of responsibility for her own circumstances—she is,
in her own mind, the cause of her own misfortune. When Therese calls her a
jinx, she agrees—what reason does she have to think otherwise? As she sees it,
“[p]eople who were lucky didn’t end up in places like this” (p. 90).
The other pervasive reminder of the women’s isolation is the narrative of the
whale. Maeve lends this thread a sense of narrative urgency when she tells Finn,
right before she dies: “It was the whale… The whale killed her” (p. 39). It is not
until Teddy arrives, to spin stories, that the motif of whale reappears; in the
heavy aftermath of Jo’s disappearance, ‘Finnian’ the lonely whale carries a
melancholy weight for Maeve and especially Lana. Teddy says (p. 147):
See, the reason we can hear Finnian is the same reason other whales can’t.
He calls out at 52 Hertz and most whales sing much, much lower. They
don’t recognise his voice. So he’s out there somewhere in the deepest
oceans calling, over and over, looking for a mate or a friend—an answer.
But he’s never met another whale. Some days he must wonder if he’s the
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only whale on earth.39
Finn spends much of the novel trying to determine the cause of Lana’s death—
what is the ‘whale’, the force that killed her? He wonders if it is Teddy—“bad
things that seem like a good things” (p. 155)—or his own birth. But the answer
the text points to is borne, also, of the isolation of Lorne. It is the loneliness that
kills Lana. She is not able to call for help—she is unable to call for anything.
She is not heard. She cannot voice her secrets and fears, and she knows that, if
the water or the island claims her, her story will disappear too. On Lorne,
anything can be forgotten or buried or rewritten. In isolation, things can happen,
and at the same time—if the official record is to be believed—can not-happen.
As the next section will discuss, some happenings, officially, can never have
happened at all.
“Wondering which part of herself to protect first”: Crabs, water, disappearing
On Lana’s first night at Lorne, there is an invasion. The cabin is overrun by tiny
crabs, crawling over everything, scuttling towards the women in their beds as
Lana’s body reacts, screaming, before she has registered her own fear:
The ground was alive with legs, a sea of something—it was too dark to see
what they were but the not-seeing was worse because Lana could feel them
scuttling.
…She tried to cover her arms and ears and eyes, wondering which part of
herself to protect first, but she didn’t have enough hands. She screamed
again, then forced herself into desperate silence, because the animals—
whatever they were—were on her cheek, crawling up her face, and she
didn’t want anything to go in her mouth. (p. 103)
Like trauma, the terror of the crabs survives the moment—it endures, long after
the crabs are gone. Lana and the other women cannot stop scratching, checking
their beds and limbs for phantom crabs, feeling remembered legs scuttling on
their bodies. That night, the women lose their only lightbulb and Lana’s bed—
sacrifices they can ill afford—and in the darkness that follows it also becomes
apparent that the women’s sense of safety has been taken from them as well.
Suddenly, the lighthouse door feels flimsy.
The women steel themselves for threats they see as inevitable. Therese cloaks
39

This story, like all of Teddy’s tall tales, is grounded in truth. Bellamy’s anecdotes are also true.
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herself in layers of underwear, pantyhose and clothing to protect herself from
sexual assault. Nancy faces the world with defensive anger; Lana notices that
when she waves her pale arms “the light caught a series of scars running all the
way up to her elbows, and wasn’t that always the way? People didn’t get mean
on their own” (p. 89). Maeve gives Lana a coveted pair of underwear, urging her
friend to use them to get Teddy to rescue her. The women protect themselves in
whatever limited ways they can, but on Lorne—as is the case for so many
women who are assaulted, abused, threatened or coerced in transinstitutions—
nowhere is private and nowhere is safe. The burden of trauma is not only the
memory of what has happened, it is also the knowledge what might happen, and
the ongoing threats to the women are intimate, personal—it is their homes, their
bodies, even their minds that are not safe. They are vulnerable in the spaces that
should be the most secure. They are forced to share their possessions but that is
not the worst of it. Not only do the women have almost nothing that is their own,
on Lorne, there is nothing that cannot be taken away.
The trauma of personal insecurity is also embodied within the other recurring
threat to the women: the rising water. It is a threat that appears more gradually
than the crabs. At first, the ocean is simply a hungry force at the edge of Lana’s
consciousness, but gradually it grows into a formidable presence. When Jo
disappears, Lana becomes frightened of the sea—“she held on tight, because
anything could be snatched away in the darkness. Even you” (p. 202)—and
gradually, the ocean colonises the lighthouse. The carpet grows soggy, never
drying out, and water seeps in until it is a cold, thick layer Lana must wade
through on the way to bed. With every trauma, the ocean grows stronger, closer,
more threatening—misfortune compounds, and Lana begins to fear not just the
things that might happen, but also what might not-happen.
It is, for the women, almost inevitable that they will disappear. On Lana’s first
day on Lorne, she describes Maeve as someone already dissolving: “She was so
thin and pale she seemed almost to be disappearing, except for a river of thick
red curls” (p. 88). After Jo’s disappearance, there is a sense of fatalism to how
the subsequent disappearances happen. They’re foretold, destined. Therese gives
voice to this:
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“There are a lot of ways a woman can disappear,” she said.
She said it quietly, but that only gave it more weight.
Lana had heard stories, too, the sort of things people whispered because
they were too terrible to say out loud. Stories about women who’d been
beaten until you couldn’t tell who they were anymore, women who were
traded for money. Women who got dragged down by pills or drugs or booze,
women who were edited out of photo albums and family stories.
(p. 121)
The women are right to fear: they vanish, sometimes in plain sight. They
disappear, and then they disappear again from their own histories, because the
nature of their circumstances is such that their lives and dangers and deaths go
unnoticed—there is no one to raise the alarm when things go wrong and no one
to record what has happened to them. It is little wonder that Maeve and Lana’s
defiant instinct, in the face of the rising water, is to scratch the disappeared
women’s names into the wall. In whatever ways they can, Maeve and Lana
commit Jo and Therese and Nancy’s names to some kind of public memory,
knowing there may be no one to memorialise them when they are gone.
The indignity of Lorne robs the women of their clothes and belongings and
safety; it also robs them of their sense of self, their assurance that their lives
matter. The allegory positions the trauma of transinstitutionalisation at an
intimate-distance so it may be witnessed. However, once again, the psychic
distance offered grows thinner as the novel unfolds. The structures that oppress
the women do not originate within the allegorical territory of Lorne. It is not the
not-here of Lorne that is responsible for the women’s invisibility and
disappearances; that callous disregard comes from somewhere much closer to
home. When Maeve disappears, it is in plain sight; in the throes of her addiction,
she becomes invisible. She says:
“They’re all gone, and now I’m lost. I’m the lost one, even though they all
disappeared. I can tell because my bones feel hollow and people look
through me.” It had happened this morning. A man had thrown a cigarette
butt that landed in her sweater, hadn’t even stopped to say sorry. (p. 25)
Intergenerational and inherited trauma
Although Finn initially believes that the island memories are his own, it soon
becomes apparent that his recollections of Lorne are, in fact, inherited. The first
clue that the visions he is ‘remembering’ are somatic memory—something
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coded into his body—is when Finn takes Bellamy’s synthetic drug and his body,
not his mind, responds:
His skin felt itchy and his teeth ached. His muscles and hair and breath
seemed to soften as if being dragged into the sand, like a Dali painting or the
box of choc-chip ice creams he’d left in the back of grandma’s car by
accident (January 19, 2005). Everything melted until they weren’t his
muscles or hair or breath. They were something else altogether. (pp. 99-100)
As Finn learns more about his mother’s experience, his body begins to take on
her trauma. Soon, it becomes difficult for him to identify the line between her
memories and his, her body and his: “It wasn’t just the desert that had crept
inside him. He could still feel the echoes of his mother’s body in his own and the
thought of it made him want to claw at his skin and scratch and scratch and
scratch until he was raw and new again” (p. 186). The narrative, via Bellamy,
justifies this through the science of inherited plant memory; however, in less
literal but nonetheless important ways, the notion of inherited memory—
particularly with respect to trauma—echoes the work of trauma theorists,
epigenetic scientists and feminist scholars, who argue that trauma can be passed
between generations. Traumatic inheritance is not merely mediated knowledge
or stories relayed to those who are born after; there may also be
transgenerational transmission of trauma (TTT) (see, for example, Kellerman
2013 and Hirsch 2002).
For Finn, the transmission of his mother’s trauma is a terrible burden, unbearable
on top of the weight of his own memory. However, his inherited memory of
Lana’s trauma isn’t fixed in the same way that historicism suspends the past in a
single vision. In cloaking her terrible reality in the allegory of the Island of
Lorne, Lana not only creates a sense of psychic distance for herself (and later for
Finn), she also makes space for more subversive interpretations of her history
and, perhaps, for more hopeful outcomes. Lana’s story isn’t only one of trauma;
there is kindness and friendship in it, and love. There is also agency and power.
She has fought back against Lorne’s greatest threat—her inevitable
disappearance into history and memory—and against the odds, she has cried out
across generations, to Finn, and is finally heard.
Empathic synaesthesia in The Memory Addicts
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While TMA explores the challenges and impediments to the act of witnessing
trauma (particularly within the context of narcotic modernity), it is nevertheless
an urgent call to witness. Just as Lana’s driving motivation is to be witnessed,
for Finn, the fact that he has witnessed his mother’s narrative is the redemptive
force that makes sense of all he has seen.
… late at night, sometimes, he wondered if Lana was the whale—she
certainly seemed lonely. She’d called and called and called. Now that Finn
had moved past his own grief and anger and loneliness, he could see hers, so
much bigger and more terrifying. All the times she’d whispered into a
broken telephone.
Maybe that was the worst of it—that he couldn’t answer. He couldn’t call
back across time. But somehow, 30 years too late, he’d heard her. It was
something. (p. 295)
Lana’s story isn’t just seen and heard. It is felt, in the same way the somatic is
privileged in TNWOT; Finn feels her trauma, her hope, her isolation and her
story. His connection to his mother’s memory is a somatic consciousness, one he
carries in his skin and his bones and his teeth. It begins with his early, vague
recollections, which situate themselves in his body:
He’d heard the phrase ‘under your skin’ 37 times but had never fully
understood the expression until now. That’s what the sunken-memory had
done: seeped inside his body, itchy and uncomfortable. And now it was
stretching him, changing the shape of his insides. He kept seeing the police
officer’s pen, still when it should have been writing down Maeve’s most
important details. We’re not supposed to lose people, that’s what Maeve had
said. Even after they’re gone, we’re supposed to carry them in our minds
and our bodies and the things we say about them. And she might have been
broken, but Finn knew—in his hands and his skin and his eyelids—that she
was right. The photo of his mother felt rigid in his pocket, like a ticket.
Someone should hear or see or know what had happened to her, Finn kept
thinking. Someone should carry her, and the only person left to do that was
him. (p. 43)
Later, it is Finn’s body that understands what his mother has gone through. Her
experience leaks into his somatic consciousness, the italics of her narrative
bleeding into his thoughts and perceptions:
His cheek throbbed; he could see blood out of the corner of his eye and the
pain of it mixed with her pain, Lana’s. It was searing. It came in waves but
even between the waves it hurt. It echoed through every part of her—her
stomach and her legs, the palms of her hands. Her tongue. All of it hurt. (p.
216)
Her pain reverberates through Finn, the way “her body was small and tired and
every inch of it felt battered, mistreated by the injustice of all of it (p. 217) and
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the way “[e]verything hurt, but it could always hurt more, and now it did” (p.
222). Finn feels her experience, although not necessarily in the same way. His
pain is a referred pain, synaesthetic. And through Finn, the reader—as intimatedistant witness—is invited into Lorne, too, protected by the allegorical distance
of the island but linked through somatic connection. Lana’s experience of the
boarding house can invade the reader’s sense-consciousness, paving the way not
only for witness but for synaesthetic empathy. Her loneliness and isolation, the
gradual destruction of self, the threat of the rising water and the scurrying of the
crabs, her growing sense of invisibility: these can echo so much further than the
not-here and not-now of Lorne, can reflect the here and now of our world, which
is responsible for the women’s traumas.
Similarly, the blinkers’ hunger for their own pasts is more familiar than it is
foreign, while Finn’s sense of overwhelm is not difficult to relate back to the
now. The near, not-quite-now of the city is tenuous psychic protection because
the thematic world of the novel is not remote at all. TMA reflects a world very
like the dark corners of our own. Perhaps, like Maeve and Finn, the intimatedistant witness can feel the threat of narcotic modernity, can harness, via
empathic synaesthesia, their own sense-consciousness to sound their own bodily
warnings. Maeve certainly senses danger:
She had it all now, almost everything she wanted, but the sense of anguish
was still there. A sheen of sweat stuck her clothes to her skin and she tried
to pretend she hadn’t noticed what was happening. The sweats—Curly
called them the lathers. She had always wondered if they were real, but now
her body had its own answer: a hammering heartbeat, telling her she was
running out of time. (pp. 24-25)
I hope the reader—as intimate-distant witness—can sense the danger too.
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Conclusion
… we need books that affect us like a calamity, that pain us very much
like the death of someone we loved better than ourselves, or as if we
were abandoned in a forest far from all people, or like a suicide; a book
should be an axe for the frozen sea within us. This I believe.
— Franz Kafka40
In TMA, it is Bellamy who best understands the burdens of surfeit. He is well
acquainted with the extremes of neuroscience, the fine line that connects and
separates the bounty of too-much from the poverty of not-enough. While so
many others interpret Finn’s infinite personal recall as a gift, Bellamy sees it for
what it is—a painful weight:
There was a look people got when they were at the edge of things. Bellamy
had seen it before, back when he was researching Alzheimer’s patients, and
he saw it now in the poor guy’s slumped shoulders and heavy gait. Maybe it
was strange to compare the two phenomena, the remembering and the
forgetting, but from a scientific perspective, extremes were much closer
together than most people realised. (p. 54)
Bellamy’s understanding of surfeit is not only professional; it is also personal.
Later, when he is confronted by the memory of someone blessing his nowamnesiac daughter with spontaneity, he is “suddenly and wholly uprooted by the
memory … Too much of anything was a curse” (p. 76).
And yet, here we are. Cursed with the persistent too-muchness of narcotic
modernity—drowning, like Finn, in a deluge of news and information and
updates and notifications, all of it packaged and meditated and aestheticised.
Within the modern techno-aesthetic, narratives disguise their origins,
information does not survive the moment, the phantasmagoria of modernity with
all its noise and screens and lights alienates and numbs us. We speak now of
infobesity, infotoxication, information anxiety; it is no wonder that context,
empathy and experience are in short supply. It has taken seven years, part-time,
to write this thesis and the techno-aesthetic Buck-Morss investigated in the
40
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1990s—which seemed both relentless and ubiquitous from my initial vantage
point of 2012—seems to grow more powerful with each passing month. The
memory crisis I set out to explore has heightened, while our collective capacity
to make sense of the world around us has been simultaneously diminished.
So I return to the question—increasingly fraught, increasingly urgent: How do
we experience, witness and remember within the sensory deluge, shock and
surfeit of modernity? Are there alternative ways to narrate and witness traumatic
histories? And, if so, do alternative modes of remembering offer alternative
opportunities for empathic engagement with trauma? Does fiction, specifically
allegory, offer enough distance from true events to allow an overloaded audience
to connect more deeply with others’ trauma and to commit events to experience
and memory? Can the simultaneous distance and closeness of allegory offer
pathways to empathic engagement with history and trauma?
The answer I have returned with is the concept of empathic synaesthesia—and
this is, I argue, a somatic consciousness, a form of critical cognition that, as
Buck-Morss suggests, can be trusted politically. Against the current crisis of
modernity, I believe the act of experience is worth fighting for, and that the
(somatic) connection and (territorial and temporal distance) of allegory allows us
to engage, as intimate-distant witnesses (a conception original to this thesis) in
narratives that sit outside the shock-inducing cycles of news and information.
While I recognise that this thesis is limited to discussion of three allegorical
texts (The Tiger’s Wife, The Natural Way of Things and The Memory Addicts), I
offer these ideas in hopes that the frameworks I have generated may extend to
other allegorical narratives, permitting new conceptions of allegory as a means
of engagement with traumatic history and unfolding events, without activating
the shock reflexes that might hinder experience and memory. Allegory, as
embodiment of both punctual and structural trauma, appeals not to intellect but
to the body. It demands somatic connection. I revisit Buck-Morss:
The critical power of art, or any cultural form, may not be perceived
universally, but if it is perceived, it hits you in the gut. Now this somatic
experience resists predatory reason, precisely because it can’t be stomached,
gobbled up by the mind. If experience leaves a nondigestable residue that
won’t go away, that is food for critical cognition. (in Kester 1997, pp. 43116

44)
And indeed, the texts I have drawn on in this thesis do leave a ‘nondigestable
residue’, an impact that survives the deluge of modernity and the hamster-wheel
of the news cycle. Long after The Tiger’s Wife concludes, there is opportunity for
the reader’s thoughts to return to Galina, which is perhaps still haunted by the
ghost of a lonely tiger and generations of unresolved violence and trauma. In The
Natural Way of Things, long after the girls have left the prison, there remains a
doll, scarred by everything they have been through and all that is still to come.
And The Memory Addicts leaves, perhaps, the echo of crabs scuttling around on
flesh, a residue of rising water that seeps into everything until nowhere (and
nothing) is safe. The novels are, I contend, an experience and indeed one that
achieves the weight of consciousness: Erlebnis. Moreover, in the intimatedistance of their allegories, the texts connect readers, as witnesses, through the
somatic language of allegory. They can thus elicit (in Buck-Morss’ words, again):
“empathy, rather than sympathy, because it is capable of producing solidarity with
those who are not part of our own group, who do not share our collective identity”
(p. 40). The intimate-distant witness’ empathy is indirect—it is referred pain,
referred sensation, sensed in one place but felt in another. Nevertheless, my
concept of empathic synaesthesia is powerful because it does not equate the
experience of the reader, as intimate-distant witness, with that of those giving
testimony; that is, it does not confuse the representation with the experience. In
this respect, this thesis also addresses some of the challenges of trauma theory: the
challenges of representation, the cost of giving testimony to trauma, the barriers to
witness and the call for the expansion of application of trauma to the narratives of
structural as well as punctual traumas. I hope to build on this in future research,
and perhaps to apply the concept of empathic synaesthesia to other allegorical
narratives.
Just as the literature of the body—medicine, science, neuroscience—has grounded
my theoretical approach to this thesis, situating this discussion in the somatic
implies opportunities for further research. It is my hope that interdisciplinary
studies in neuroscience and psychology expand the work currently being done to
assess the physical impact of literature on the brain and body. We may turn, also,
to the literature on the condition of synaesthesia itself to consider future
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applications of the concepts I have discussed here.
There is a kind of poetry to the way synaesthetes describe their perceptive
experience. One sight/sound synaesthete (‘RP’, in Cytowic, p. 18) says:
It’s definitely colors, but I’m not sure that ‘‘seeing’’ is the most accurate
description. I am seeing, but not with my eyes, if that makes sense.
I love my colors, can’t imagine being without them. One of the things I love
about my husband are [sic] the colors of his voice and his laugh. It’s a
wonderful golden brown, with a flavor of crisp, buttery toast, which sounds
very odd, I know, but it is very real.
Another synaesthete (‘MD’ in Cytowic, p. 27), who had restricted vision from
birth and was completely blind by the time she entered college, said:
For as long as I can remember, each letter of the Braille alphabet has had an
assigned color, and that color has never changed. Some letters seem to emit
light or, perhaps, to reflect light from another source.
The synaesthetic condition is multimodal and concurrent; where anaesthesia is
“no sensation”, synaesthesia is a “joined or coupled sensation”, two perceptions
that exist together (Cytwoic, p. 2), a form of sense-consciousness that not only
permits but actively encourages recognition of the differences in our experiences
and perceptions. Sagiv (p. 7) suggests “[s]ynesthesia also brings a message of
diversity; reminding us that we do not all see the world the same way”. Moreover,
unlike the modern anaesthetic, which overloads the senses, the multimodal
synaesthetic experience is not overwhelming, it is simply the “normal texture of
reality” (p. 12) for those with the condition, a contradictory multimodal
experience that need not be reconciled. One synaesthete says:
It is not a hallucination but it is hard for me to describe. As I look at a page,
I see the colors there even though I see the color of the real ink that’s before
me. I know it isn’t there for real, but I still can’t help seeing it. There is still
a sensation that the color is there.
I can’t remember when I didn’t have it. It’s not something that I do. It
happens all by itself. Letters and colors seems exactly as they are since
forever. (in Cytowic, p. 36)
Visual arts scholar Regine Rapp (2016, p. 53), drawing also on neuroscientist
Hinderk Emrich, says the concept’s value in the field of contemporary art is its
transmodality—it is a means of “creating processes” and it is never singular or
mono, “always trans, inter, syn”. Similarly, allegory can also be characterised as a
multimodal representation, where the signal and the signified can co-exist, can be
perceived at the same time. W. J. T. Mitchell calls it “a paradoxical trick of
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consciousness, an ability to see [something] as both ‘there’ and ‘not there’ at the
same time” (1986, p. 17). And indeed, the reader of allegory—as intimate-distant
witness—can inhabit two places and two chronologies at once. They can be
immersed in the not-here, not-now of Obreht’s allegorical world—Galina, a
village where a tiger has taken a wife—while cognizant of what the allegory
signifies: the historical trauma of the Balkan wars. They can experience the
synaesthetic trauma the Hardings women undergo in the not-quite-here, not-quitenow world of TNWOT, simultaneously aware that the structural traumas the
characters are oppressed by originate in a world very much like our own. The
reader, as intimate-distant witness, can experience the structural and punctual
trauma of transinstitutionalisation from the comforting psychic-distance of the
allegory of the Island of Lorne, which is palpably elsewhere, not-here, and yet so
vague and nebulous that it could-be-here (or could-be-somewhere-like-here).
My use of the term ‘experience’ is, again, intentional. The territorial and temporal
distance (and indeed, the personal distance of not-me) offered by the allegorical
threads in each of these novels enables readers to engage in the act of experience
and witness, without engaging the shock defences that disrupt experience and
impede memory. As they are depicted in the texts, the traumatic events the
allegories seek to represent are both urgent and timeless, distant and proximate.
At an intimate-distance, narratives of punctual and structural trauma (which may,
when presented in the form of news and information, be relegated to the lesser
impression of Erfahrung—scrolled past, sped through, passed over) are instead
elevated to Erlebnis. The body’s critical consciousness is engaged, and through
their embodiment in allegory, the trauma can be sensed. The narrative events
become a ‘moment that has been lived’ by the reader, one that can be consciously
remembered—memorie volontaire.
Of course, the central limitation of this thesis is that the act of witness is only the
beginning. The traumatic histories I invoked in the introduction (South Africa, the
Algerian war, genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, Syria, Myanmar, South
Sudan, Nauru, Afghanistan, Somalia, West Papua and so many others) and the
many structural traumas (of race, gender, poverty, sexuality, disability, climate,
displacement and so many others) demand more than witness. They demand
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memory and action, commitments to a better future. However, the act of witness
is our first, foundational, moral obligation. And, against the backdrop of narcotic
modernity, the ability to experience—even synaesthetically—the traumatic
narratives of others (especially those who are not like us) is not to be
underestimated. That we may invest in the not-here, not-now, not-me narratives of
allegory as if they are indeed here, now, ours, while protecting ourselves from the
alienating forces of shock, is a kind of awakening from Buck-Morss’ modern
anaesthetic. I admit that this seems like a small act of resistance in the face of the
ubiquitous, powerful techno-aesthetic. However, perhaps in this instance, even a
little is enough. After all, the opposite of numbing is not deluge—it is sensation.
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